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CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION: SYMPATHY AND SITUATION            On thy wild banks, by frequent torrents worn,              No glittering fanes, or marble domes appear,           Yet shall the mournful Muse thy course adorn,              And still to her thy rustic waves be dear.           For with the infant Otway, lingering here,              Of early woes she bade her votary dream,           While thy low murmurs soothed his pensive ear,              And still the poet‐‐‐consecrates the stream.           Beneath the oak and birch that fringe thy side,              The first‐born violets of the year shall spring;           And in thy hazels, bending o'er the tide,              The earliest Nightingale delight to sing:           While kindred spirits, pitying, shall relate          Thy Otway's sorrows, and lament his fate!        Charlotte Smith, Sonnet XXVI “To the River Arun,”                   Elegiac Sonnets, 1784  Charlotte  Smith’s  collection,  Elegiac  Sonnets,  was  a  success  both  for  its sales—allowing  Smith  to  buy  her  husband  out  of  debtor’s  prison,  where  she  had been  living  with  him—and  for  its  literary  influence;  Coleridge  and  Wordsworth were  both  influenced  by  her  program of  capturing  a moment  of  passion  in  verse. Her  twenty‐sixth  sonnet  is  simultaneously  an  ode  to  pathos  and  homage  to  the restoration  dramatist,  Thomas  Otway.  In  the  poem  she  identifies  Otway  as  an antecedent and “kindred spirit”  to whom she  is connected by the  flow of  the river Arun, with  its “wild banks” and “frequent torrents,” phrases that suggest effects of passion and  imply  that  the  river  connecting Otway and Smith  is  a metaphor  for  a shared pathetic strain in their work.  In the preface to the first and second editions 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of  her Elegiac  Sonnets,  Smith makes  an  appeal  to  a  small,  inclusive  crowd  that  is similar to the description of the sympathetic, “pitying” group with which she closes the  twenty‐sixth  sonnet  and  portrays  herself  a  pathetic  figure,  like  the  sorrowful Otway:   Some very melancholy moments have been beguiled, by expressing in      verse the sensations those moments brought. Some of my friends,      with partial indiscretion, have multiplied the copies they procured of      several attempts, till they found their way into the prints of the day in      a mutilated state; which concurring with other circumstances,        determined me to put them into their present form. I can hope for      readers only among the few, who to sensibility of heart join simplicity      of taste.   In  order  to  cultivate  a  sympathetic  audience  in  the  face  of  the  challenge  of  the anonymous distribution of print, Charlotte Smith  fashions herself a pitiable  figure, victimized by publication, her poems, themselves her own sensations “mutilated” by the process. Smith’s location of antecedence in Otway, rather than in a fellow poet, gets  at  the  theatricality  of  her  own  performance,  showing  how  little  different  in many  respects  the  situation  of  the  dramatist  and  the  author  of  a  collection  of sonnets.  Smith  creates  a  persona  that  is  a  pathetic  figure  like  the  sympathetic characters  of  Otway’s  plays.  The  poet,  Smith,  is  like  the  suffering  protagonist  of 
Venice  Preserv’d,  Jaffeir,  oppressed  by  systems;  Smith  is  caught  in  the  system  of print, in which the author is alienated from her audience.   This  brief  glance  at  Charlotte  Smith  illustrates  the  central  issues  of  the present study, capturing the convergence of  three apparently disparate  topics:  the issue of character in Restoration and eighteenth‐century drama; the manipulation of authorial personae  in  the print market of  the Romantic period;  and  the history of sympathy  in  the  long  eighteenth  century.  I  hope  to  demonstrate  now,  that  these 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three fields of inquiry are related. The passage from Smith above already begins to show the degree to which authors of the Romantic period were engaged in a kind of theatrical  fashioning  of  the  self  as  a  character  that  was  indebted  to  eighteenth‐century  dramaturgy.  In  turn  I will  show  that  eighteenth‐century  dramatists  could only have been helpful to Romantic writers because they too were concerned with engaging and manipulating a  changing public. And  sympathy was  the principal by which  both  eighteenth‐century  dramatists  and  Romantic  essayists  engaged  their audiences. With the concept of sympathy comes a way of understanding both what is at stake in such engagements, and how they were achieved. This study primarily examines  the  adaption of  sympathy  to  eighteenth‐century dramaturgy  in  order  to meet the challenges of a changing public.    My  study  enters  by  addressing  the  question  of  character  in  eighteenth‐century drama.  I will argue  that  the question of character  is about negotiating  the relation of  the  subjectivity of  an  individual  spectator  to  the voice of  the public. At issue  is  affective  judgment  and  the  location  of  epistemological  authority,  ergo, judging character rather than the depiction of realistic character is the real issue. This  study  looks  at  Pathetic  Drama  alongside  contemporary  changes  in  thinking about  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  the  attendant  changes  in  thinking  about  the relation  of  self  to  the  material  world.  Empiricism  and  aesthetics  hold  that knowledge and judgment come from sense experience; but both fields make moves to  replace  subjective experience with objective  truth. As  science uses  induction  to make particular sense experience objective knowledge, so generic form represents an  attempt  to  standardize  aesthetic  judgment.  In  both  cases  the  particular 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experiences of  individuals are abandoned  for  the sake of objectivity. Paradoxically this  devalues  the  individual  sense  experience  purported  to  be  the  basis  of  these fields  of  knowledge.  At  the  same  time,  the  individual  subject’s  sense  of  what Habermas  calls  “saturated  interiority”  is  threatened  by  the  increasing  social importance  of  public  opinion.  Pathetic  Drama  sought  to  engage  its  audience sympathetically,  offering  a  way  of  maintaining  the  particularities  of  subjective experience  by  emphasizing  the  situational  nature  both  of  selves  and  of  affective judgment and resisting the objectifying tendency of formal conventions. By creating an aesthetic  experience  that  is  simultaneously private  and  shared, pathetic drama negotiates the tension between the spectator’s simultaneous desires for interiority and membership  in  the public sphere. This placed Pathetic Drama  in  line with  the doctrine  of  moral  sense  philosophers  like  Shaftesbury,  Frances  Hutcheson,  and Adam  Smith  who  sought  to  ease  the  tension  between  individual  and  public  by rendering the division between them permeable.    In answer to the question of character I propose that character is functional rather  than  representational.  The  function  of  character  is  broken  into  two conceptual  elements:  a  pathetic  figure,  and  situation.  The  pathetic  figure  offers  a way of understanding character as a  rhetorical device  that appeals  to  the pathetic concern of spectators. Situation represents arrangement of action versus the driving force of genre, which represents the dominance of public response over that of the individual.  The  distance  between  figure  and  situation  is  manipulated  in  order  to maintain  particularity  in  the  face  of  systemic  induction  and  to  achieve  a  kind  of sympathy aligned with the privileging of spectatorial judgment. 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 By  focusing  on  figure  and  situation,  this  project  attempts  to  explain  the nature  and  significance  of  pathetic  engagement  between  theatre  audiences  and theatrical performances1  in the eighteenth century: what do the assumptions from which  dramatists  formulated  strategies  for  enacting  these  engagements  reveal about contemporary understandings of the nature of the self, and what role may the experience of being engaged with theatrical performances have had in shaping the audience  members’  conceptions  of  self;  dramatic  engagement  stands  to  tell  us something  about  the  relation  of  individual  to  public.2  This  study  will  look specifically at the way a kind of English drama, a precursor of sensibility, in the long eighteenth century sought  to engage  its audience  through pathos, how this sort of engagement  was  depicted  on  stage  in  the  relationships  between  characters,  and how these sorts of engagements and relationships suggested models of subjectivity.  
Groundwork for an alternative genealogy of sentimental drama     In  its  focus  on  the  development  of  a  pathetic  dramaturgy,  this  project contributes  to  our  understanding  of  the  long  eighteenth‐century  by  giving  a  new perspective  on  the  period’s  culture  of  sentiment.  The  invention  of  sentimental drama  has  traditionally  been  credited  to  Colley  Cibber  or  Richard  Steele,  both  of 
                                                        1  I  pursue  this  topic with  the  idea  in mind  that  a  text might  be  seen  as  a  kind  of performance  as  well,  and  that  the  present  examination  of  theatrical  engagement might serve to shed some light on the experience of reading down the road. 2 Jerome Christensen, in “Hume’s Social Composition”, Representations: Politics and 
Aesthetics, Fall, 1985. 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who  wrote  reformed  and  moralized  kinds  of  comedy.3  Cibber’s  and  Steele’s sentimental comedies, however, were part of a broader evolution in dramatic values that occurred in the late seventeenth‐century.  If the sentimental is characterized by moralizing,  emphasis  on  affective  judgment,  pathetic  scenes,  and  sympathetic engagement4, then the pathetic tragedy that emerged in the 1680’s played a key role in bringing  important elements of  the sentimental  to  the stage. An alternative and more complex genealogy of sentimental dramaturgy that considers the development of  pathetic  tragedy  from  the  1680’s  onward  demonstrates  how  the contemporaneous  philosophical  reflection  on  questions  of  sympathy  bear  on  our critical  understandings  of  the  birth  of  the  genre.  The  generic  confusion  that surrounds sentimental drama leads to a tendency to equate sentimental drama with sentimental  comedy, which not only  assigns Richard Steele’s The Conscious Lovers an  especially  prominent  place  in  the  development  of  the  eighteenth‐century’s culture of sensibility, but also leads to a misapprehension of the roles of pathos and situation.  I  hold  with  Ernest  Bernbaum  in  The  Drama  of  Sensibility,  1915,  Eric Rothstein, in Restoration Tragedy: Form and the Process of Change, 1967, and Laura Brown  in, English Dramatic Form,  1981, who have demonstrated  that  the pathetic tragedies written by Lee, Banks, and Otway during the 1680’s set the foundation for sentimental  drama.  This  genealogy  leads  easily  however  to  a  problem  of terminology. The equation of  sentimental drama  in  such works as with  the mixed mode pioneered by Steele,  in a work  such as Sherbo’s English Sentimental Drama,                                                         3  See  for  instance  Ernest  Bernbaum’s  The  Drama  of  Sensibility,  1915,  and  Arthur Sherbo’s English Sentimental Drama, 1957. 4 These criteria are loosely based on those laid out by Sherbo. 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downplays  the centrality of pathos which,  in  the  field of drama, can be  traced  in a line  from  the  works  of  Otway  and  Banks,  to  Rowe,  and  Lillo,  and  finally  to  the melodrama of the late eighteenth century. Sympathetic engagement is the essence of sentimental drama; this plays out through a protagonist who stands as the person of the viewer on the stage, and this figure’s relationship with other characters models sympathy.5 Pathetic  drama  was  a  reaction  to  the  formalism  of  heroic  tragedy,  just  as sentimental comedy challenged the restoration comedy of manners. Both responded with a moralizing aim that anticipated the ideological principles of the moral sense philosophers  that  were  first  formulated  in  Francis  Hutcheson’s  writings  of  the 1720’s. In the earlier forms of restoration drama, passions and wit ran rampant over virtue; frenzied Almanzors slew, and witty Dorimants wooed all  in their path. This does not mean that restoration drama had no moral end, but if it did, it was cast by negative example, and most significant, the passions are played at odds with virtue.6 The sentimental forms of drama sought to tame the rampant passions displayed on the restoration stage and unite them with moral virtue. This  raises  the  rather  challenging  question:  why  should  the  passions suddenly find common cause with virtue? Writers have approached this question by                                                         5  In  Fatal  Desire,  2006,  Jean  Marsden  offers  what  is  the  only  extended  study dedicated solely to the examination of pathetic drama to date. She contends that the advent of pathetic drama coincides with the return of female actresses, particularly female bodies,  to  the  stage. The presence of  the  female body  creates  a mixture of sexual fascination and anxiety over the prospect of feminine transgression. 6 At any rate, its morals would have been different from those of sentimental drama. In Two­Edg’d Weapons Robert Markley argues that the comedy of manners sought to reinforce aristocratic ideologies. 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aligning  the  development  of  moral  sense  with  political  expediency.  Reinhardt Koselleck  attends  to  the  relationship  between  politics  and  ethics,  contending  in 
Critique  and  Crisis,  1959,  that  Hobbes  sought  to  realign  conscience  with  law, morality with politics  through reason. Conscience having become private morality as  it  was  alienated  from  the  state  under  absolutist  rule.  In  The  Passions  and  The 
Interests, 1977, Albert Hirschman argues that the management of the passions was a crucial political problem of  the seventeenth century and eighteenth centuries. The answer to which problem lay in setting the passions against each other. While glory seeking had hitherto been considered an accepted sort of  lust, aristocratic in ideal, having  replaced  church  ideology,  this  heroic  ideal  crumbled  under  the  weight  of Hobbes’s attention, as it was demonstrated to be merely a form of self‐preservation. Subsequently,  unruly  passions  were  kept  in  check  by  the  seemingly  harmless passion of interest in attaining worldly goods, an instance of private vice leading to public  good.  Victoria  Kahn  takes  a  different  angle  on  the  same  issue  in Wayward 
Contracts,  2004.  Rather  than  attending  exclusively  to  Hobbes’s  treatment  of vainglory,  Kahn  looks  at  the  response  to  the  problem  posed  by  self  interest,  i.e. breach  of  contract,  as  it  is  taken  up  in  royalist  literature,  which  proposed  an “affective basis for political obligation” in the form of sympathy.7 Taken collectively, these  accounts  construct  a  theoretical  frame  for  understanding  the  confluence  of passion  and  politics  from  which  pathetic  drama  emerged,  with  Kahn’s  work providing the closest parallel to the genre’s trajectory, which rejects the heroic ideal                                                         7  See  Koselleck,  Critique  and  Crisis,  pp  27‐35;  Hirschman,  The  Passions  and  The 
Interests; Kahn, Wayward Contracts, pp 224‐227. 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and  seeks  to  replace  it  with  affective  contract.8  While  the  political  approach  to understanding the alignment of passion and virtue offers a compelling explanation of the reasons for this new alignment, it does not demonstrate how it is carried out; for this we must turn to dramaturgy and to moral sense philosophy.   Eric  Rothstein  accounts  for  the  theoretical  evolution  of  pathetic  tragedy during  the  restoration  by  describing  the  simultaneous  influences  of  Cartesian physiology,  Hobbesian  psychology,  and  Aristotelian  dramatic  theory,  by  way  of France.  Prior  to  the  Restoration  there were  two  broad  explanations  of  the moral effect  of  tragedy.  The  first  of  these  explanations  Rothstein  calls  “fabulist”.  The fabulist explanation involved a separation of Horace’s delight and instruct. The work of drama was to create a moral fable on one hand, and “sweet” embellishments on the  other,  with  the  embellishments  functioning  as  persuasives.  The  second explanation,  the  affective,  came  from  Aristotle.  The  emotions  aroused  by  tragedy themselves acted as a moral force. Similarly, there were two accounts of the source of  tragic pleasure:  that which Rothstein  terms “aesthetic”,  in which the poet’s skill delights,  and  “providential”,  in  which  pleasure  is  derived  from  the  symmetry  of events; both require a view of the play as a whole. In the mid‐seventeenth century these accounts of dramatic pleasure were replaced by new theories. 
                                                        8  Kahn’s work  is  also  helpful  for  its  demonstration  of  a  parallel  between  political contract and generic convention. This point, considered along with her argument for understanding sympathy as affective contract, alternative  to Hobbesian contract—which  is essentially rational according to Koselleck, makes clearer the grounds  for pathetic dramaturgy’s privileging affective judgment over form, an understanding of genre as aesthetic and descriptive rather than cognitive and prescriptive. 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 Proceeding from Cartesian physiology wherein excitation of the passions is a sort  of  inner  sensuality  and  from  Hobbes’s  psychology  in  which  one  derives pleasure from a feeling of personal safety in the face of theatrical distress. 9   These new theories, with their emphasis on moving the passions demanded formal change.      The rhetorical basis of tragedy had changed. To be persuasive,        pleasure had to be deeply satisfying, it demanded sensationalism; and      sensationalism, in turn, bludgeoned the sense of a providential whole      out of recognition. …This desire for critical justification, for exalting      the individual emotional moment in theory as it was being exalted in      practice, drove Restoration critics toward the new (scientific) theories     of tragic pleasure discussed above. It also drove them toward a non‐     rhetorical, affective, theory of tragedy.     (Rothstein 8‐9)  There  is  a  disjunction  between  terror  and  pity  just  as  there  has  been  between delight  and  instruction.  The  playwright’s  job  is  to  move  the  passions,  the  moral instruction is up to the observer who must reflect on and learn from them. “Thus the pleasure  of  passion  separates  itself  from  the  bitter  moral  of  passion’s  fruits. Pragmatically, this division of labor, by which the playwright excited emotions that the spectator’s reflections were to temper and apply, led directly to sentiment” (13). Providence  of  the whole  is  out;  artistry  is  out;  empathy with  characters  becomes most  important.  Dryden  and  Rapin  emphasize  the  Aristotelian  principle  of “concernment” wherein “pity  is evoked by undeserved misfortune, and fear by the plight of a man like ourselves” (16).   In  “Emotions  and  the  Ethics  of  Response  in  Seventeenth‐Century  French Dramatic  Theory”,  2009,  Emma  Gilby  examines  the  written  exchanges  between                                                         9 I want to stress the physicality of such theories of theatrical rhetoric. The Cartesian self, as Kant points out, does not  follow  from sensual experience –  it  is  imaginary. Likewise, character  is  imaginary, while the figure  in pathetic theater  is material as well as imaginary. 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Corneille and  the Abbé d’Aubignac  in which  they debate over  the most efficacious means for managing the passions of an audience. Gilby surveys early modern views of the passions in order to establish their broad importance and to call into question the notion  that  passions were meant  to  be  overcome  altogether,  or  indeed  that  it were  ever  possible.  She  cites  Pascal,  claiming,  “critical  thinking  on  passions  and emotions  simultaneously  broaches  the  question  of  social  control—reasoned, ordered control of  the public sphere as well as of  the personal—and with  this  the question of social bonds” (58). Corneille and d’Aubignac espoused Aristotle’s idea of “catharsis” as a means of combating passion with passion (Gilby 60‐1). But Corneille comes to favor a theory of “commiseration,” an ethics of response achieved through emphasis  on  the  “contingencies  of  circumstance”  (63).  These  contingencies  are illustrated  through  close  relationships  of  blood,  love,  or  friendship  that  cause  a character to be subjected to the power of another. This reveals, by way of a powerful emotional response, a truth about the “mutable and messy material of human life,” thereby blurring distinction between emotion and knowledge. We might see how, if Corneille’s theories influenced pathetic dramaturgy on one side, the pathetic in turn shared common interest with philosophical theories of sympathy which were soon to develop.     David  Marshall’s  work  is  especially  useful  for  showing  the  connection between  seventeenth‐century  dramaturgy  and  theories  of  sympathy.  Marshall informs us that late seventeenth‐century “theories of acting as well as debates about morality  and  the  effects  of  drama  focused on questions  of  identification,  distance, and  the  ability  of  both  actors  and  audience  to  perform  acts  of  sympathy”  (2). 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Shaftesbury’s “Advice to an Author,” published two decades after the earliest plays we  will  look  at  here,  might  have  been  influenced  by  the  debates  out  of  which sentimental  drama  emerged  as  it  shows  concern with  the  theatrical  nature  of  the relations between authors and readers, “as if they were actors and spectators.”10 In the eighteenth‐century, the French dramatist Marivaux rather belatedly called for a shift  from  classical  aesthetics,  with  its  a  priori  rules,  to  one  that  emphasizes subjectivity  and  affect;  this  is  much  the  same  as  what  we  see  happening  in  the seventeenth century with Corneille, and with the subsequent emergence of pathetic drama.  Still,  looking  back with Marivaux’s  formulation  in mind makes  salient  this development in dramatic theory that anticipates Frances Hutcheson’s philosophy in which moral judgments are the product of a moral sense, a kind of judgment that is aesthetic rather than intellectual. When looking at the development of sentimental drama, it is important to keep these roughly contemporaneous philosophic concerns in mind. Both pathetic tragedy and sentimental comedy might be understood to aim at establishing a maximally sympathetic relationship with their audience in order to cultivate moral sense. 
 
The question of character   The  complaints  leveled  against  pathetic  tragedy  give  some  insight  into  the sort  of  cultural  influence  the  genre  was  perceived  to  have  been  exerting. Sentimental  drama  has  been  disparaged,  in  its  own  time  and  now,  because  it  is perceived as unnatural, unbelievable, and artificial. This line of criticism is especially                                                         10 See Marshall’s The Figure of Theater, pp 69‐70. 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remarkable  because  it  is  so  sharply  at  odds  with  the  characterizations  initially applied  to  pathetic  drama,  particularly  to  Otway’s.  Perceptions  of what  is  natural have much to do with changing expectations. As Lisa Freeman notes in Character’s 





gets  at  why  the  sentimental  been  so  dismissed.  It  imagined,  and  advocated,  a different  model  of  subjectivity  and  to  go  with  this,  a  different  sort  of  rhetorical engagement. Recent work  in  literary  studies has attempted  to displace  the  rule of reason over emotion, to advocate an affective subjectivity over the cognitive model of consciousness that became prominent during the eighteenth and dominated the twentieth  century.12  The  sentimental  should  be  viewed  then  not  as  a  flawed aesthetic, but as an alternate one—one that contested the cognitive perspective that seems now to dominate. Pathetic tragedy suggests a different sort of subjectivity—non‐autonomous,  non‐cognitivist,  i.e.  not  the  modern  subject,  and  demands  a different kind of response.13 The subjectivity modeled by the pathetic/sentimental was  not  that  of  a  contained  subject.  As  such,  it  presented  a  sort  of  resistance, perhaps  even  at  times  a  threat  to  autonomy,  and  to  the  ideological  systems  that proceeded from the assumption of an inviolable self.   In English Dramatic Form, 1660­1760 (1981), Laura Brown describes pathetic tragedy  as  something  of  a  failed  genre  for  its  inability  to  portray  plausible characters,  but  this  underestimates  the  drama’s  capacity  to  deal  with  issues  of identity  and  misses  the  function  of  the  pathetic  aesthetic.  According  to  Brown, affective  tragedy’s  emphasis  on  “the  expressed  pathos  of  situation”  leads  to  an absence  of  coherent  grounds  for  comprehending  either  character  or motive  (69). Brown’s appraisal of affective tragedy presumes that drama of the time aimed for a                                                         12 Charles Altieri in The Particulars of Rapture, 2003, and Donald Wesling in The Joys 
and Sorrows of Imaginary Persons, 2008. 13  Cf  Altieri’s  affective  response,  and  aesthetic  subjectivity  in  Subjective  Agency, 1995, and The Particulars of Rapture, 2005. 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realistic  representation  of  a modern  sort  of  subject  through  its  characterizations. This  is a point which Lisa Freeman has called  into question, asking whether  there could  have  been  a  “subject”  on  the  eighteenth‐century  stage  (17).  According  to Freeman, eighteenth‐century drama was less  interested in portraying the “modern subject” than in dramatizing complex relationships. Freeman’s writings on the issue of character  in eighteenth‐century drama reveal  that Brown’s crucial misprision  is in thinking that situation displaces character, when in fact the play treats character as  situational.  Pathetic  tragedy  explores  the  relationship  of  character  to  affective contracts like friendship and marriage. Opposed to heroic tragedy in which there is no  differentiation  between  generic  expectation  and  character,  affective  tragedy shines light on the situation of the subject in relation to forms, or systems.  Laura Brown’s critiques of pathetic  tragedy for  its  failure to provide  formal grounds  for  judgment  and  for  its  unconvincing  characters  are  both  answered  by Rothstein’s  account.  There  is  more  to  the  picture  that  is  missed  if  we  consider dramaturgy apart  from rhetoric. Generic change  is  in effect  rhetorical  change, and these developments  in dramatic  theory and practice are  in a sense as much about the  influence  of  Aristotle’s Rhetoric  as  they  are  about  his Poetics.  Victoria  Kahn’s work has shown that writers in the seventeenth century were keenly aware not only of  a  relationship between  rhetoric  and poetics,  but  between  rhetoric  and political contract, which was seen  to have an analog  in generic  form.14  In  this  light,  society itself functions as a rhetorical community. Its relation to society defines the subject,                                                         14 Wayward Contracts, 2004, and “Rhetoric, Rights, and Contract Theory in the Early Modern Period”, 2003. 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and  the  relation  of  subject  to  society  is  determined  rhetorically,  through  the linguistic construction of laws and contracts. Kahn argues that the political crisis of the  seventeenth  century  revealed  the  fictional,  linguistic,  rhetorical  nature  of contract and therefore of society.    Developments  in political and natural philosophy  led  to a  sort of  rhetorical crisis. The generic change occurring in the development of pathetic drama was one of many responses to the heightened awareness of the rhetorical nature of society described by Kahn. One of the concerns of the age was to find a suitable style for the discussion of scientific topics, which needed above all a clear exposition of facts and arguments, rather than the ornate style favored at the time. Many of those looking for  a  simpler  style  looked  back  to  Aristotle’s  Rhetoric.  In  The  Advancement  of 
Learning  Bacon  criticized  those  who  are  preoccupied  with  style  rather  than  "the weight  of  matter,  worth  of  subject,  soundness  of  argument,  life  of  invention,  or depth of judgment" (I.IV.2). On matters of style, he proposed that the style conform to the subject matter and to the audience, that simple words be employed whenever possible,  and  that  the  style  should  be  agreeable.15  Along  with  a  shortened translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Hobbes also produced a number of other works on the subject of rhetoric. Hobbes, like Bacon, promoted a simpler and more natural style that used figures of speech sparingly though himself continuing to make good use of figures in his writing. After all, what is the Leviathan but a figure?16  Hobbes 
                                                        15 Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse, 1975. 16 See Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, 1996, for an examination of Hobbes’s use of rhetoric. 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gave great latitude to the senses and the imagination, and his theory of association is congenial to the flow of sentimental. Descartes,  an  outspoken  opponent  of  formal  rhetoric,  was  attentive  to persuading an audience as he walked them through the inductions of the cogito. In 
Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric, Thomas Carr explains Descartes’s rhetoric of  attentiveness.  Despite  his  reputation  for  setting  rhetoric  below  mathematical precision, Descartes favored a style that kept in mind the attention of his audience. Attentiveness, Carr argues, is a notion that holds a singular place as the point where the  cogitans meets  the  body—sensations,  and passions may  either  help  or  hinder understanding  depending  on  attention.  Yet  Descartes  held  that  evidence  of  truth was  ultimately more  persuasive  than  sophistic  eloquence.17 He  sought  truths  that were self evident, and therefore no one needed to be persuaded to accept them so long  as  they  were  understood.  But  self‐evidence  depends  on  a  store  of  common sense, that is, on set of assumptions and expectations shared by an audience. Thus, the  embodiment  of  the  figure  of  pathos might  be  seen  as  a  compromise  between Aristotelian  and Cartesian  rhetoric  as  it  transformed  a  figure  into  tangible  data—proof of person, and proof of moral feeling.  So, on the one hand, it seems quite right to view the emerging prevalence of the pathetic with the familiar account, that the pathetic drama, as the precursor to the  sentimental,  was  a  part  of  the  counter‐enlightenment’s  rebellion  against  the disciplining discourses of rationalist and experimentalist philosophies of Descartes and  Hobbes—and  later  Locke,  which  demanded  a  new,  plain  rhetoric  that                                                         17 Descartes, Discourse on Method, 1637. 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downplayed the role of ambiguity, affect, and its rhetorical component,  figure. But, the  above  suggests  quite  strongly  that  there might not  be  such  a  clear distinction between the rhetoric of  the pathetic and the reformed rhetoric of  the seventeenth century. The pathetic drama then is part of the same movement of rhetorical reform that looks back to Aristotle. They share an emphasis on knowing and engaging the audience.  This  puts  the  sentimental  strangely  in  league  with  enlightenment philosophy, rather than purely in league with moral sense, troubling the perception of  the  sentimental  as  anti‐Hobbesian.  The  pathetic  mode  essentially  carries  the same  rhetoric  to  its  conclusion—though  perhaps  it  is  not  the  conclusion  that Descartes would  desire.  But  the  pathetic  rejects  the  scientific  classification  of  the self,  the  separation  of  cognition  from  passions—“the  involuntary  subjection  of bodies  to  systems  of  power  by  different  kinds  of  discourse,”  in  other  words, incorporation of the particular subject into the sensus communis.   Pathos  in Aristotle’s rhetoric is an appeal to the passions through the use of figure. As the movement of passions became of crucial importance, the theater of the late  seventeenth  century  gave  the  pathetic  figure  body,  and made  it  the  focus  of drama. Here the use of the term figure is especially apt to describe the function of character  in  pathetic  drama  because  of  figure’s  simultaneous  appeal  to  multiple meanings.  Figure  suggests  a  rhetorical  turn,  a  phrase  that  is  not  literally  true.  It summons the sense of a body, but more particularly the shape or outline of a body; outline enforcing an understanding of a thing’s being as determined by its being set in relief against a background, or its situation amongst other things. So that a thing, a  character  in  this  instance,  is  at  once  determined  by  its  being  distinguishable 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against its situation at the same time that this set of circumstances reminds one that the relation between character and other  things—be  they other characters, props, 
etcetera; situation itself is determinant of character.   Much  work  relating  literary  culture  to  models  of  the  self  in  the  long eighteenth century has argued the evolution of deep subjectivity over the course of the period, presenting a narrative of  the waxing popularity of  a notion of  identity that is interior and secure. This model is reinforced by Dror Wahrman’s The Making 
of the Modern Self (2006), which proposes that a radical shift in notions of personal identity occurred at the end of the eighteenth century—the self ceased to be social and  took  on  qualities  of  psychological  depth  and  interiority.  In  both  Desire  and 
Domestic Fiction (1987) and How Novels Think (2005), Nancy Armstrong insists that the eighteenth‐century novel modeled a type of character that was then emulated by its  readers,  leading  to  different  conceptions  of  subjectivity.  These  accounts  of  the development of the conception of subjectivity as deep interiority present a paradox. In fact, the argument that the eighteenth‐century novel modeled a type of character that was then emulated by its readers, leading to deep interiority requires that the self  must  be  seen  as  strongly  engaged  with  the  text,  and  that  the  appearance  of individuality  is  really a  symptom of very close engagement,  resembling sympathy. So that when identity appears to be most independent, it is really most caught up in something other.    In  Naturalization  of  the  Soul,  Raymond  Martin  and  John  Barresi  give  a different  account  that  shifts  the  terms  of  the  conversation  by  arguing  that  the predominant  model  of  the  self  in  the  eighteenth  century moves  from  immaterial 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soul  to  natural mind.18  This  suggests,  in  regards  to  the  relation  of  the  self  to  the material world, that by the end of the century thinkers have ceased to find the neo‐Platonic/Cartesian model of  the self a viable one: different measures needed to be taken  to  preserve  the  inviolability  of  the  particular  self,  as  is  intimated  in  the passage  from  Hazlitt  above.  In  light  of  Martin  and  Barresi’s  work,  the  issue  of personal  identity ceases  to be about  the development of  the autonomous self,  and becomes about the relation of the self to the material world. It is largely an issue of accounting for the meeting of the immaterial spirit, consciousness, with the world of the  senses.  The  answer  to  the  question  of what mediates  this meeting,  or  indeed, whether there is such a gap to be bridged, is the point where aesthetics and theories of the self meet.    Character  is  inextricably  connected  to  scene  and  circumstance  in  order  to represent the nature of subjective relation to the material world. It was drama of an epicurean  sort:  characters  were  atoms  interconnected  through  material  and passionate  situation.  Adam  Smith’s  evocation  of  Epictetus  in  his  Theory  of  Moral 
Sentiments  sheds  some  light  on  the  sort  of  connectedness  that  bore  on  issues  of character in the drama of pathos.     “In what sense,” says Epictetus, “are some things said to be according      to our  nature, and others contrary to it?—it is in that sense in which      we consider ourselves as separated and detached from all other      things. For thus it may be said to be according to the nature of the foot     to be always clean. But if you consider it as a foot, and not as                                                            18  Martin  and  Barresi  give William  Hazlitt,  a  writer  better  known  for  his  literary criticism  than  for  his  philosophical  productions,  special  place  in  their  study  as  a thinker ahead of his  time  in his  conception of  identity.  It  is  largely  for  this  reason that Hazlitt’s criticism holds special place in the present study, since one of my chief concerns is the overlap between literary engagements and the bounds of the mind. 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 something detached from the rest of the body, it must behove it      sometimes to trample in the dirt, and sometimes to tread upon thorns,     and sometimes, too, to be cut off for the sake of the whole body; and if      it refuses this, it is no longer a foot. Thus, too, ought we to conceive      with regard to ourselves. What are you?—a man. If you consider      yourself as something separated and detached, it is agreeable to your      nature to live to old age, to be rich, to be in health. But if you consider      yourself as a man, and as part of a whole, upon account of that whole      it will behove you sometimes to be in sickness, sometimes to be      exposed to the inconveniency of a sea‐voyage, sometimes to be in      want; and at last, perhaps to die before your time. Why then do you      complain? Do you not know that by doing so, as the foot  ceases to be a     foot, so you cease to be a man?”       (TOMS VII.II.405.)  Characters  served  a  rhetorical  purpose:  the  movement  of  the  passions,  the achievement  of  sympathy.  As  such,  characters  were  not  meant  to  represent individual  subjectivity;  rather  they  showed  that  subjectivity  was  situational.  In 
Character’s Theater,  Lisa Freeman offers an alternative  to  the conventional, novel‐centered  account  of  character  in  the  eighteenth  century  as  deepening  into  the modern  subject.  Freeman  demonstrates  that  character  is  a  contested  site  in England's attempt to negotiate a changing sociology of class, and gender. Freeman argues for the situational quality of character in order to make her claim about the sociological stakes of its deployment. However, she does not explore the conceptual importance  of  situation,  an  intervention  that  I  intend  to  make  in  this  study.  The Pathetic drama’s  aim  is  to  sympathetically  engage  the  audience member  to  scene, circumstance, and situation in a manner like the characters on stage and sympathy arises from situation.19                                                          19  In  the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith says,  “Sympathy,  therefore does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it” (I.1.7.) Deidre Lynch has argued that objects have pathetic properties  in sentimental writing  in “Personal Effects and Sentimental Fictions”, 2000. A similar 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 Character  in  pathetic  drama  is  a  rhetorical  figure,  a  pathetic  figure,  which engages  the  spectator  sympathetically  so  that  he  may  negotiate  the  tenuous situation  of  being  a  judger  in  the midst  of  a  sea  of  judgers.  The  issue  of  realistic characterization then is irrelevant. The pertinent issue is the reading, or the judging of character.   Freeman  offers  a  reading  of  Fielding’s  “An  Essay  on  the  Knowledge  of Characters  of  Men”  (1743)  that  describes  the  essay  as  exhibiting  an  increasing frustration  with  the  project  of  offering  a  method  for  reading  character,  turning eventually  into a commentary on the  impossibility of ever being able to do so. But Fielding’s essay signals this “frustration” clearly in its title, implying that it will be a meditation on knowing from the start, and not on character. It is about the judging of  character  and  is  as much  if  not more  about  the  performer  of  judgment  as  it  is about the performer of character.  At issue in Fielding’s essay is the preservation of the individual’s capacity to judge for himself in the face of those who would impose their judgments upon him.   Fielding’s essay opens with a statement of  the problem: “men have devised systems to impose on the rest of mankind,” while “few or none… have stood up the 
                                                        line is taken up by the theatrically minded Laurence Sterne in A Sentimental Journey 
Through  France  and  Italy,  1768,  when  he  relates  the  sentimental  power  of circumstantial things in the mourning of a dead ass: “the mourner was sitting on a stone bench at the door, with ass’s panel and its bridle on one side, which he   took up from time to time—then laid them down—look’d at them and shook his head. He then took the crust of bread out of his wallet again, as if to eat it; held it some time in his hand—then laid it upon the bit of his ass’s bridle—looked wistfully at the little arrangement he had made—and then gave a sigh” (39). 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champion of the innocent and undesigning… to arm them against imposition.”20 He goes on to assert that one cannot generalize when it comes to mankind, for, quoting Rochester,  “man  differs  more  from  man,  than  man  from  beast.”  Fielding  is championing  the  particularity  of  knowledge  arising  from  an  individual  suspect  in the face of systems. He associates these systems of imposition with deception, which is encouraged by education in a society that is essentially self‐serving and opposed to  the  stoic  belief  in  man  as  fellow  citizen,  and  working  for  common  good.21 Deceitfulness depends on being taught to value self‐interest.    Deception  is  learned as a means of  furthering self‐interest, and so  it  is  that deceitful  men  impose  themselves  on  others.22  The  artifice  of  deception  is  put  in opposition to  the “natural,” which though suppressed by  imposture always  finds a way  of  coming  out.  Passions  are  natural,  as  opposed  to  the  “face”  which  is performed. Passions leave legible marks on the countenance, which, Fielding claims, one must be trained to read for they often mean the opposite of what they appear to say.  Rather  than  asserting  a  general  principal,  Fielding  suggests  an  appeal  to “instances.”  Ultimately,  the  best  way  to  judge  of  a  man’s  character  is  situational: observing  the  way  that  he  behaves  towards  his  “private  family  and  nearest intimacies”  allows  one  to  judge  “whether  he  has  acted  the  part  of  a  good  son, brother, etc…”  
                                                        20 cf Swift in A Tale of a Tub. 21 cf Bernard Mandeville, and Adam Smith. 22  Think  about  the  imposition  of  hypocrisy,  which  for  Smith  is  remedied  by sympathy, against Hazlitt’s view that sympathy is itself an imposition (cf Levinas). 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 The  imposition  of  the  deceptive  performance  of  character  is  not  the  only danger identified by Fielding. Equally insidious are the impositions of bad judgment, which can serve a similarly self‐interested purpose. Fielding deals at  length with a kind of hypocrite that he calls “the saint”, a character saintly in form only, and who encourages a  similar kind of  shallow virtue because he  sets himself up as a  “rigid observer”  but  attends  only  to  forms  (think  opposition  between  “nature”  and performance.” The saint  is particularly bad because he  is a bad  judge of character, hypocritical  and  partial,  and  he  imposes  his  bad  judgment  as  the  standard  of judgment.23   In Lecture on jurisprudence, Adam Smith advocates an impartial judge (here we must think about the TOMS). What is an impartial judge then? If partiality is like self‐interest aligned with hypocrisy and deceit, and opposed to nature, and if nature is aligned with passion and stoic belief in common good, then we have sympathy as the way of judging character. Judging the character of men for Fielding and Smith is a way of arming oneself against  the  imposition of artifice and performance, which ultimately  put  one  in  the  service  of  the  interests  of  selfish  men.  The  answer proposed  to  this  situation  is  impartiality,  specifically  the  cultivation  of  a  natural, socially‐oriented passion, or sympathy. But Laurence Sterne, troubles the reliability of  impartial,  sympathetic  judgment,  showing  that  sympathy  depends  not  just  on                                                         23  cf  Jane Shore, with  its  strict  adherence  to  form,  analyzed  in Chapter 2,  and The 
London Merchant’s  Thorogood, who  exemplifies  this  kind  of  saintly  character  and bad judgment. The problem with the LM is that its virtuous characters are “saintly,” thus Charles Lamb’s calling the play a “nauseous sermon.” Compare Fielding’s claim that  they  are  saintly only  in  form with my  idea  about distance between  character and form (generic form as a kind of imposition). 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situation, and circumstance, but on an expectation of scene/situation that resembles generic form. See “Calais” and “The Monk” in A Sentimental Journey through France 
and Italy. After dilating “every vessel in his frame” through generous thoughts (and wine),  Yorick  is  ready  to  share  “—Now, was  I  a King  of  France24,  cried  I—what  a moment  for  an  orphan  to  have  begg’d  his  father’s  portmanteau  of  me!”  But  the character who enters the scene does not match Yorick’s expectation, and so he does not elicit a sentimental response.     I had scarce utter’d the words, when a poor monk of the order of St.      Francis came  into the room to beg something for his convent. No man      cares to have his virtues the sport of contingencies—or one man may      be generous as another is puissant—sed non, quo ad hanc—or be it as      it may—for there is no regular reasoning upon the ebbs and flows of      our humours; they mad depend upon the same causes, for ought I      know, which influence the tides themselves—‘twould oft be no      discredit to us, to suppose it was so: I’m sure at least for myself, that      in any case I should be more highly satisfied, to have it said by the      world, “I had an affair with the moon, in which there was neither sin      nor shame,” than have it pass altogether as my own act and deed,      wherein there was so much of both. ‐‐But be this as it may. The      moment I cast my eyes upon him, I was predetermined not to give him     a single sous… This  passage  troubles  some  key  aspects  of  the  solutions  offered  by  Fielding  and Smith,  viz.  the  notion  of  impartiality,  especially  what  looks  like  the  alignment  of impartiality with the “natural.” Sterne uses the natural to question how can one ever 
                                                        24 It is important to note that this cycle begins with Yorick’s annoyance at the King of France, which he’s overcome by drinking the French good health. Until the entrance of the monk he identifies himself as the very figure that had irritated him to begin with…  a  deliberate  sort  of  movement  to  achieve  sympathy  that  evokes  Hobbes’s Leviathan in that he thinks of the good of all Frenchmen to get at sympathy with the King who represents them all. Regardless, the question is whether he has achieved Smithean impartiality.  It would seem that he had achieved a  false sympathy of the universal from which he is removed by the intrusion of the particular, in the form of the monk. 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claim  to  be  impartial  when  one  is  the  sport  of  unseen  forces?  The  problem  of judging arises from the possibility of performance in Fielding’s essay. Fielding wants to  get  around  deception,  but  his  test  of  character  is  ultimately  performative  and dependent  on  generic,  formal  expectations.  Sterne’s  writing  suggests  the importance  of  situation  as  a  sort  of  invisible  force  that  determines  judgment  of character.  In TS  Walter  Shandy  explains  to  his  son  that  the  passions,  themselves meant to equip the individual against the imposition of artifice on his judgment end up imposing upon his will:      Love, you see, is not so much a SENTIMENT as a SITUATION, into      which a man enters, as my brother Toby would do, into a corps—     being once in it—he acts as if he did; and takes every step to shew      himself a man of prowesse.”25(VIII.xxxiv)    
The situation of spectatorial judgment: pathos and the public sphere   The  development  of  pathetic  drama  with  its  method  of  sympathetic engagement, was contemporary with the emergence of what Habermas has termed, the public sphere.26 Previously,  in what Habermas calls  “representational culture,” politics, taste, fashion, and judgment in general were the preserves of an elite.  The public  sphere  was  a  public  space  outside  of  the  control  by  the  state,  where individuals  exchanged  views  and  knowledge.  In  Habermas's  view,  the  growth  in newspapers,  journals,  reading  clubs,  Masonic  lodges,  and  coffee‐houses  in eighteenth‐century Europe, all in different ways, marked the gradual replacement of 
                                                        25 Note too, his discussion of shaving as an aid to writing: “—the Situation,  like all others, has notions of her own to put into the brain.—“ (book IX, chapter xiii.) 26 Jurgen Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 1962. 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"representational"  culture  with  Öffentlichkeit  culture.  Habermas  argued  that  the essential characteristic of  the Öffentlichkeit  culture was  its "critical" nature. Unlike "representational" culture, where only one party was active and the other passive, the  Öffentlichkeit  culture  dialogic  as  individuals  either  met  in  conversation,  or exchanged views via the print media.    But  some  have  argued  that  the  public  sphere  was  not  so  egalitarian.  The development of  the public sphere moved  judgment  to  the public, but  it created  its own kind of hegemony, demanding a consensus. Nancy Fraser argues in “Rethinking the public sphere,” that the public sphere excludes in order to include. Rather than creating equality the public sphere bracketed inequalities in order to make subjects fit  into  its  community.  The  emergent  public  sphere  drew,  like  the market,  on  the force of sentimental consensus for the formation of opinion, credit, and belief. This tended to weaken the  idea of  the self by assuming  it was a creature of passion.  In this state of affairs the debate about aesthetics takes it rise, supposing another kind of consensus immune to reason.   The  public  sphere  depended  on  what  Habermas  calls  the  individual’s “saturated  interiority,”  but  the  individual  did  not  give  distinct  voice  to  this interiority:  it was interiorities in the mass that opened up fields of judgment outside the  restricted  domains  of  the  court,  the  house  of  commons,  and  the  Exchange.  Public sentiment, and it was sentiment, counted for something. The  effect  of  this upon individuals was to create a tension between public and private identification. Individuals had a stake in the preservation of their saturated interiority, and wished to express it not just in the mass.  But it turns out that the public sphere makes the 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definition of individuality difficult.27 No longer is it defined by received opinion, nor is  it  yet  defined  by  a  strong  liberal  formulation  of  rights.  Instead  authors  were driven  to  a  series  of  pragmatic  solutions  to  the  problem,  of  which  the  deliberate indulgence of the passions is the most obvious: what you feel must be true because empirical philosophy says so.  But the reality of the passions, insisted on in different ways by Mandeville, Hume and Burke, is a very fluid one, lasting only as long as one is  in  their possession. However,  it  is worth noting  that  those who emphasized  the importance of the passions all have theories of sympathy.   By  creating  an  aesthetic  experience  that  is  simultaneously  private  and shared,  pathetic  drama  negotiates  the  tension  between  the  audience  member’s desire for interiority and membership in the public. Pathetic drama ameliorates this tension between public and private self by denying the divide. Aesthetic experience, affective knowing, resists the cognitivist divide between subject and experience that is mirrored in the divide between saturated interiority and public self.  
 
 
Method   My study, rooted in cultural studies,  is concerned only tangentially with the shaping of subjectivity; rather it is concerned with how constructions of subjectivity determine  the  nature  of  aesthetic  engagements.  My  method  largely  consists  in identifying  and  examining  resonances  between  practices  of  pathetic  dramaturgy and  the  writings  of  roughly  contemporary  critics  and  social  and  political philosophers  in  the  belief  that  this  will  help  to  clarify  the  broader  cultural                                                         27 See Reinhardt Koselleck, Critique and Crisis, 1959. 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significance  of  these  practices.  That  being  said,  throughout  this  study  I  return  to figures employed by certain modern critics that I believe are useful for giving shape to the practice of analyzing these cultural resonances. As has already become clear, I find the idea of the emergence of a public sphere, put forth by Habermas to be useful way  of  organizing my  thoughts  on  the  relation  of  subjectivity  to  spectation,  even though there have been significant critiques levied against his thesis. Victoria Kahn’s arguments  for  considering  the  rhetorical  elements  in  the  ordering  of  ideas  of seventeenth‐century English society are fundamental to my study as well (Wayward 
Contracts,  2004).  Kahn’s  demonstration  that  literary  genre  functions  as  a  sort  of social contract is especially important. Lastly, the figure of a market of sentimental exchanges that Deidre Lynch argues for so convincingly in The Economy of Character (1998) is one that I make repeated use of in my thesis. I envision these three models working  together  to  make  my  point  out  the  situational  nature  of  character. Spectatorial subjects find themselves in the midst of a public connected by a system of pathetic exchange that is ordered by generic contracts.   Because  my  study  is  very  much  concerned  with  mainstream  cultural phenomena,  I  examine  theater,  and  the  plays  that  I  have  chosen were  all  popular and  exerted  influence  on  the  shaping  of  culture.  The  exception  to  this  is my  final chapter. While George Colman the Younger was a popular playwright, neither of the plays  that  I  look  at were  particularly  successful.  This  exception  is  justified  by  the primary  purpose  of  that  chapter,  which  I  see  as  illustrating  Hazlitt’s  musings  on issues of rights and sympathy. 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 Why  drama?  While  a  great  deal  of  valuable  work  has  been  done  on  the relation of the aesthetics of the novel and subjectivity, relatively little attention has been given to drama,28 despite drama’s status as a more popular cultural form. But the more pressing reason to consider issues of pathos, and subjectivity through an analysis of the eighteenth‐century is because theater relations occurred as a popular trope  in  an  array  of  prose  forms,  from  novels  to  philosophical  treatises.29  Again, while  important work has been done  to explore  the popularity of  the  theater as a figure in prose works, not enough critical analysis has been applied to exploring the ways  in  which  principles  of  the  theater  set  the  stage  for  aesthetics  and  social philosophy.  
Outline 
   In my first chapter I will look at the innovations of Thomas Otway and John Banks  in  developing  a  Pathetic  drama  that  both  builds  on  and  rebels  against Dryden’s Heroic drama. Dryden’s drama came about in response to the battle of the ancients  and  moderns,  which  had  lead  to  the  separation  of  arts  and  sciences.30  Dryden found a way to apply modern, scientific method by making use of Aristotle’s 
Poetics. But the pathetic resisted this. While it embraced the privileged place given                                                         28  The  modern  preference  for  discussions  of  the  novel  is  largely  because  of  the modern  preference  for  the  novel.  Analyses  of  the  novel  in  relation  to  subjectivity traditionally  attribute  a  correlation  between  the  rise  of  this  innovative  form with the birth of the modern subject, though this approach has begun to fall from favor.  29 See, for instance, David Marshall’s The Figure of Theater, 1986.  30  Michael  McKeon  argues  that  this  separation  came  about  as  a  result  of  the moderns’ determination  that  there were different kinds of knowledge appropriate to these different disciplines. 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pathos and concernment, it resisted the split between art and science, and between kinds  of  knowledge.  Its  aesthetic  judgment  depends  on  the  senses,  and  the  sense judgment is its aim. The difference between science and art is that the former does not depend on opinion for truth. Perhaps pathos is a way to try to get around this. Pathos  is  felt,  not  thought,  and  maybe  more  objective  than  opinion.  But  trouble arises when  this  sort  of  drama  becomes  formalized  and  subjective  agency  is  lost, resulting in the sort of passive figure that is central in Nicholas Rowe’s plays.   Chapter two picks up from the formalized passivity of Rowe’s Tragedy of Jane 
Shore and looks at the Scriblerian response to it which attempts to temper sympathy with wit, to trouble form in order to maintain the particularity of aesthetic response and resist  induction—the method by which  the empirical purports  to be objective knowledge by distancing from particular experience, through induction and getting away from opinion. The mix of wit and pathos in Jonathan Swift’s Tale of a Tub, and to a greater degree in John Gay’s plays resists the loss of individuality in the face of the growing voice of public opinion.   In  my  third  chapter  I  examine  George  Lillo’s  play  The  London  Merchant through the lens of the debate the critique of Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees levied  by  Adam  Smith  in  his  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments.  Lillo’s  play  exhibits  a similar concern for figuring the role of passion in a modern, market‐based society. Lillo  appears  to  side  with  Smith  in  advocating  control  of  the  passions,  and  his dramatic  techniques  in many ways  adumbrate  Smith’s  delineation of  sympathy  in their emphasis on situation, spectation, and guilt. But Lillo’s drama also performs a disciplining  function  that  runs  counter  to  the  plays  examined  in  the  first  two 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chapters:  The  London  Merchant  wants  to  put  its  audience  in  its  place  socially speaking  and  diminishes  the  importance  of  particular  subjectivity  in  favor  of  the whole. Lillo’s play encourages spectators to imagine themselves as spectacles, which creates an estrangement of subjective experience from its source leading to anxiety over  the  loss  of  self‐determination  expressed  in  William  Hazlitt’s  criticism  of Burkean sympathy.   Chapter  four  looks  at  two  of  George  Colman  the  Younger’s  plays  alongside William Hazlitt’s writings on fame. These texts on the edge of the nineteenth century are looking back at the mental/physical, subjective/objective split at the heart of the sentimental tradition.31 Expressing concern over the loss of subjective authority to the public, the characters in Colman’s plays desire to combine the subject and object in  character  through manipulations  of  reputation  and  fame.  Colman’s  plays  get  at the  implications  for  the  self.  Wanting  to  become  an  object  means  wanting  to preserve individuality by making sympathy impossible. They express the Romantic inheritance of the pathetic aesthetic while pointing to what has become paradox of wanting  to  be  an  object  and  a  subject  at  once  in  the  context  of  tightly  defined boundaries of the person at the end of the century.    
                                                        31  Thomas  Nagel  argued  that  the  mental/physical  distinction  is  really subjective/objective.  Objective  truth  can  be  understood  by  more  than  one,  while subjective can be understood by one point of view at most. “What is it Like to be a Bat?” 1974. 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CHAPTER II  FROM FORM TO FIGURE: PATHETIC DRAMA AND THE CHARACTER OF SITUATION    The issue of the inadequacy of depictions of character in eighteenth‐century drama can be addressed by looking at the rise of pathetic drama. The rise of pathetic dramaturgy  marks  a  shift  away  from  the  formalism  of  the  heroic  drama  that immediately  preceded  itwhile  retaining  the  pathetic  elements.  As  the  essential quality  of  this  dramaturgical  approach  is  affective  involvement,  judgment  is determined by the degree of pathetic response. Its characters were meant to serve a rhetorical  purpose  rather  than  depict  realistic  subjectivity.  These  pathetic  figures were  completed  and  justified  by  the  sympathetic  involvement  of  their  spectators, suggesting  a model  of  situational  subjectivity.  In  this  chapter  I  will  illustrate  and elaborate on these points through analysis of two plays by Thomas Otway and John Banks, both of whom were innovators of pathetic dramaturgy.   Thomas Otway’s Venice Preserv’d, 1682, is especially useful, not only because it  enjoyed  the  most  enduring  success  of  any  pathetic  drama,  but  also  because  it enacts the genre’s aesthetic. For these reasons I let the play stand as representative of  its  genre  and  examine  it  in  detail.  After  enjoying  an  exceptionally  long  run  of popularity, Otway’s Venice  Preserv’d  fell  from  critical  favor  in  the  late  nineteenth‐century.32 This has been attributed  to  the growing expectation  that  “a play should                                                         32  See Aline Mackenzie  Taylor, Next  to  Shakespeare:  Otway’s Venice  Preserv’d and The Orphan and their History on the London Stage, 1950. 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produce  in  the  study  an  effect  comparable  to  the  one  it  produces  on  the  scene” (Taylor 5). This explanation for the play’s decline in popularity seems only partially correct at best. True, if the public had come to privilege a private reading experience over performance as Taylor argues, this play that depends so much on its physical performance in order to achieve its effect, must disappoint.33 But the story of Venice 
Preserv’d’s changing relationship with its audiences must be understood in terms of the cultural and, more specifically, the generic contexts from which it arose. Taylor’s account would make the fall of Otway’s play from favor is something of a tragedy in itself in that the very sort of attitude that it sought to create ultimately undid it.    One  of  Otway’s  early  supporters,  the  restoration  critic  Gerard  Langbaine, wrote that Otway has “a Tallent, very few of our English Poets have been Master of, in moving the Passions, that are, and ought to be the Aim of all Tragick Poets, Terror and  Pity.”34  A  description which  one  of  Otway’s more  ardent  supporters,  Charles Gildon,  included  in The  Lives  and  Characters  of  the  English  Dramatic  Poets,  1699.                                                         33 Though this point was directly disputed by the nineteenth‐century critic William Hazlitt, who wrote, “The merit of Venice Preserved is not confined to its effect on the stage, or to the opportunity it affords for the display of the powers of the actors in it, of a Jaffeir, a Pierre, a Belvidera: it reads as well in the closet, and loses little or none of  its power of  riveting breathless attention, and stirring  the deepest yearnings of affection.  It  has  passages  of  great  beauty  in  themselves  (detached  from  the  fable) touches of true nature and pathos, though none equal or indeed comparable to what we meet with in Shakespear and other writers of that day; but the awful suspense of the situations, the conflict of duties and passions, the intimate bonds that unite the characters together, and that are violently rent asunder like the parting of soul and body, the solemn march of the tragical events to the fatal catastrophe that winds up and closes over all, give to this production of Otway’s Muse a charm and power that bind  it  like  a  spell  on  the public mind,  and have made  it  a proud and  inseparable adjunct of the English stage.” Lectures Chiefly on the Dramatic Literature of the Age of 
Elizabeth, 1821. 34 Langbaine, An Account of the English Dramatic Poets, 1691. 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Gildon was one of the first to claim that Otway was of the modern dramatists most fit  to be compared with Shakespeare, claiming to prefer him to Shakespeare.35 But Gildon’s advocacy for Otway attempted to account for his poetic excellence in terms of  classical  form,  and  that  was  at  odds  with  the  accounts  of  his  contemporaries. 
Venice  Preserv’d  plays  a  key  role  in  the  development  of  a  new  genre  of  drama  to follow the decline of  the heroic and with the advent of  this new form, affective, or pathetic  drama  comes  a  shift  in  literary  culture  with  far‐reaching  effects.  Eric Rothstein claims that “the adoption of a pathetic drama in the late sixteen hundreds conditioned  the  entire  subsequent  development  of  English  tragedy”  (viii).  With pathetic drama comes a move from the formal, stylized characterizations of heroic tragedy  towards  more  affecting  depictions  of  subjectivity,  and  this  change demanded  a  new mode  of  engagement  from  its  audience.36  But  the  problem with pathetic  drama  in  the  nineteenth  century might  just  as well  be made  sense  of  by reflecting  once  again  on  the  significance  of  Hazlitt’s  staunch  opposition  to  the principle  of  sympathy,  which  he  perceived  as  a  threat  to  the  sanctity  of  the individual person. While the chronological  focus of this chapter  is  firmly set  in the                                                         35 See Taylor, p 259. 36 See Bernbaum, and Laura Brown  in English Dramatic Form, 1981. This mode of sympathetic  engagement  between  spectator  and  performance  resembles,  and perhaps  adumbrates  the  sort  of  private  aesthetic  experience  that  is  most  often attributed to novel reading. Though I shall not attempt to demonstrate this claim in the present study, Michael McKeon comes close to suggesting as much in his paper, Experimental  Method  and  the  Emergence  of  the  Aesthetic  Category  of  Fiction.” Further, the facility with which Nancy Armstrong’s readings of domestic fiction can be applied to  the drama of an earlier period troubles her claim that “the domestic novel antedated—was necessarily antecedent to—the way of life it represented” as it suggests that novels were likely influenced by the theater. See Nancy Armstrong, 
Desire and Domestic Fiction, p 9. 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restoration  and  early  eighteenth  century,  the  period  in  which  pathetic  drama developed, it is important to have the looming specter of change in reception, albeit a distant specter, in mind as we examine the development of this genre that would have such an influence and to consider the difference in contemporary reception.  
Resistance to form and genre     In  The  Drama  of  Sensibility  (1915),  a  foundational  text  in  contemporary studies of sentimental drama, Ernest Bernbaum describes the genre as one that was set against convention and prescriptive forms from its beginning.  The  drama  of  sensibility…  was  from  its  birth  a  protest  against  the orthodox  view  of  life,  and  against  those  literary  conventions  which had  served  that  view.  It  implied  that  human  nature, when  no,  as  in some  cases,  already  perfect,  was  perfectible  by  an  appeal  to  the emotions. It refused to assume that virtuous person must be sought in a  romantic  realm apart  from  the  everyday world.  It wished  to  show that beings who were good at heart were found in the ordinary walks of  life.  It  so  represented  their  conduct  as  to  arouse  admiration  for their  virtues  and  pity  for  their  sufferings.  In  sentimental  comedy,  it showed  them  contending  against  distresses  but  finally  rewarded  by morally  deserved  happiness.  In  domestic  tragedy,  it  showed  them overwhelmed  by  catastrophes  for  which  they  were  not  morally responsible.            (Bernbaum 10)  The nascent sentimental drama’s appeal to the emotions was aligned with its moral aim, and at the same time, this appeal to moral feeling was linked to its resistance to both  literary  convention,  and  by  implication,  social  conventions,  or  “orthodoxy,” which robbed the virtuous characters of their agency.    In  Venice  Preserv’d,  Otway  is  dealing  explicitly  with  issues  of  shifting aesthetics and generic change, expressing thematically the death of the heroic as a valid form of expression at the point of transition from the politically focused heroic 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tragedy  to  the  private  realm  of  domestic  drama.  And  as  Otway  is  staging  a commentary on dramatic  form, he  instructs his  audience  in  the proper manner of sympathetic  engagement  through  a  protagonist  who  plays  the  spectator  on  the stage. Jaffeire’s request to Pierre, “let me partake the troubles of thy bosom,” voices the  desire  of  the  model  spectator  to  intermingle  his  own  person  with  the  fictive other  of  the  drama.37  It  invites  the  audience  into  a  particular  sort  of  engagement with the plight of the characters on stage.38    Both  Derek  Hughes  and  Debra  Leissner  interpret  Venice  Preserv’d  as essentially  a  depiction  of  a  character  split  between  two  opposing  systems  of identification.  Hughes  describes  the  play  as  a  portrayal  of  a  “hero  torn  between politics and domesticity” while Leissner contends that Jaffeir’s dilemma “dramatizes a  national  neurosis”  brought  on  by  social  and  political  turmoil.  Significantly,  both readings  see  Jaffeir  as  a  subject  representative  of  a  larger  set  of  dynamic relationships between citizens and societal values. But if this sort of representation is acceptable, then one must entertain the possibility of the inverse—we might see the whole play  as  a  public  display of  the  interior workings  of  an  individual mind, caught  between  systems  of  identification  and  resisting  the  necessity  of  choosing between  the  two.  The  divided  self  so  prominent  in  Venice  Preserv’d  is  part  and                                                         37 Pathetic drama’s ability to represent in the action the proper mode of spectation relies  on  a  process  of  distancing  from  formal  conventions  by  making  these conventions  salient  through  exaggeration.  In  this way,  it  is  not  unlike  the parodic metadrama, The Rehearsal, 1671, which itself struck a major blow against Dryden’s heroic drama. 38  In  fact, what  it  advocates  is  sympathy  in  the sense described a  century  later by Edmund  Burke  as  “a  sort  of  substitution,  by  which  we  are  put  into  the  place  of another man, and affected in many respects as he is affected”. 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parcel  of  sympathy.  From  Shaftesbury’s  “Advice  to  an  Author”  to  Adam  Smith’s Internal Spectator, sympathy’s possibility  for shared passions  implies a self  that  is not  autonomous  and  that  is  aware  of  itself  as  a  self  that  feels,  performs,  and spectates.   Venice  Preserv’d  insists  that  its  audience  enter  into  the  same  sort  of sympathetic  relationship  with  the  characters  on  the  stage  that  those  characters share with one another. This relationship is marked by deep identification nearing the point of interchangeability. As we have seen, Jaffeir’s identity is bound up with those of Pierre and Belvidera. We are told that Belvidera’s soul is Jaffeir’s soul, and that  Pierre’s  heart  and  Jaffeir’s  are  one  as  well.  The  three  are  linked  but  denied perfect sympathy until they are united in death at play’s end, finally overcoming the distinctions forced on them by Venetian society.    In  Venice  Preserv’d,  Otway  treats  subjectivity  as  necessarily  dependent  on affective  identification  with  a  social  system  even  as  his  protagonist  resists committing to such associations.39 Jaffeir must decide whether to align himself with the heroic world of politics and masculinity, or with the domestic, and feminine. The split between the two ideological systems is not tidy. Belvidera, though immediately marking the private sphere, is in the end loyal to the political system represented by her  father.  Jaffeir resists choosing between the  ideological systems represented by Belvidera  and Pierre  and  this  resistance  is  embodied  in  the  play’s  descriptions  of him  in  terms  characteristic  of  both  genders  the  play  depicts  the  crisis  of  an 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individual at  the point where  identities are being established  in a new way.  Jaffeir fittingly exclaims to Belvidera:                   th’art my Soul it self; wealth, friendship, honour,       All present joys, and earnest of all future,       Are summed in thee…     That  Belvidera  is  Jaffeir’s  “soul  itself”  shows  clearly  that  their  identities  are commingled.  Yet  he  stands  in  similar  relation  to  Pierre,  who  addresses  him:  “My Friend  good  morrow!/How  fares  the  honest  Partner  of  my  Heart?”  Notice  the temporal markers in Jaffeir’s speech to Belvidera above, “present” and “future” joys describe  their  relationship.  The  past  is  left  blank  and  as  it  is  made  explicit  that everything  is  to  be  linked  to  Belvidera  in  the  future,  this  should  be  taken  as indication that she will supplant Pierre’s role. Accordingly, Jaffeir grows increasingly effeminate  throughout  the course of  the play as he  is  influenced by his allegiance, albeit  a  reluctant  one,  to  this  feminine  subject  represented  by  Belvidera.  As  it becomes clear that identification with Pierre will not be allowed, the language used by Jaffeir to express his desire grows increasingly sexual.40 The sexualization of his desire  appears  to  occur  because  of  its  prohibition,  but  the  two  happen simultaneously. He becomes the advocate of a new, interior system of value. But in doing  so  marks  the  end  of  the  heroic.  Jaffeir  is  stuck  between  the  two  aesthetic systems,  two  sets  of  circumstances  and  he  must  determine  which  with  which  to align himself. His agency lies completely in his capacity to judge, to know by gauging his  feelings. But his affiliation with Pierre, representative of the heroic,  transforms 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his affect into sexual desire, stripping away his agency as his affective experience is defined by form. In Desire and Domestic Fiction Nancy Armstrong gives a Foucauldian account of the emergence of a new, feminine subjectivity, which she argues is equivalent to the modern  subject. Armstrong  claims  that  the promulgation of  the new  feminine subject  is  responsible  for  a  shift  in  cultural  preference  from  the  political  to  the domestic  sphere.  The  development  of  this  new  subjectivity  follows  from  the emergence  of  clear  demarcations  in  sexual  difference.  Much  of  what  Armstrong observes  at work  in  the domestic  novel  can be  seen  in Venice Preserv’d.41  Jaffeir’s dilemma  functions  as  a  portrayal  of  the  “struggle  between  competing  ideologies” described by Armstrong, or in the terms laid out above, as the result of a discourse that  categorizes  and  classifies,  separating passion  from reason,  the domestic  from the political, in terms of masculinity and femininity. This categorization leads to the breaking of promises, a breaking down of  the rhetorical basis of society. Put  in an impossible position,  torn between two categories and contracted  to both,  Jaffeir  is finally destroyed.  Jaffeir  must  choose  between  aligning  himself  with  the  masculine  world  of politics, or with the feminine and domestic, but the line between the two ideological systems is not clear. Belvidera, though immediately marking the private sphere, is in the  end  loyal  to  the  political  system  represented  by  her  father.  Jaffeir  resists                                                         41 Jessica Munns gives an account of how Otway’s plays were classified as feminine and affective by critics throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century. She cites Samuel Johnson, who wrote of The Orphan, “Its whole power is upon the affections; for it is not written with much comprehension of thought or elegance of expression.” Johnson’s criticism clearly sets comprehension in opposition to affect. 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choosing between the ideological systems represented by Belvidera and Pierre and this resistance is embodied in the play’s descriptions of him in terms characteristic of  both  genders.  As  all  of  these  figures  represent  the  deep  subjectivity  of  person centered in the figure of Jaffeir,  it can be seen that the play depicts the crisis of an individual  at  the  point  where  gendered  identities  are  being  established  in  a  new way.     JAFFEIR. Oh Belvidera! We must change the Scene       In which the past delights of Life were tasted… (II.ii.305‐6) Armstrong argues that domestic  fiction naturalizes  institutional restrictions on domestic practices and sexuality. Venice Preserv’d plays out this process of sexual division  but  in  its  attention  to  the  process  of  division  resists  its  naturalization. Jaffeir’s  “divided  Soul,  that wars within  [him]”  is  split  along  lines  of  sexual  desire which are figured in terms of affective identification (IV.2.301‐3). This division in his identity allows him to say quite honestly to Belvidera: JAFFEIR. No, th’art my Soul it self; wealth, friendship, honour,       All present joys, and earnest of all future,       Are summed in thee…    (IV.i.81‐85) That  Belvidera  is  Jaffeir’s  soul  itself  expresses  clearly  that  their  identities  are commingled. Yet he stands in similar relation to Pierre, who addresses him thusly:   PIERRE. My Friend good morrow!/How fares the honest Partner of      my Heart?”         (I.i.120‐121)  The temporal markers in Jaffeir’s speech to Belvidera above indicate the shift from heroic  to  pathetic  ideologies:  “present”  and  “future”  joys  are  embodied  in  their relationship. The past is left blank and as it is made explicit that everything is to be linked  to  Belvidera  in  the  future,  this  should  be  taken  as  indicative  of  her 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supplanting  Pierre’s  role.  Accordingly,  Jaffeir  grows  increasingly  effeminate throughout  the  course  of  the  play  as  he  is  influenced  by  his  allegiance,  albeit  a reluctant one, to this feminine subject represented by Belvidera. As it becomes clear that  identification with  Pierre will  not  be  allowed  the  language  used  by  Jaffeir  to express his desire grows increasingly sexual. The sexualization of his desire appears to occur because of  its prohibition, but the two happen simultaneously. As we will see,  it  is  the  entrance of  the market  as  a dominant  force  in  social  affairs  that  sets these changes in motion.   The  entrance  of  the  market  represents,  literally  and  figuratively,  the application of a fixed system of value.42 The fixed worth of sentiment represented by money means  that  there  is no  longer a place  for affective response, and agency  in the  form  of  subjective  judgment  is  lost.  In  a  word,  the  entrance  of  the  market represents the tyranny of form. Women are made prostitutes by the entrance of the market  into politics, which  corresponds with  the dissipation of  the heroic  system. Aquilina, whose Hellenic origins connect her with classical heroism, is marked as a “purchase” in the fading economy of manly valor, indicating that in this older system the developments of the market were already present. JAFFEIR. Oh Aquilina! Friend, to lose such Beauty,       The dearest purchase of thy noble labours… (I.i.165‐6) Pierre’s anger evokes Achilles’, but with the added tinge of the corruption of money. The  invasion of  economics  into  the play  suggests  that  a  citizen’s  obligation  to  the state depends on the state’s respect and indeed its capacity to protect private life.                                                          42 See Deidre Lynch, The Economy of Character. 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PIERRE. A souldier’s mistress Jaffeir’s his Religion,       When that’s prophan’d, all other Tyes are broken…                              (I.i.199‐200)  Though  Jaffeire  is  desperately  wants  affiliation  with  Pierre,  this  possibility  is doomed from the start because in stealing Belvidera from her father, he is guilty of the  same offense  that drives Pierre  to  rebel. Yet  this  is not  the only way  in which Jaffeir has been  infected by  the corrupting  forces of  the market. His penury  forces him to accept money from Pierre, almost as though his affections are being bought, and gives Belvidera as a pledge  to  the rebels who are,  ironically,  revolting against the system that has brought about conditions wherein private desire is invaded and proscribed. The practices of the rebels reify those that they would stamp out in the state, which renders salient the fact that their ideology is not so different. What has changed  is  that  ownership  has  been  destabilized.  Further,  a  superficial  system  in which ownership is linked to identity must be replaced.    The  corrupting  effects  of  money  necessitate  that  value  be  attributed elsewhere, that inner virtue become the privileged site. Thus Armstrong’s claim that “writing  about  the domestic woman afforded  a means of  contesting  the dominant notion  of  sexuality  that  understood  desirability  in  terms  of  a  woman’s  claims  to fortune  and  family name”  (Armstrong 8).  Indeed,  Jaffeir  is  eager  to  attest  that  his attachment to Belvidera is based on her private virtue. JAFFEIR. …My heart that awes me is too much my master:       Three years have past since first our Vows were plighted,       During which time, the World must bear me witness,       I have treated Belvidera like your Daughter,       The Daughter of a senator of Venice;       Distinction, Place, Attendance and Observance,       Due to her Birth, she always commanded;       Out of my little Fortune I have done this; 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 Because (though hopeless e’re to win your Nature)       The World might see, I lov’d her for her self,       Not as the Heiress of the great Priuli.—  (I.i.84‐95) Jaffeir has become the advocate of a new, interior system of value, and in doing so marks  the end of  the heroic. Pierre,  as  the  representative  figure of heroic  tragedy tells the feminized Jaffeir: PIERRE. this vile world and I have long been jangling,       And cannot part on better terms than now,       When only men like thee are fit to live in’t. (IV.ii.224‐7) 
Venice  Preserv’d  ‘s  thematic  resistance  to  heroic  form  is  not  an  expression  of resistance to the particular qualities of that genre, indeed many qualities are shared between  the  two,  so  much  as  it  is  an  attempt  to  circumvent  the  calcification  of response  brought  that  comes  with  an  established  and  highly  formalized  genre. Formulae would interfere with the pathetic tragedy’s aim for affective response and affective judgment, would serve as a sort of anaesthetic. The many acclamations of Otway  on  the  grounds  of  his  naturalness  put  his  work  in  the  context  of  the contemporary discourse on the binary of art and nature. This brings us up against a topic far too unwieldy and complex to approach in any depth in the present study. But this gets at  the concern over avoiding the artificiality of art  in order to elicit a kind  of  sensible  response  that  is  not  prescribed  by  formal  expectations.43  The 
                                                        43 See Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko, Alexander Pope’s Essay on Criticism… Appraisals of Shakespeare during the eighteenth century centered around the ‘naturalness’ of his work. See D. Nichol Smith, XVIIIth Century Essays on Shakespeare, 1903, and Otway was frequently brought up as the contemporary playwright who best compared to Shakespeare.  See  Taylor,  Otway’s  Venice  Preserv’d  and  The  Orphan,  1950. Additionally this brings up the terms to be used by Henry Fielding in his “Essay on the Knowledge of the Characters of Men” (1743). 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efficacy  of  pathetic  tragedy  depends  on  its  being  a  genre  between  genres,  one  in which there is a certain degree of tension between expectation and action.    
Situation of the actor: Betterton’s Jaffeir   Many of the later negative appraisals of the sentimental were not an issue for viewers of the play’s initial run because the particular qualities of the actor playing the lead role which would have tempered the perception of Jaffeir as bathetic rather than a pathetic figure. Eighteenth‐century playgoers came to a performance with a great  deal  of  expectation,  including  anticipation  of  the  sort  of  characters  to  be encountered based upon  the actors  listed on  the playbill. Viewers’ experience of a character  would  be  largely  colored  by  their  knowledge  of  the  actor  or  actress playing a particular part. For instance, in Sexual Suspects: Eighteenth­Century Players 
and  Sexual  Ideology,  Kristina  Straub has  shown how  spectators’  knowledge  of  the sexual  reputations  of  actors  affected  reception  of  performance.  Such  anticipation would  have  affected  the  reception  of  the  character  of  Jaffeir  in Venice  Preserv’d’s initial run.   Venice  Preserv’d  was  first  performed  by  Thomas  Betterton’s  company  at Dorset  Garden  on  February  9,  1682,  with  Betterton  himself  playing  the  role  of Jaffeir.   In  the  nineteenth  century  dramatic  reviewers  lamented  that  Jaffier was at  best  a  selfish  fellow  who  alternated  between  roaring  and whining.  Broad‐minded  critics  sometimes  conceded  that  it  was  an uphill,  difficult  part,  which  put  an  actor  on  his  mettle  to  keep sympathetic. How Betterton  acted  the part  can only be  guessed,  but one may be sure that his Jaffeir was no whiner.  (Taylor 146) 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Betterton’s  stoic  character  would  have  put  the  figure  on  stage  at  odds  with  the judgment  of  Jaffeir’s  as  whimpering.  Betterton’s  stature  and  age  would  have tempered the unmanly impression that later critics formed of Jaffeir. In appearance he was athletic, slightly above average in height, with a tendency to stoutness; “his voice  was  strong  rather  than  melodious,  but  in  recitation  it  was  used  with  the greatest dexterity” (Lowe). At the time of the first performance of Venice Preserv’d Betterton would have been  forty‐six or  forty‐seven years old,  firmly  in his middle age, and solidly established as a fixture of the London stage. His repertory included a large  number  of  Shakespearian  roles,  many  of  them  presented  in  the  versions adapted by Davenant, Dryden, Shadwell and Nahum Tate. He played Lear opposite Elizabeth  Barry's  Cordelia  in  Tate's  modified  version  of  Shakespeare's King  Lear. Betterton was  himself  author  of  several  adaptations which were  popular  in  their day.44    In  The  History  of  the  Stage  (1742),  Colley  Cibber  writes  “Mr.  Thomas Betterton’s Character.” Cibber proclaims,  “Betterton was an Actor,  as  Shakespeare was an Author, both without competitors.” Cibber credits Betterton’s acting on the grounds  of  his  ability  to moderate  passions,  to  express  feeling without  “tearing  a passion to rags.” And Steele writes in a memorial piece in The Tatler that Betterton was a man “from whose action  I had received more strong  impressions of what  is great  and  noble  in  human  nature,  than  from  the  arguments  of  the  most  solid philosophers,  or  the  descriptions  of  the  most  charming  poets  I  had  ever  read” (Tatler 167). These impressions indicate that the character of Betterton was itself a                                                         44 See Robert Lowe’s Thomas Betterton, 1891. 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model  of  stoic  virtue.  Yet Cibber  grants Betterton  special  esteem  for his  ability  to change with his characters:      A further excellence in Betterton, was, that he could vary his spirit to      the different characters he acted. These wild impatient starts, that      fierce and flashing fire, which he threw into Hotspur, never came from     the unruffled temper of his Brutus: When the Betterton Brutus was      provok’d, in his dispute with Cassius, his spirit flew only to his eye…   Steele compares Betterton to Roscius and repeats a line Tully had attributed to the roman actor  that  reinforces Cibber’s  claims:  “The perfection of  an actor  is  only  to become what he is doing.” Further, Cibber writes, “Othello became him better than the sighs and tenderness of Castalio: for though in Castalio he only excell’d others, in Othello  he  excell’d  himself…”  This  line  of  praise  for  Betterton,  one  of  the  most respected actors of his time, on the account of his protean ability to shift character might  suggest  that  the critic  is not  so  fond of  that which viewers are  said  to have taken in stride, the fact that they never quite lost sight of the character of the known actor  as  he  plays  a  character  on  the  stage.45  But  Cibber  still  refers  to  these characters  in  proprietary  terms,  e.g.  “the  Betterton  Brutus”  suggesting  that  even though  Betterton  excelled  at  “becoming  what  he  was  doing,”  of  losing  his  own character  to  the  situation of  the character he was playing,  there was  still  a  strong sense  in which  he was  himself  become  a  figure  on  the  stage meaning  double  and emphasizing  the  importance  of  situation by way  of  the  distance  between his  own reputation and the written character of Jaffeir.                                                           45 See Freeman, 18. 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Governing the crowd   Tendentious relationships are enacted not only on the stage, but between the stage  and  the  audience  as  well.  Though  Eric  Rothstein  claims  that  restoration tragedy  is  to  be  understood  in  terms  of  aesthetic  response  as  opposed  to  an aesthetic  of  creation,  and  Allardyce  Nicoll  argues  that  “all  dramatic  art  depends ultimately for its form and content on its audience,” Venice Preserv’d exhibits signs of engaging in the task of audience shaping (Nicoll 5). This claim does not contradict the  notion  that  audience  determines  the  shape  of  drama,  but  it  suggests  that  the relationship  be  understood  in  more  dialectic  terms.  Venice  Preserv’d’s  aesthetic arises very much as a response to the nature of the restoration audience. But rather than  cater  to  the  demands  of  audience,  as  Rothstein  and  Nicoll  seem  to  suggest, Otway’s  play  exerts  demands  of  its  own.  Venice  Preserv’d’s  strategy  of  creating  a sympathetic  connection with  the  audience was  practical  as well  as  aesthetic.  The restoration  play  had  to  contend  with  the  action  in  the  pit  for  the  audience’s attention.        The  conditions  in  which  drama  was  staged  during  the  restoration  were unsuited  for  a  serious  playwright  such  as  Otway.  The  challenge  of  conveying significant meaning  to  an  audience  as much  interested  in  impressing  one  another with  their witty  quips,  in pursuing  the masked  courtesans  in  the pit,  or  simply  in dodging payment would have been no small one. Indeed, Allardyce Nicoll might be understating the conditions of  the theater  in writing: “When we conjure up before our minds  such  an  audience  and  such  a management  fearful  at  every moment  of offending the slender clientele, we can understand that attention to the play in hand 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was grievously lacking” (Nicoll 14). Indeed, the character Pierre’s request within the play for a dignified death may have worked double duty as a plea that the audience remain quiet and attentive during a crucial scene.       PIERRE. Captain, you should be a Gentleman of honour,         Keep off the Rabble, that I may have room         To entertain my Fate, and dye with Decency.                     (V.i.473‐5)  Such a multi‐valent utterance reveals that the boundary between the action on the play  and  the  interaction  between  audience  and  actors  was  permeable  at  best. Otway’s ploy to sway engagement and ultimately identification from the aristocratic, masculine  society  of  the  pit  to  the  pathetic  scene  on  the  stage  by  appealing  to  a feminine  capacity  for  sympathy  runs  parallel  to  the  dramatic  theme  of  Venice 
Preserv’d. Jaffeir, the sentimental man, teaches theater‐goers how do watch a play as he inscribes in them what it is to be a subject. For this shift in subjectivity might be seen  as  an  evolution  in  the  identity  of  drama  itself—Jaffeir  is  a  figure  for  drama caught  between  generic  identities,  or  rhetorical  contracts.  Heroic  tragedy  is associated with masculinity, politics, and formal determinations and is represented by Pierre; it is a form that is no longer tenable. Jaffeir longs to associate himself with the  formal  certainty  of  the  heroic  even  while  his  being  already  wedded  to  the domestic guarantees that such an association would be a dead end. Belvidera looks ahead to domestic tragedy and shows Otway’s desire for a new dramatic form that might  better  express  the  complexities  of  character.  Pathetic  tragedy  then  is  a necessary step  toward  the sentimental as  it works  to establish a new relationship between audience and stage. 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 Otway’s  ploy  to  sway  engagement  and  ultimately  identification  from  the aristocratic,  masculine  society  of  the  pit  to  the  pathetic  scene  on  the  stage  by appealing  to  a  sentimental  capacity  for  sympathy  runs  parallel  to  the  dramatic theme of Venice Preserv’d.  Jaffeir,  the  feminized man,  teaches  theatergoers how do watch a play as he shows them what it is to be a subject. This shift in subjectivity is inextricably mixed with an evolution in the identity of drama itself—Jaffeir might be read  as  a  figure  for  drama  caught  between  generic  identities.  Heroic  tragedy  is associated with masculinity, politics, and formal determinations and is represented by Pierre; it is a form that is no longer tenable. Jaffeir longs to associate himself with the  formal  certainty  of  the  heroic  even  while  his  being  already  wedded  to  the domestic guarantees that such an association would be a dead end. Belvidera looks ahead to domestic tragedy and shows Otway’s desire for a new dramatic form that might  better  express  an  alternate  model  of  character.  Affective  tragedy  is  a necessary step towards a more productive aesthetic as it works to establish a new relationship  between  audience  and  stage  that  comes  in  the  form  of  sympathetic identification.   
Banks and judgment   While Otway’s Venice Preserv’d is the textual focus of this chapter, it was not the  sole  example  of  innovating  pathetic  tragedy.  Otway’s  play  provides  a  useful example  for  exegesis  because,  in  addition  to  being  perhaps  the  most  popular example of pathetic tragedy in the eighteenth century, it vividly underscores many of  the  dramaturgical,  thematic,  and  performative  issues  central  to  the  pathetic. 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Equally  important  to  the development of pathetic  tragedy were Nathaniel Lee and John  Banks.46  I  wish  to  turn  briefly  to  Banks’s  work  at  this  point  to  highlight  an important element of the pathetic drama that aligns it with a relocation of judgment from prescribed form to the experience of the observer that was impacting the fields of  rhetoric,  natural  philosophy,  aesthetics,  and  in  the  emergence  of  moral  sense philosophy; all of which presage  the advent of  sensibility.47  In  John Banks’s Virtue 
Betray’d, first staged in 1682, passions, which run rampant in heroic tragedy, are in need of taming. The source of tragedy, however, is not that King Henry is lusty, but that his uncontrolled passion results in the breaking of promises or the betrayal of virtue.  The  play’s  title might  be  applied  in  a  number  of  ways:  to  virtuous  Queen Anne  who  is  raised  up  only  to  be  cast  aside  when  Henry’s  passions  find  a  new object; to Piercy, to whom Anne had pledged her heart, only to marry the King; or, to King  Henry  who  has  betrayed  himself  by  heeding  the  counsel  of  self‐interested advisors.  According  to  the  Cardinal,  virtue  is  incompatible with  unlawful  love.  So, the first lesson of this play is that virtue is roughly equivalent with legitimate affect, but this is a problem when a lusty tyrant controls the law.    The  play  opens with  Rochford  lamenting  the  forced marriage  of  his  sister, Anne  Bullen.  The  evil  of  loveless  marriage,  and  the  tyranny  of  the  fathers  who enforce them are themes that run throughout pathetic tragedy. This might be read alternately as saying something about the importance of contract, or the wrongs of                                                         46 See Laura Brown in English Dramatic Form. 47  Peter Kivy  is  useful  to  look  at  for  a  perspective  on  the  shifting  of  the power of valuation from artist to crowd. He sees this development expressed in the writings of Frances Hutcheson, a philosopher whose works show the proximity of theories of aesthetics and moral sense philosophy. 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patriarchal, aristocratic  ideology.48 But  I  take marriage to stand  for sympathy, and this  partly  explains  sentimental  literature’s  advocacy  for  romantic  marriage—a union in which both parties feel the same love is a model for perfect sympathy. King Henry is wreaking havoc by rendering sympathy impossible:     PIERCY. The king! What, would the tyrant be a god! To take upon        himself to dispose of hearts, and join unequal souls to one        another?  In “joining unequal souls,” that is, souls that do not feel the same for one another, or are  not  sympathetic,  King  Henry  is  said  to  show  a  disregard  for  the  heart.  And though he  is  led about by his passions,  the heart he  least  regards  is his own, as  it should be working as his guide in moral judgments.   In  the  dedication  of  Virtue  Betray’d,  John  Banks  explains  his  choice  of domestic history as the material for his play, setting himself apart from other poets who find it      an easier course to write of the improbable and romantick actions of      princes remote, both by distance of time and place, than to be confin’d     at home, where ev’ry school‐boy has a right to be a critick.   Banks appears strangely eager to invite criticism at the outset of his play. But what he is up to here gets more to the point of the play and announces his allegiance to tenets  that  will  come  to  be  associated  with  the  sentimental.  He  advocates  an abridgement  of  the  distance  between  the  play’s  audience  and  its  setting,  and 
                                                        48 Victoria Kahn’s Wayward Contracts is useful to consider both here, in considering the relation of affect to contract, and in the analysis of Venice Preserv’d below, where I look at the relation of affiliation to subjectivity. 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connects  this  to  the  issue of  judgment.49 Banks,  it would seem, wants an audience that judges. In fact, the real moral of the play concerns subjective judgment and the cultivation of moral sense.      The  play  does  not  close  on  the  pathetic  spectacle  of  Anne  going  to  her execution;  instead it presents its audience with a penitent King Henry.    In his final speech, the King resolves to reign alone, realizing too late that his subjects have led him astray because his passions have opened him to serving their interests.      KING. If subjects thus their Monarchs will restrain;       ‘Tis they are Kings; for them we idly Reign:       Then I’ll first break the Yoak; this Maxim still       shall be my Guide (A Prince can do no Ill!)       In spite of slaves, his genius let him trust;        for heav’n ne’er made a king but made him just.  (V.i.)                                                                                                                          This  seems  overtly  royalist,  and  apologist,  but  the  speech  deals  with  a  strange inversion  of  power;  the  suggestion  of  inversion,  along  with  the  King’s  resolve  to trust in his own genius, and the dedication’s pronouncement that “ev’ry school‐boy has  a  right  to  be  a  critick,”  turns  this  into  a  call  for  the  exercise  of  judgment generally.  
Sympathy and spectacle 
Venice  Preserv’d  works  to  engage  by  stirring  the  placid  waters  of  formal expectation  through  its  emphasis  on  spectacle:  scenes which  emphasize  the  place                                                         49 Steele also argued for the value of everyday characters and a domestic setting, as did writers of domestic  tragedy  like George Lillo,  author of The London Merchant, and Joanna Baillie makes the case again late in the 18th century. The common thread is the belief that everyday settings and characters that the audience can sympathize with are more conducive to moral edification. 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situation  has  in  shaping  character  and  response.  The  pathetic  situations  around which  the  play  is  structured  are meant  to  draw  in  the  audience  through pity  and fear—a  sudden  affective  identification  rather  than  a  slow,  unfolding  one.  Max Scheler,  in his  study of  sympathy, describes  certain  cases of divided  consciousness, noting, “they do not come about progressively, through the imitative performance of individual utterances,  gestures or  actions,  but  in  a  sudden  leap”  (Scheler 24). The explanation  for  the efficacy of  the shock of  the sudden pathetic scene, particularly relevant to the claims about affective tragedy here, might be seen in Scheler’s claim that true sympathy “occur[s] only when two spheres of man’s consciousness which are  by nature  always present  concurrently  in  him,  are  almost  or wholly  empty  of particular content: the cognitive, spiritual and rational sphere (which is personal in form),  and  the  sphere  of  physical  and  corporeal  sensation  and  sensory  feeling” (Scheler 35). It is through the shock of the affective aesthetic that the play draws the spectator  suddenly  out  of  himself;  his  attention  is  pulled  away  from  the  crowd around him and into the scene of the tragedy.  The  impact  of  the  pathetic  spectacle  in  its  capacity  to  inspire  horror  is recognized  but  misunderstood  in  the  aesthetically  minded  plan  of  the revolutionaries: RENAULT. Without the least remorse then let’s resolve       With Fire and Sword t’exterminate these Tyrants;       And when we shall behold those curst Tribunals,       Stain’d by the Tears and sufferings of the Innocent…       With all that sad disorder can produce,       To make a spectacle of horror…  (III.ii.375‐9; 383‐4) Renault’s plan is to replace one pathetic scene with another. The tear‐stained halls of  the  tribunal,  presumably  stained with  the  tears  of  the  soldiers who  have  been 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unjustly persecuted, are to covered up with a new scene of horror; the tears are to be washed away with blood. But  the  inadequacy of  this heroic aesthetic,  rooted  in the logic of providence and poetic justice, is revealed in Renault’s attempt to assuage the consciences of the rebels with the insistence that “there’s nothing pure upon the Earth,” suggesting quite strongly that the heroic can no longer accommodate virtue (III.ii.386).  This,  as  has  been  argued  above,  is  because  virtue  has  moved  from external  forms  to  private  interiority.  The  rebels’  plan  is  to  create  a  spectacle  of destruction  that will  cover  their  tears—in  effect, masking  their  own  interiority  in protest.  The  pathetic  spectacle  however works  in  the  opposite manner,  providing access to interiority through affect. In  stark  contrast  to  this  is  Pierre’s  account  of  the  effects  of  Belvidera’s suffering on a crowd of spectators:     PIERRE. Hads’t thou but seen, as I did, how at last Thy Beauteous Belvidera, like a Wretch       That’s doomed to Banishment, came weeping forth,       Shining through Tears, like April Sun’s in showers       That labour to orecome the Cloud that loads ‘m,       Whilst two you Virgins, on whose Arms she lean’d,       Kindly lookt up, and at her Grief grew sad,       As if the catch’t the Sorrows that fell from her:       Even the lewd Rabble that were gather’d round       To see the sight, stood mute when they beheld her;       Govern’d their roaring throats and grumbled pity…                    (I.i.256‐266) Pierre  describes  a  scene  of  irresistible  sympathy  where  Belvidera’s  suffering permeates  all  who  observe  the  spectacle.  But  the  effect  of  this  shared  sorrow  is beneficial. It is compared to life‐giving spring showers, and it creates social order as it “govern[s]” even the “lewd Rabble,” transforming their roars to “grumbled pity.” 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Problems as pathetic drama becomes a formalized genre   Nicholas Rowe’s The Fair Penitent, first staged in 1702, is a later example of pathetic tragedy. It responds to a play like the Man of Mode, and like Venice Presev’d, it  can  be  read  as  a  meta‐drama:  Lothario  is  a  carry‐over  from  the  comedy  of manners, but here the rake  is cast as  the villain, his  joi de vivre portrayed as cold‐hearted disregard  for  all  that  is  virtuous.  Further,  it  continues  the  feminization of the sentimental protagonist. Lucilla wonders that Calista could have any feelings for the  vile  Lothario  when  she  has  the  chance  to  join  herself  to  the  new  model  of sentimental man.      LUCILLA. Why do you follow still that wand’ring fire that has misled        your weary steps, and leaves you benighted in a wilderness of        woe, that false Lothario? Turn from the deceiver; turn, and        behold where gentle  Altamont, kind as the softest virgin of our        sex… sighs at  your feet and  woos you to be happy. (II.i.)  The  feminized  man  that  emerges  from  pathetic  tragedy  anticipates  Harley  in Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling.50 Altamont, even more than Jaffeir, shows that this feminine  subjectivity  is  marked  by  the  benevolence,  charitability,  and  sympathy characteristic  of  the  sentimental.  But  in  the  final  scenes  of  The  Fair  Penitent  we begin to see that sentiment has a tendency toward morbidity if left unchecked and the play suggests that this undermines pathetic tragedy’s bid at sympathy and moral instruction.   Sentimental  comedy  seems  to  be  addressing  the  problem  that  emerges  in pathetic  drama:  how  can  sentimentality  lead  to  anything  but  suffering  and  false                                                         50 G. A. Starr has argued that the protagonist of Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko  is the true precursor to the man of feeling in his essay “Aphra Behn and the Genealogy of the 
Man of Feeling”, 1990. 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sympathy? Having, as I’ve claimed above, roughly the same aim as pathetic tragedy, the writers of  sentimental  comedy must  come up with a different way  to  create a sympathetic  response.  Sentimental  comedy  intersperses  pathetic  scenes  with humor.  Judging  from  Richard  Steele’s  words,  this  form  is  more  a  concession  to audience than a pure artistic decision. He claims  in a review of Terence’s The Self­
Tormentor  that  a  sufficiently  sensible  culture  would  need  nothing  pathetic  in  its plays; he writes: “There cannot be a greater argument for the good understanding of a people, than a sudden consent to give their approbation of a sentiment which has no  emotion  in  it”  (Spectator  502).  Meaning,  that  sentiment,  and  approbation  are associated  with  emotion  on  the  British  stage  and  this  is  the  result  of  weak understanding. In “wit… encourag’d in the interests of virtue” Cibber and Steele find an  alternative  to  the  excess  of  pathos  that  leads  to  the  decay  of  understanding (Preface to The Lying Lover). In Cibber’s Love’s Last Shift, wit becomes the means for achieving  the  sympathy  represented  by  romantic marriage.  The  virtuous  Amanda disguises herself as a wanton in order to win back the love of her faithless husband, Loveless.  In  keeping with my  readings  of  these  plays  as meta‐dramatic,  I  contend that Amanda’s ploy models the use of wit in sentimental comedy in that a trick must be  played  on  the  fickle  crowd  in  order  to  get  them  to  do what  is  good  for  them. Sentimental  comedy  is essentially pathetic  tragedy with a  twist of wit  to keep  the crowd engaged. Both are genres that try to cultivate sensibility through sympathetic engagement. 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Conclusion     In  giving  an  alternate  account  of  the  genealogy  of  sentimental  drama,  this chapter  has  answered  the  criticisms  aimed  at  it  on  the  grounds  of  its  unnatural characters. The forces at work influencing the innovations of pathetic tragedy were also  inspiring,  or  inspired  by  new  considerations  of  the  nature  of  subjectivity  in relation to experience, of epistemology and judgment. The development of pathetic drama as a genre created a unique challenge because it was a genre fundamentally opposed  to  generic  convention.  It  emphasized  affective  response  and  spectatorial judgment.  A  distance  between  character  and  genre  makes  genre  apparent  and creates  pathetic  response.  Reveals  the  relation  of  situation  to  character  and judgment.  In  this  way,  the  pathetic  seems  to  be  in  league  with  sensation  and  its associates, sentiment and sympathy. Situation and concernment seem to be the two key elements in a ‘pathetic scene’: the disposition of bodies plus the play of emotion.   While  any  one  character  in  pathetic  tragedy  cannot  and  does  not  model subjectivity—because  this would presume an autonomous  self—the production of the pathetic figure as the focus of attention does make claims about the status of the self.  The  pathetic  figure  is  a  rhetorical  figure,  a  means  of  engaging  the  audience sympathetically. What  emerges  is  a  rhetorical  sort  of  person,  one whose passions are felt by all in the audience, and one that can inhabit, or be inhabited by them as well. But, as the pathetic figure is embodied, no imaginative work is really needed to feel the effect/affect as long as the actor is doing his job. This language of the body, the  belief  in  the  capacity  for  an  actor  to  transmit  passion  from  himself  to  his audience  through his  postures  and movements  and  its  cultural  significance  in  the 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eighteenth century is territory that has received due attention.51 What has not been covered is the genealogy of the phenomenon—how the body becomes inserted as a signifier  in  the  rhetoric  of  social  discourse,  giving  life  to  a  pun  on  figure.  Though perhaps this  is coming at the issue from a perspective of textual prejudice and the question  should  be  reconsidered—since  rhetoric was  a  technique  of  oratory  long before it was one of writing it should be no surprise that the figure of pathos should be embodied on the stage.   





             
  The Beggar’s Opera debuted at  the Theatre Royal on  January 29, 1728, and ran for sixty‐two nights in its first season, the record for that time.52 The first night’s performance  was  attended  by  Pope  and  other  notable  figures,  and  was  eagerly followed in Ireland by Swift, whose suggestion it was to write a “Newgate pastoral.” The  success  of  this  formally  innovative  play  was  a  surprise  to  some.  After  being turned down by Colley Cibber at Drury Lane, Gay took his play to the manager of the Theatre Royal, John Rich, who only agreed to stage the play at the insistence of the Duchess of Queensbury. But the ballad opera quickly made “Rich gay and Gay rich,” as their contemporaries said.53 Gay wrote in a letter to Swift:     The Beggar’s Opera hath now been acted thirty‐six times, and was as      full the last night as the first, and yet there is not the least probability      of a thin audience, though there is a discourse about the town, that the     directors of the Royal Academy of Music design to solicit against its      being played on the outlandish opera days, as it is now called. On the      benefit day of one of the actresses last week, one of the players falling      sick, they were obliged to give out another play, or dismiss the       audience. A play was given out, but the audience called out for the      Beggar’s Opera, and they were forced to play it, or the audience would     not have stayed.          (20 March 1728)  Its  popularity  elicited,  in  1728  and  after,  a  flood  of  response,  in  the  forms  of pamphlets, sermons,  letters, and newspaper verse. It received newspaper criticism                                                         52 See William Schultz, Gay’s Beggar’s Opera: its Content, History & Influence, 1923. 53 The Craftsman, February 3, 1728. 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that was  both  critical  and  complimentary  to  an  extreme  degree. There was much debate  about  the  social  effects  of  The  Beggar’s  Opera  over  the  course  of  the eighteenth century.    Some of the play’s sharpest critics claimed that it led to a swell in the number of highwaymen as young men sought to emulate the gallant Macheath.54 T.F. Dibdin, the  nephew  of  Charles  Dibdin  and  editor  of  a  weekly  journal  called The  Director (1807), printed a letter from a professed clergyman which gives an account of two young brothers, jailed for highway robbery a crime which they were inspired to by their viewing of The Beggar’s Opera.  In his commentary, Dibdin goes so far as to say:     The historical anecdote of the day, that the success of this Opera      caused a distinguishable increase in highway robberies, appears to me     both natural and probable. Thus the Author (as others have been      since) became an accessory before the fact, to all the robberies and      murders which have been suggested by the representation of it.                   The Director, 1807  The  problem  arises,  Dibdin  claims,  because  the  spectator  admires  either  Polly  or Macheath  and  becomes  habituated  “for  the  society  of  abandoned  prostitutes.” Others argued with equal  force that the play had the opposite effect  for nearly the same reasons. In “On Actors and Acting”, 1815, Hazlitt ventured that “the acting of the Beggar's Opera a certain number of nights every year since it was first brought out has done more towards putting down the practice of highway robbery, than all the gibbets that ever were erected” because, “a person, after seeing this piece, is too 
                                                        54 The Newgate Calendar mentions Mary Young, hanged in 1740, who called herself Jenny  Diver,  and  Isaac  Darking,  a  highwayman  who  modeled  himself  closely  on Macheath,  and  read  The  Beggar’s  Opera  in  the  death  cell.  5  vols  (London,  1779) 2.385; 4.191‐7. 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deeply imbued with a sense of humanity, is in too good humour with himself and the rest of the world, to set about cutting throats or rifling pockets.”   Robert  Bisset,  in The  Life  of  Edmund  Burke,  1798,  explains  that  Burke  had little esteem for The Beggar’s Opera, believing that its merits were overbalanced by its moral deficiencies. Burke did not however hold with  the  common opinion  that the play inspired imitation. Rather, he found The Beggar’s Opera’s moral failing in,        arraying vice in agreeable colours, and representing the greatest      crimes without exciting the proper detestation ; that there is more      pains taken to shew that others are greater villains than thieves and      highwaymen, than to teach and induce these to refrain from their      villainies.              (151‐2)  Burke  denied  the  “hypothesis”  of  Gay’s  play,  that  thieves  and  courtiers  were essentially the same, and perceived it as representing “mankind, in civilized society, as universally vicious” (152).   But going back to those in the know, the beggar’s opera was believed to have an aim, a function. In a letter to Gay dated November 27, 1728, Swift writes:     The Beggar’s Opera hath knocked down Gulliver; I hope to see Pope’s      Dulness knock down the Beggar’s Opera, but not till it hath fully done      its job. To expose vice, and make people laugh with innocence, does      more public service than all the ministers of state from Adam to      Walpole…   Swift repeats this theme of the play doing work in a letter to Pope: “You talk of this Dunciad, but  I  am  impatient  to have  it volare per ora—there  is now a vacancy  for fame;  the  Beggar’s  Opera  hath  done  its  task, discedat  uti  conviva  satur.” Meaning, roughly, to break up, or disperse through the use of satire. But what structures were the Scriblerians trying to break up? 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 In  1714  Nicholas  Rowe’s The  Tragedy  of  Jane  Shore,  a  play  bearing  strong resemblance  to  the manner of Otway’s and Banks’s pathetic dramas of  the 1680’s, was  performed  at  Drury  Lane  where  it  had  a  successful  run  of  nineteen  nights. Rowe’s drama draws heavily on pathos, relying  for  its effect almost exclusively on the  presence  of  the  suffering  figure  of  the  titular  character.55  But  it  differs  from Otway’s Venice  Preserv’d  in  that  there  is  no  striving  against  form,  thematically  or generically. Jane Shore is passively acquiescent, and the tragedy itself is a distillation of Otway’s techniques. The thematic and formal passivity of Rowe’s play expresses a struggle to reestablish the reality of disinterestedness in response to views typified by  Hobbes  and  Mandeville  that  reinforce  economic  and  political  self‐interest.  In 
Power of the Passive Self, Scott Paul Gordon points to an “inescapable suspicion” in Mandeville’s  worldview.  This  suspicion  of  motives  puts  people  in  a  real  bind. Characters  are  portrayed  as  passive  in  order  to  deny  that  they  are  calculating. Agency  is  located  outside  of  them,  in  God,  Nature,  or  in  other  characters.  The discourse  of  passivity  constructs  a  self  whose  disinterestedness  is  guaranteed  by forces outside of conscious control, external forces that work through the body and bypass  the  mind.  This  discourse  seems  to  tie  in  rather  nicely  with  the  forced insistence on obedience put into effect with the passage of the Riot Acts in the same year that Rowe’s play was enjoying such success. The Riot Acts gave the parliament a  way  of  controlling  unruly  crowds—even  if  they  were  not  unruly.  And  it  is interesting  to  place  this  development  next  to  the  growing  importance  of  public opinion and  concerns  for  audience  in  the  theater.  Just  as  the Riot Acts  enforced a                                                         55 See Laura Brown on she‐tragedy in English Dramatic Form, 1660­1760, 1981. 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sort  of  civil  obedience,  pathetic  drama  like  Rowe’s  led  to  a  sort  of  passive engagement.  And  I  think  this  subtle  difference  between  obedience  and  passive virtue is to the point which I argued in the previous chapter: it is a mistake to think of  the  pathetic  mode  as  a  negative  response  to  Hobbes,  rather  it  represents submission of  the  contracting  self  to  civil  society  as described  in Leviathan.56  The Pathetic  drama’s  wedding  of  materialism  and  Aristotelian  rhetoric  renders concernment  a  form  of  sympathy  as  it  aims  at  a  sort  of  deep material  resonance between  audience  and  character,  and  a  complete  wedding  of  character  to  form. These generic principles imply a definition of persons as deeply tied to the ordering ideological systems of state. Rowe’s timing was impeccable, introducing a drama of passive  virtue  just  as  the  Tories  were  driven  from  power.  In  1715,  Rowe  staged another  She  Tragedy, Lady  Jane  Grey.  This  one was  not  nearly  as  popular  as  Jane 
Shore,  but  the year was still  a good one  for Rowe as he was named poet  laureate. The passivity of form, theme, and character in Rowe’s plays amounts to an indirect plea  for  accepting  the  sovereignty  of  George.  The  pure  appeal  to  pathos,  with  its growing  association  with  the  passive  acceptance  of  generic  form  and  the commitment to the contracted structure of civil society which form represents must have  chafed  the  sensibilities  of  the  Tory writers who  suddenly  found  themselves scrambling for patronage.57   
                                                        56  See  Jonathan  Lamb, The  Evolution  of  Sympathy  in  the  Long  Eighteenth  Century, 2009. 57  For  a  demonstration  of  the  corollary  between  formal  expectation  and  political contract  see Victoria Kahn, Wayward Contracts:  the  Crisis  of  Political Obligation  in 
England, 1640­1674, (2004). 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 No  longer  favored by  the court,  the Scriblerians  found themselves  in a new relationship  with  their  audience,  a  relationship  not  altogether  uncommon  as audiences  became  more  demotic.  Previously  politics,  taste,  wit,  fashion,  and judgment in general were the preserves of an elite. But pathos’s democratization of judgment  joined  in  the  host  of  social  forces  at  work  to  render  public  opinion  a powerful force.58 Jonathan Swift had opened his “Argument Against the Abolishment of Christianity” by positioning himself as a lone voice of reason against the growing tide of public opinion.     I am very sensible what a weakness and presumption it is to reason      against the general humour and disposition of the world. I remember      it was with great justice, and a due regard to the freedom, both of the      public and the press, forbidden upon several penalties to write, or      discourse, or lay wagers against the — even before it was confirmed      by Parliament; because that was looked upon as a design to oppose      the current of the people, which, besides the folly of it, is a manifest      breach of the fundamental law, that makes this majority of opinions      the voice of God.            (Swift, 1708)   Public  sentiment  counted  for  something  and needed  some kind of  regulation  if  it was  to  be  managed  and  exploited:  hence  the  prevoyance  of  Addison  and  Steele whose magazine, The Spectator, aimed to elevate the public’s tastes. The stated goal of The Spectator was "to enliven morality with wit, and to temper wit with morality... to bring philosophy out of the closets and libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs  and  assemblies,  at  tea‐tables  and  coffeehouses."  Addison  and  Steele recommended that their readers "consider it part of the tea‐equipage" and not leave                                                         58  The  flourishing  of  print  culture was  hugely  important  to  the  growing  power  of public  opinion  as  has  been  demonstrated  by  Habermas.  Still,  I  think  it  is  worth focusing  on  the  other  factors  that  shifted  power  of  judgment  to  the  audience: aesthetics (see Kivy); the pathetic; and scientific method. 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the  house without  reading  it  in  the morning  (No.  10). One  of  its  functions was  to provide readers with educated, topical talking points, and advice in how to carry on conversations and social interactions in a polite manner. But it is not clear that Swift and company wanted to have the public to tea, no matter how many issues of The 
Spectator  they  had  read.  Their  sort  of  wit  belonged  to  an  era  prior  to  the  public sphere. But if it was to find a satisfactory position in the new dispensation, it had to acknowledge an audience outside the elite company of the club. If one sets A Tale of 
a Tub alongside Shaftesbury’s “Letter Concerning Enthusiasm” one sees that this is done  by  means  of  irony,  but  irony  put  to  new  uses  to  fit  the  changing  contexts.  Instead of saying what one means by not saying it, or saying the opposite, in such a way  that  everyone  instantly  understands,  irony  becomes  a  means  of  defending oneself against those not fit to understand.  The growing authority of public opinion in matters of taste led to a transformation of the function of wit. The ideal of comic wit in the restoration had been imitative of gentlemen’s conversation, developed to legitimate  royalist  ideology  and  the  ideals  of  the  ruling  class.59  The  emergence  of new political realities meant that wit had to appeal to the public en masse in order to  succeed.  Writers  like  the  Scriblerians  had  to  rely  more  on  the  mask  of  irony, producing works that were speciously demotic, secretly hegemonic.   The  exclusive  Scriblerians  resented  public  opinion  playing  a  role  in judgment.  They  were  not  so  much  against  form  as  representative  of  ideological contract  so much  as  they  are  against  it  as  something  that  puts  the  audience  in  a                                                         59  See  Robert Markley, Two­Edg’d Weapons:  Style  and  Ideology  in  the  Comedies  of 
Etherege, Wycherley, and Congreve, 1988. 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the  pathetic  drama  sought  to  elicit  from  its  audience  might  be  described  as sympathetic, Gay and the Scriblerians sought to temper sympathy with wit.   Accounts of The Beggar’s Opera’s first performance claim that, while initially silent,  at  some  point  the  crowd  became  enthralled  and  responded  with  great applause. But the accounts differ in locating the point at which the crowd began to show its enthusiasm for the play. Pope was present at the first night’s performance and recounts that,     We were all at the first night of it, in great uncertainty of the event; till      we were very much encouraged by overhearing the Duke of Argyle,      who sat in the box next to us, say, “it will do,‐‐it must do!—I see it in      the eyes of them.”—This was a good while before the first act was      over, and so gave us ease soon; for the duke, (besides his own good      taste) has a more particular knack than any one now living, in        discovering the taste of the public. He was quite right in this, as usual;      the good nature of the audience appeared stronger and stronger with      every act, and ended in a clamour of applause.  Benjamin Victor, writing in 1730, says that,     …on the first night of performance, its fate was doubtful for some      time. The first act was received with silent attention, not a hand      moved; at the end of which they rose, and every man seemed to      compare notes with his neighbor, and the general opinion was in its      favor. In the second act they broke their silence by marks of their      approbation, to the great joy of the frighted performers, as well as the      author; and the last act was received with universal applause.  This  account  does  not  necessarily  conflict  with  Pope’s,  it  being  possible  that  the “silent  attention”  on  the  part  of  the  spectator  might  be  accounted  for  by  the strangeness  of  the  production,  and  the  audience  at  large might  not  have  been  so quick in its judgment as the Duke of Argyle was.   But  other  spectators  present  at  the  play’s  opening  interpreted  this  silence differently. In his biography of the comic actor Charles Macklin William Cooke says: 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 Macklin was present at the first representation of the Beggar’s Opera,      and confirmed what has been often reported, that the success was      doubtful, till after the opening of the second act, when, after the      chorus song of ‘Let us take the road,’ the applause was as universal as      unbounded.           (Memoirs of Macklin 57)   Macklin’s  account,  as  Schultz  points  out,  indicates  a  later  turning  point  than  that described by Pope, who was confident of the play’s success, “a good while before the first act was over.” The silence of  the crowd takes on a different cast altogether  in the report given to Boswell by Richard Owen Cambridge,      that there was good reason enough to doubt concerning its success.      He wast told by [James] Quin that during the first night of its        appearance it was long in a very dubious state; that there was a      disposition to damn it, and that it was saved by the song,        “Oh ponder well! be not severe!”     the audience being much affected by the innocent looks of Polly, when     she came to those two lines, which exhibit at once a painful and      ridiculous image,       “For on the rope that hangs my Dear,       Depends poor Polly’s life.”      (Life of Johnson)  This  song, which  is  the  twelfth,  comes  about  two‐thirds  of  the way  through Act  I. This  story  sounds  plausible,  both  because  of  Pope’s  comment  and  the  earlier position in the play, at a somewhat natural break in the plot. It is likely that some in the  audience  were  struck  with  Polly’s  pathetic  appeal  to  her  parents,  especially when  it  was  sung  to  a  popular  tune.  Polly’s  supplication  puts  her  clearly  in  the pathetic role of suffering  figure, and  it makes explicit appeal  to a clichéd notion of sympathy  wherein  her  life  and  her  husband’s  are  one.  But  Gay  slips  in  a  clever pun—the dual  sense  of  “depends,” mocks  sympathetic  involvement  by  alluding  to the  literal  and  particularly  physical  image  of  Macheath’s  body  hanging  from  the noose,  and  this  pun  takes  on  third  and  fourth  senses  as  it  points  to  the  sinister customs  necessary  for  sympathy,  and  to  the  allusion  to  hanging  as  the  scene  on 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which the play depends. This point of unabashed pathos, one which piles on all of the  effects:  pathetic  figure,  melancholy  air,  and  even  an  expression  of  complete sympathy actually achieved sympathy, and this was the point at which the audience was  likely  to  have  entered  into  the  play.  Despite  flipping  form  and  social  order, pathos  remains  the way  into  engagement with  the  play—it  remains  the  center—even as Gay occasionally makes light of it. While The Beggar’s Opera’s great success is  clear,  the  source  of  that  success  is  and  has  been much  in  question. Was  it  the acting?  Probably  not:  while  the  acting  was  by  all  accounts  good,  it  has  been successful with many different casts. Arguably, much of the incredible success of the Beggar’s  Opera was  owing  to  its  use  of  popular  songs—allowing  the  audience  to resonate at the same pitch. This tension, capitalizing on cultural expectation in order to  deny  and  put  accepted  forms  to  new  use.  The  Beggar’s  Opera’s  novel appropriation  of  popular  ballads  results  in  a  reversal  of  polarities  in  which  the hegemonic attitude is made passive by popular culture.    
Wit and sympathy 
   The  work  of  the  Scriblerians  shows  that  wit  and  sympathy  can  be  used together  in different measures,  and  that  there are close parallels,  as well  as  sharp distinctions  between  the  two  concepts.  In  terms  of  aesthetic  engagement,  the relationship between wit and sympathy is about rhetoric, or style in the sense that the issue is language’s capacity to transmit emotion. In Pope’s “Essay on Criticism,” the word  “wit,”  allows  for  the play of wit  in making various  connections between sense and context. The substitutability to which “wit” lends itself, i.e., one sense for 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another,  at  once  is  already  making  an  important  point,  that  substitutability establishes an analogy between wit and sympathy. Empson says of Pope’s “Essay,” “there is a not a single use of the word in the whole poem in which the idea of a joke is quite out of sight” (Empson 87).  The jocularity of wit is important. First, because wit  is  often  joined  with  mirth  it  must  be  noted  that  this  faculty  of  the  mind  is strongly  associated with  a  kind of  passion.  Secondly,  humor  suggests  an  alternate form of sympathy, one that might not allow for substitution, but which does suggest separate souls resonating to the same chord. Humor, like sympathy takes two.    The  sympathetic  relationship  between  performance  and  audience  depends upon  the  performance’s  ability  to  move  the  audience.  Longinus’s  treatise  On  the 
Sublime,  the  influence  of  which  on  eighteenth‐century  rhetorical  and  aesthetic theory  was  quite  strong,  claimed  that  “the  effect  of  elevated  language  upon  an audience is not persuasion but transport” (Longinus 43). The effects of the sublime in  oratory  described  are  much  like  Burke’s  description  of  sympathy.  His “substitution”  implies  a  “transport”  through  the  imagination  and  the  affinity between his  “social passion”  and  the  acts of  reading and writing become clear,  so that the text becomes a means for enacting substitution and transport.   Pope’s account of how texts convey sympathy facetiously evokes the idea of transport while advocating sympathy of a different kind. He writes: “A perfect Judge will  read each work of Wit,/With  the same spirit  that  its author writ.” The absurd quintuple rhyme suggests the impossibility of such substitution. Here the “spirit” is to  be  transferred,  but  this  spirit  does  not  seem  to  be  essential  to  the  identity  of either  party,  there  is  no  substitution  at  work,  only  something  shared.  While  the 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rhetoric of the sublime aims at a substitutive sympathy witty writing aims at getting readers and authors to resonate to the same instrument, the text, but each remains firmly within his self. Just as humor might be seen as an alternate sort of sympathy from  the  usual  partaking  in  the  suffering  of  another,  wit  as  a  style  or  technique should be seen as an alternate  to  the rhetoric of  the sublime. The sublime aims at using the text as a conduit for felt passion, and works by drawing the reader out of himself  through  the  right  use  of  techniques  and  figures.  And  Jonathan  Swift’s 
Mechanical Operation of the Spirit  is a rhetorical tract of sorts, and in keeping with Pope’s  “Peri  Bathous:  or,  the  Art  of  Sinking  in  Poetry,”  it  blatantly  eschews  every principle laid out by Longinus. And, as in Peri Bathous, wherein Pope returns again and  again  to  the  figure  of  the  state  as  a way  of  projecting  “reform”  in  poesie  and drama, Swift’s work uses textual concerns to get at social ones. From the start, the work is marked as a fragment in a note from “the bookseller” which not only points to the materiality and the artificiality of the text, but announces the impossibility of following Longinus’s insistence on the importance of the relation of the whole to its parts as well. The reader has been denied access to the whole, indeed, as the reader soon discovers, the part which has been removed seems to be the most important. The  piece  reads  like  a  string  of  features  deliberately  aimed  at  undercutting  its capacity for achieving sublime transport.   The  bookseller’s  advertisement  appeals  to  the  reader’s  judgment  in determining  the  identity  of  the  author,  and  then  a  footnote  on  the  first  page questions the reliability of said bookseller. On the first page Swift has achieved the creation of  a  chorus of  voices,  all  addressing  the  reader.  In addition,  the  reader  is 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 In  order  to  put  the  comparison  of  wit  and  sympathy  into  philosophical perspective,  it  is useful to  jump ahead and see what  later thinkers thought as they looked back on the early eighteenth century. In the introduction to his Philosophical 
Enquiry Edmund Burke examines Locke’s definition of wit64: “Mr. Locke very justly and  finely  observes  of  wit,  that  it  is  chiefly  conversant  in  tracing  resemblances” (Burke 17).65 Burke goes on to write that the “satisfaction in tracing resemblances” 
                                                        64 See Locke’s Essay, XI.ii. 65 Burke goes on to remark on judgment and to make clear that the two, though they “both  seem  to  result  from  different  operation  of  the  same  faculty  of  comparing”, 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is  one  of  man’s  great  pleasures  and  argues  that  this  is  a  sort  of  pleasure  of  the imagination. Sympathy, according to Burke is one of the “social passions,” and it  is its status as a passion that distinguishes it from wit, yet it is a source of pleasure too, and one that arises from a sort of tracing of resemblances. That is, sympathy arises when we see a person like ourselves in pain; presumably it could not happen if one did not firstnote the resemblance between himself and the sufferer. As Hume says, “resemblance must  very much  contribute  to make us  enter  into  the  sentiments of others” (318). There is an analogy between wit, which finds resemblances in ideas, and sympathy, which is felt resemblance between persons.   Much  later  in  the  century,  Kant  defines  wit  as  “the  faculty  by  which  we determine the universal appropriate to the particular” (Anthropologie,  i.42). Kant’s definition of the function of wit would seem to put it at odds with sympathy as the move  to  universalize  works  against  sympathy’s  reliance  on  particularity. Representations  of  sympathy  tend  to  depend  on  the  particular.  Mandeville,  and Hume rely on violent scenes to illustrate the workings of sympathy. In Mandeville, the sight of an infant being devoured by a sow elicits an undeniable, nearly physical reaction. He  seems  to  relish  in  showing  that  a  sort  of  immediate  sympathy  arises from such a detailed scene. Mandeville’s vivid description of a sow eating an infant does  elicit  a  reaction  from  its  reader,  but  it  isn’t  sympathy.  The  scene  becomes ridiculous as the details of the passage grow more particular—it moves from pathos to bathos, until at its end, we see that it’s a joke. The reader is the “cruel animal” that                                                         they are quite different such that  the “perfect union of wit and  judgment  is one of the rarest things in the world” (Burke 17). 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finds  pleasure  in  this  scene—as  Burke  says,  sympathy  is  a  sort  of  delight  in  the suffering of others. Mandeville makes the point that sympathy, as a merely physical reaction  is  one  that  can be  easily manipulated. With Mandeville,  and  Swift  below, one encounters a cynical kind of sympathy that does not penetrate to the heart and a dismissal of  the body as a potential seat  for understanding. This refusal  to move beyond particular detail  to a universal, sympathetic response amounts to a refusal of  the  inductive  move  to  standardize,  or  make  objective  a  particular  subjective response.66     “Locke,”  writes  Kant,  “sensualized  all  concepts  of  the  understanding.”  This reflects Kant’s fundamental belief that wit left unchecked will always go too far in its application of universals  to particulars (see above). This  tendency of wit  leads  the mind  to  arrive  at  certain  illusions wherein  ideas  that  can  only  be  known  through reason are falsely believed to be knowable through empirical experience, viz., ideas are mistaken  for  substances.  This  flaw  of  reason,  hypostatization,  was  frequently mocked  by  Jonathan  Swift,  who  frequently  turned  abstract  ideas  into  objects  in order to model the faulty wit of hack authors and poor readers who confuse figures for  things,  universals  for  particulars.  Hypostatization  is  a  sort  of  inverse personification: materiality  is assigned to human qualities. Kant’s chief example of hypostatization  is  Descartes’  cogito,  wherein  the  philosopher  moves  from  the  “I think,”  which  already mistakenly  presupposes  a  persisting  “I”  that  can  be  known empirically  (intuitively  in  Kant’s  terminology),  to  assigning  the  soul  with  the                                                         66 See Michael McKeon’s account of the relation of experimental method’s induction to aesthetics. 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properties of a substance. Kant’s critique of Locke, which seems so pertinent to the matter at hand, is in fact an attempt to rehabilitate empirical knowledge from David Hume’s skepticism.   Hume  questioned  whether  inductive  reasoning  might  lead  to  knowledge. That  is,  what  is  the  justification  for  either  generalizing  about  the  properties  of  a class  of  objects  based  on  some  number  of  observations  of  particular  instances  of that  class  or presupposing  that  a  sequence of  events  in  the  future will  occur  as  it always has in the past. Hume called this the Principle of Uniformity of Nature. The problem calls into question all empirical claims made in everyday life or through the scientific method. Although the problem arguably dates back to the pyrhonnism of ancient  philosophy,  David  Hume  introduced  it  in  the  mid‐18th  century.  Hume described  the  problem  in An Enquiry  concerning Human Understanding,  §4. Hume comes  to  the  question  of  induction  in  his  reflection  on  the  discovery  of  causal relations, which form the basis for what he refers to as "matters of fact." He argues that causal relations are found not by reason, but by induction. This is because for any  cause,  multiple  effects  are  conceivable,  and  the  actual  effect  cannot  be determined by reasoning about the cause; instead, one must observe occurrences of the causal relation to discover that it holds. In general, it is not necessary that causal relation  in  the  future  resemble  causal  relations  in  the  past,  as  it  is  always conceivable otherwise; for Hume, this is because the negation of the claim does not lead to a contradiction.   Hume ponders the justification of induction. If all matters of fact are based on causal relations, and all causal relations are found by induction, then induction must 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be  shown  to  be  valid  somehow.  He  uses  the  fact  that  induction  assumes  a  valid connection between  the proposition  "I  have  found  that  such  an object  has  always been attended with such an effect" and the proposition "I foresee that other objects which  are  in  appearance  similar  will  be  attended  with  similar  effects."[8]  One connects these two propositions not by reason, but by induction. Although induction is not made by reason, Hume observes that we nonetheless perform it and improve from  it. He proposes a descriptive explanation  for  the nature of  induction  in §5 of the Enquiry, titled "Skeptical solution of these doubts". It is by custom or habit that one draws the inductive connection described above, and "without the influence of custom  we  would  be  entirely  ignorant  of  every  matter  of  fact  beyond  what  is immediately  present  to  the memory  and  senses."[9]  The  result  of  custom  is  belief, which is instinctual and much stronger than imagination alone. [10]   In  “Hume’s  Social  Composition,”  (1985)  Jerome  Christensen  describes Hume’s  rhetorical practice  in  terms of  ideology and  induction. Christensen argues that  in  Hume’s  writing  on  property  as  the  basis  for  civil  society  the  threat  of ideological breakdown is a necessary step in the inductive move from particular to whole: “the idea of annihilation supplies the essential opening for induction, which retrospectively  discovers  a  necessary  connection  between  an  effect  and  a  cause” (46). The cause, or  reason, he  then describes as a  sort of  composition,  “an  idea of mass  that  induces  ostensibly  aleatory,  potentially  anarchic  particulars  across  a surface  of  propensities  that mobilize  and  contain  energy”  (47).  The  public  is  one such  composite  created  by  induction.  The  Scriblerians  sought  to  break  apart  this composition by exposing the induction at its root and to put a moveable structure in 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its place,  to  invert  the position of cause and effect with a composite genre, so that the particularity of individual response might be maintained and agency restored to individuals rather than to the public opinion.   Christensen  argues  that  theatrical  performances  provide  an  ideology  of ideology,  and  drama  such  as  Rowe’s  makes  clear  an  ideology  of  passivity.  The spectator is taught to be properly submissive in the face of a form in which he has no  say. Genre  is  a  kind of  composite,  a  form of  authority  that  takes  the  agency of judgment away from the individual spectator and puts it in the hands of the public at  large  in  the  form of convention.  In Virtue, Commerce, and History  (1985)  J. G. A. Pocock demonstrates  that mid  seventeenth‐century debates  over  ownership were actually debates over authority.  In this case, ownership of subjective experience  is generalized, so the standardization of genre represents induction.   In an essay called “Definition of Wit”, 1829, William Hazlitt describes wit as a faculty  that  reveals  and  breaks  apart  associations,  describing  its  function  as  “the untwisting  the  chain  of  our  ideas,  whereby  each  link  is  made  to  hook  on  more readily  to others  than when  they were all bound up  together by habit,  and with a view  to  a  set  purpose.”  Notice  that  Hazlitt,  like  Swift,  emphasizes  the  purposeful nature of wit. He  then proceeds  to elaborate  that purpose as one  that  reveals and reforms ideological structures:      Ideas exist as a sort of fixtures in the understanding; they are like      moveables (that will also unscrew and take to pieces) in the wit or      fancy. If our grave notions were always well founded; if there were no      aggregates of power, of prejudice, and absurdity; if the value and      importance of an object went on increasing with the opinion        entertained of it, and with the surrender of our faith, freedom, and      every thing else to aggrandise it, then " the squandering glances " of      the wit, " whereby the wise man's folly is anatomised," would be as 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 impertinent as they would be useless. But while gravity and        imposture not only exist, but reign triumphant; while the proud,      obstinate, sacred tumours rear their heads on high, and are trying to      get a new lease of for ever and a day; then oh! for the Frenchman's art      ("Voltaire's?—the same") to break  the torpid spell, and reduce the      bloated mass to its native insignificance!         (1829)  Hazlitt’s definition of wit can be reconciled with sympathy’s reliance on particulars because  it  breaks  down  inductive  associations.  The  Scriblerians  sought  to  break down this composite and install a new sort of composite in its place: one that resists induction and restores agency to individuals. They do this by keeping the artificiality of genre,  the move of  induction  in clear sight. So both sympathy and wit might be compared to induction, the intellectual move from the particular to the general that figured strongly  in Hume’s  theory of  the basis of civil society, and  in experimental method.67 The inductive move to make a rule of the particular and subjective has a corollary in generic form. Play with form reveals the fictionality of form and exposes the fiction at the base of public opinion, in a blend of wit and pathos that emphasizes situation.   
 
Particularity and situation in Gay’s drama    Swift’s Tale  of  a  Tub  links  hypostatization  and  sympathy  in  order  to mock them and  to  emphasize  the  importance of  particularity  over universal,  or  catholic principles.  The  running  joke  of  the  text  is  that  authors  or  readers  treat  ideas  as material things. Swift derides the implications of treating discourses as things that matter as he describes zeal growing on a warm day into substance. Swift’s work has                                                         67 See Christensen, and Michael McKeon. 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its pathetic figure, and it gives several accounts of sympathy. It turns out that he is not denying material pathos, but he does seem to be critiquing its sufficiency as it is merely physical and thus of the same order as any other bodily function. A Tale of a 
Tub, takes an ambiguous position on the uncertainties of the mediated relationship between  author  and  reader  by  simultaneously  demonstrating  and  denouncing  as absurd the principal of sympathy. Swift’s “author” claims that     Whatever reader desires to have a thorough comprehension of an      author’s thoughts cannot take a better method than by putting himself     into the circumstances and posture of life that the writer was in upon      every important passage as it flowed from his pen. For this will      introduce a parity and strict correspondence of ideas between the      reader and the author.        (Tale of a Tub 20)   This  appears  at  first  glance  a  straight  description  of  sympathy  as  an  aesthetic principal  of  affective  substitution.  But  Swift  makes  a  joke  of  the  absolute substitution demanded by sympathy as the author goes on to list in increasing detail his squalid circumstances. The list of physical particulars makes it clear that one can never really enter  the circumstances of another’s  life, nor would one want  to. The author  concludes  this  passage  by  informing  his  reader  that  the  better  part  of  the work  was  written  while  hungry,  in  bed,  in  a  garret.  This  image  of  the  author suggests  the  insurmountable  isolation  of  the  Cartesian  subject,  a  consciousness trapped in a body. But, the reader who gets this, through not sympathizing with “the author”  has  achieved  a  kind  of  ironic  sympathy  with  Swift,  rather  than  the  mad version  of  sympathy, which  is  compared  to  the  resonance  of  strings  tuned  to  the same pitch,  the  reader and Swift  are united by  their  sense of  superiority over  the passive reader. Swift’s denies being moved by situation and the passive reception of feeling. 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 John Gay’s dramatic work stands in interesting relation to the deployment of wit and  formal  innovation  in response  to pathetic drama. Like Swift’s prose, Gay’s plays  resist  genre,  sporting with  form and expressing  this  resistance  thematically, suggesting that he desires a different sort of engagement, but he allows more room for  the  inclusion of pathos and situation  than Swift. While Pope and Swift want  to replace pathos with wit, and install a sympathy of exclusivity, Gay tries to blend the two.  As  he  resists  committed  contract  he  denies  the  complete  concernment  of pathetic drama and the material objectification of the subject. Still, his mixed modes make use of the figure of pathos, albeit tempered by wit in attempt to straddle the line between subject and object, or perhaps to deny the split altogether. The What 
d’ye Call It is explicitly a mash‐up of form in order to please all. An earlier play, The 
Mohocks, makes a motif of the mutilation of bodies that creates an analogy between the destruction of body and bucking generic form. There has to be tension between character and form in order to avoid a subjective passivity that is anathema to the Scriblerians. Gay’s dramatic productions thematize the breakdown into particulars, seemingly random articles are given the weight of something like icons in order to resist  their  being  interpellated  into  the  universalizing  induction  thematically manifested in hegemonic forms of affective circulation: marriage, and currency.   In  the preface  to his The What d’ye Call  It?, Gay sets up a number of  issues that characterize the nature of  the Scriblerian response to the pathetic. He defines his  project  in  relation  to  stage  productions  that  have  preceded  it  as  something entirely new.      We have often had Tragi‐Comedies upon the English Theatre with      Success: but in that sort of Composition the Tragedy and Comedy are 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 in distinct scenes, and may be easily separated from each other. But      the whole Art of the Tragi‐Comi‐Pastoral Farce lies in interweaving      the several Kinds of the Drama with each other, so that they cannot be     distinguish’d or separated.        (Preface 6‐10)    
 Gay insists that the audience and the critics should not classify his work as a hybrid, but  as  ‘composite’  fitting  into  each  of  the  many  categories  he  has  applied. Particularly significant is his use of the term ‘composition’, an oft‐used term of the age, which generally suggests a sort of blending of idea and matter.68 Gay goes on in his preface  to  take on claims against  the appropriateness of applying each generic category  one  by  one.  Curiously,  he  uses  the  term  ‘character’  again  and  again  to defend his play’s composite categorization, ultimately using the term to describe the figures  in  the  play,  and  the  play’s  form.  It  is  as  if  to  say  that  the  nature  of  the characters  in  a  play  that  determine  its  generic  categorization,  and  this  point  is driven home when  finally he applies  “character”  to  the play  itself. So  that genre  is defined  by  it  characters  and  genre  is  itself  character.  This,  coupled  with  his insistence  on  the  notion  of  the  inseparability  of  this  composite  quality  suggests  a relation between subject and form that resists being split  into separate categories, along the lines of the split between mind and body, or subjectivity, and objectivity. Gay’s  resistance  to  standard  formal  categorizations  is  an  attempt  to  preserve individual subjectivity in the face of objectifying impulse of the public. But he makes use of pathetic figures to draw the public in. 
                                                        68  See  Jerome  Christensen,  “Hume’s  Social  Composition,”  Representations:  Politics 
and Aesthetics. Fall 1985. 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 Historically, The Beggar’s Opera  is exemplary of the marketability of pathos, yet  thematically  it  critiques  exchange  that  has  become  estranged  from  subjective value.  The  sensation  of  The  Beggar’s  Opera  included  making  a  celebrity  of  the character Polly, and Lavinia Fenton, the actress who played her. The public’s desire to possess Polly manifested in a sort of merchandising that is familiar to the modern moviegoer.  Fans with  Polly’s  likeness  printed  on  them,  and  numerous  pamphlets inspired by her, or advertised as collections of her own quips were sold (Schultz 24‐29). A note in The Dunciad remarks, “her pictures were engraved and sold in  great numbers,  her  life  written;  books  of  letters  and  verses  to  her  publish’d;  and pamphlets made even of her sayings and jests.” The popularity of his own creation prompted Gay to remark to Swift:     There is a mezzotinto print published to‐day of Polly, the heroine of      the Beggar's Opera *, who was before unknown, and is now in so high      vogue, that I am in doubt, whether her fame does not surpass that of      the opera itself.        (Letter, March 20, 1728)  None of this would be remarkable in the world of theater and popular culture aside from  the  unprecedented  extent  of  the  phenomenon  except  for  the  fact  that  it  is ironic considering the play’s thematic concern with danger of marketability and the undesirability  of  a  woman’s  transformation  into  currency.  This  thematic  concern was  already  visible  in  The  What  d’ye  Call  It?.  The  relationship  of  people  to sentimental things, i.e., to the pathetic figure ceases to be one that can be described in terms of property as it replaced by the model of currency, which has fixed value, but  which  empties  out  individual  interiority.  The  exchange  of  pathos  must  be accompanied  by  formal  play  in  order  to  preserve  the  authority  of  individual response. 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 The  What  d’ye  Call  It  is  constructed  as  a  frame  play,  but  the  boundaries between  frame  and  play  are  permeable.  There  are  points  of  convergence: interactions between the nobles, who maintain their identities, and the actors, who respond in character. The nobles take a significant part in shaping the plot while it seems at first that the play is staged to please them, it turns out that the players are using the performance  in order to  take control over  the dispensation of  justice. At the end of The What d’ye Call  It?,  the boundaries between  imagined spaces breaks down again: a real curate performs what was to be only a mock wedding, and so the wedding  is  real  and  all  is  right  inside  the  frame  and  out.  This  had  all  been  the steward’s  contrivance  to  right  things.  The  What  d’ye  Call  It?’s  tragic  ending  is  a wedding.   Timothy Peascod is the unlikely hero of the play: a deserter who admittedly lacked  the  heart  to  fight.  Bound  by  his  captors  and  about  to  be  shot,  it  is  not surprising that Peascod should weep, but  the curious thing  is  that he weeps while reading publication information on Pilgrim’s Progress.      PEASCOD. Lend me thy Handkercher—The Pilgrim’s Pro—                   [Reads and weeps.       (I cannot see for Tears) Pro—Progress—Oh!—The Pilgrim’s  
      Progress—Eighth—Edi­ti­on Lon­don—Prin­ted—for—Ni­cho­ 
      las Bod­ding­ton: With new Ad­di­tions never made before. –Oh!        ‘tis so moving, I can read no more.                   [Drops the Book.                    (II.i.23‐28)  Much of this passage consists of Peascod reading aloud. His only expressive words are  passionate  exclamations  and  complaints  about  the  effects  of  his  pathetic outporing.  The  farce  is  in  the  mismatch  between  his  pathetic  response  and  the completely affectless quality of the words that he is reading. We might imagine that 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nearly any reading could be an excuse for tears under such circumstances, but the specific nonsense chosen to illustrate this pathetic effect is significant. Might be read to  be  about  the  sorrows  of  the  literary  marketplace,  or  as  making  a  point  about anything  being  potentially  tragic  depending  upon  how  it’s  read,  or  the  context  in which it is read.   Subsequently  Peascod  announces  that  he might  get  out  of  being  shot  if  he “could but raise five Pound” to give the Sergeant. Hearing this, the countrymen offer up a sympathetic rush of personal, sentimental effects.69 A few have a bit of money, but  what’s  offered  quickly  becomes  a  list  of  things  with  sentimental  value:  “my Cramp‐ring,  would  that  it  were  a  better  thing”;  “my  box  of  copper”;  “my  wife’s thimble”;  and a  “’Bacco  stopper.” But  the Sergeant will  have none of  it.  Preferring cash  to  mementoes,  he  tells  the  countrymen:  “Take  back  your  Things—I’ll  have them not.” However, the Sergeant’s refusal is not an outright refusal of sentimental exchange  but  a  refusal  to  barter  sentiment  for  sentiment  as  Peascod  himself  has become a token of pathos. The Sergeant’s demand for currency is about cashing in on pathos. Shifting the terms of exchange from sentimental tokens to currency, that is  to  say,  from  something  that  has  unique,  subjective  value,  to  something  whose value is determined and objective. This turn makes new sense of the play’s Prologue which proclaims the work a “Something, or  [a] Nothing of a Play, Which strives  to please all Palates at a time.” This is the danger of complete sympathetic engagement of which Gay and his companions are chary, the rendering an object of the subject.                                                         69  See  Deidre  Lynch’s  “Personal  Effects  and  Sentimental  Fictions,”  Eighteenth­
Century Fiction, 2000. 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 It is a well known story that the idea for The Beggar’s Opera came from Swift, who  wrote  to  Alexander  Pope  on  30  August  1716  asking  "...what  think  you,  of  a Newgate pastoral among the thieves and whores there?" This novel idea of making a pastoral  of  a  prison  sets  the  stage  for  the  riffing  on  social  inversions  that  runs throughout the play. But what does it mean to effectively idealize a place of forced confinement?  The  prison  offers  security;  it  is  inviolable,  a  place  of  one’s  own.  It offers  a  way  out  of  the  anonymity  and  the  threat  to  subjectivity  found  in  the squabbling crowd. As an image, it evokes Swift’s author in the garret, and the prison is  ultimately  a  trick  pastoral  because  it  is  really  the  calcification  of  hegemonic ideology.  Rather  than  offering  an  imaginative  space  outside  of  civil  society,  the Newgate pastoral reveals that even imaginative spaces contain one firmly within its reach. In the introduction the Beggar says “I have a Prison Scene which the Ladies always  reckon  charmingly  pathetick”  (18‐19).  Death  scenes  figure  prominently  in Gay’s drama, whether  they are hangings, or weddings. Both Hobbes and Rousseau look at executions in their writings and describe the passivity of the felon going to the  gallows  as  an  acceptance  that  depends  on  the  individual’s  subscription  to  the laws of the society. This  is analogous to the audience’s acceptance and delight  in a performance’s adherence to expectation.     POLLY.  –Methinks I see him already in the Cart, sweeter and more        lovely  than the Nosegay in his Hand!—I hear the Crowd        extolling his Resolution and Intrepidity!—What Vollies of Sighs       are sent from the Windows of Holborn, that so comely a Youth        should be brought to disgrace!—I see him at the Tree!—even        Butchers weep!          (I.xii.1‐7)  This  passage  shows  that  even  those  least  inclined  to  passively  accept  the  rules  of law, i.e. the denizens of Holborn, are moved by a scene so touchingly pathetic that it 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draws tears  from butchers, who,  it  is  implied are society’s members  least  likely  to feel pity. This spectacle unites and orders the citizens of London for a moment in a way  that  mere  laws  cannot,  operating  as  an  affective  version  of  Hobbesian  civil society. But, given the Scriblerian resistance to an inductive kind of pathos, it is not clear  that  such  a  spectacle  that  inspires  a  giving  over  of  the  self  is  altogether desirable.  Gay’s  plays  show  a  resistance  to  this  sort  of  thing  in  their  criticism  of marriage.      In The Beggar’s Opera when Peachum tells his wife he would indulge his dear Polly “in anything but marriage! After that, my Dear, how shall we be safe” Are we not then in her husband’s power?” (I.iv.78‐80).         A Maid is like the golden Oar, 
      Which hath Guineas intrinsical in’t, 
        Whose Worth is never known, before 
      It is try’d and imprest in the Mint. 
        A Wife’s like a Guinea in Gold, 
      Stampt with the Name of her Spouse; 
        Now here, now there; is bought, or is sold; 
      And is current in every House.    (I.v.7‐14) He  explains  “All  men  are  Thieves  in  Love,  and  Like  a  Woman  better  for  being another’s Property,” putting affective value directly at odds with the fixed value of currency. Macheath  compares women  to money,  saying  “a man who  loves money, might  as well  be  contented with  one Guinea,  as  I with  one woman”  (II.iii.2‐4). He goes on to brag about the number of women he has “recruited” to the prostitution showing that his attitude toward them begets actuality as these women considered as currency come to treat themselves as commodities.   But he  is soon betrayed by these  some  of  these  same  women,  who  turn  him  over  to  the  constables—for money—showing  the  danger  of  setting  monetary  value  on  what  should  have 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sentimental value.   Upon his arrest Macheath’s position is made clear by Peachum, who tells him,     PEACHUM. Your Case, Mr. Macheath, is not particular. The greatest        Heroes have been ruin'd by Women. But, to do them Justice, I        must own they are a pretty sort of Creatures, if we could trust        them. You must now, Sir, take your Leave of the Ladies, and if        they have a mind to make you a Visit, they will be sure to find        you at home. This Gentleman, Ladies, lodges in Newgate.                    (II.v.5‐11.)  Macheath’s attitude influences his relationships with the two women who love him as well.  Stamped with Macheath’s  face,  Polly  and  Lucy  exhibit  a  sort  of  sympathy that made is made to seem ridiculous as their author prepares for the gibbet.     LUCY. Would I might be hang’d!     POLLY.          And I would so too!     LUCY. To be hang’d with you.     POLLY.           My Dear, with you.     MACHEATH. O leave me to thought! I fear! I doubt!       I tremble! I droop!—See, my courage is out.             [Turns up the empty Bottle.     POLLY. No token of love?     MACHEATH.      See, my courage is out.             [Turns up the empty Pot.     LUCY. No token of love?                 (III.xv.10‐18)  Macheath does not get off  lightly here either. His perverted sense of value reduces the sentimental tokens his lovers ask for to empty vessels, hollowed even of matter that might  have provided  a  cheap  substitute  for  the  sort  of  feeling  that  his  lovers seek. 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 The  frame  of The  Beggar’s  Opera  evokes  and  subverts  a  particular  kind  of triangulation  that  occurs  frequently  in  the  eighteenth‐century  novel.70  This triangulation involves a beggar, a middle class sort of protagonist, and an observer. At the end of Gay’s play, it is the beggar giving alms to the audience in the form of a happy  ending  that  adheres  to  formal  convention,  while  revealing  the  arbitrary quality of such conventions.      BEGGAR. Your Objection, Sir, is very just; and is easily remov’d. For        you must allow, that in this kind of Drama, ‘tis no matter how        absurdly things are brought about. —So—you Rabble there—       run and cry a  Reprieve—let the Prisoner be brought back to        his Wives in Triumph.     PLAYER. All this we must do to comply with the Taste of the Town.                   (III.xvi.11‐17) The  relationships  that  existed  at  the  outset  of  the  play  are  flipped—the beggar/playwright begins as supplicant to the audience, just as the audience begins as hesitant almsgiver and ends up beggar, while, perhaps most curious, the player is the  spectator  all  the while  indicating  that  the  one  that  stays  constant,  despite  the witty play with form, is the pathetic figure, the performed pathos whose value has been fixed. The society of thieves, which is the underside and mirror image of civil society,  is  united  in  its  opposition  to  an  institution  that  represents  mainstream authority and valuation. Currency means  the marketability and easy circulation of affect, but value is prescribed by rigid, formal authority rather than determined by individual judgment. Like Venice Preserv’d, The Beggar’s Opera has a plot driven by competing systems, but here the competing systems are piled on top of one another:                                                         70  Lisa  Zunshine  emphasized  the  importance  of  this  pattern  of  triangulation  in  a recent paper given at Vanderbilt University. 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Polly is torn between her love and filial obligation, Macheath is torn between the life of  the  highwayman  and  that  of  the  lover,  and  he  is  torn  between  his  competing lovers, i.e., he is torn between competing kinds of love. And these systems represent two  solutions  to  the  problem of  induction:  the  first  is  represented  figuratively  by currency as a method  for  fixing value and  thereby guaranteeing knowledge at  the cost  of  subjective  agency;  the  second  solution  is  to  resist  induction  altogether—value,  and  knowledge  are  determined  according  to  the  influence  of  situation,  the arrangement of particularities, both objects and subjects.   
 
Conclusion 
  The Beggar’s Opera continued in its popularity and was performed more than any other piece during  the  eighteenth  century.  In  fact,  there  is  some  record of  its appearance in nearly every year between 1728 and 1886.71 It’s enduring popularity a result of its ability to be “all things to all men,” a phrase Christensen refers to in his description  of  Hume  as  a  man  of  letters,  “an  elastic  representational  practice laboring to perfect an imitation of social reality that was conceived of as discursive through and  through”  (44). This  is much  like Gay’s  claim  in  the What d’ye Call  It? that he has written a “nothing of a play” to “please all palates.” The Beggar’s Opera continues  in  this  conceit,  its  form,  or  forms,  lacking  particularity  undercuts  the composite  of  generic  propriety.  By  playing  with  the  boundaries  between  the 
                                                        71 See Schultz, xxi. 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recognizable  and  the  new,  by  mixing  sympathy  and  wit,  Gay  puts  authority  of pathetic  judgment  in  the  domain  of  the  individual  spectator.
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CHAPTER IV  SYMPATHETIC SITUATION IN THE LONDON MERCHANT    In  this  chapter  I  examine George Lillo’s play The London Merchant  through the  lens  of  the  critique  of  Bernard Mandeville’s Fable  of  the  Bees  levied  by  Adam Smith  in  his Theory  of Moral  Sentiments.  Lillo’s  play  exhibits  a  concern  similar  to Mandeville’s and Smith’s for figuring the role of passion in a modern, market‐based society. Lillo appears to side with Smith  in advocating control of  the passions, and his dramatic techniques in many ways adumbrate Smith’s delineation of sympathy in  their  emphasis  on  situation,  spectation,  and  guilt.  Smith  sought  to  counter Mandeville’s vision of a society impelled by self‐interest by locating impartiality  in the  natural,  social  passion  of  sympathy.  In  this  instance,  sympathy  also  stands  to offer a  form of  impartial  judgment  that gets around  the deceptive masks worn by self‐interested  operators  of  a  system  of  gain  and  preserves  the  possibility  of subjective  knowledge,  i.e.  being  able  to  trust  one’s  own  experience  as  a  basis  for legitimate  knowledge.  But  as  David Marshall  has  argued  in The  Figure  of  Theater (1986),  Smith’s  theory  of  sympathy  ends  up  creating  a  problem  for  the  sort  of knowledge which had hitherto been taken for granted, the knowledge of oneself as the  subject  comes  to  think  of  himself  as  a  spectacle.  Lillo’s  drama  follows  an analogous disciplining function that runs counter to the work of The Beggar’s Opera examined in the previous chapters of this dissertation, and in order to understand Lillo’s most successful play I will compare it at points to Gay’s as well as to his own 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failed first project, Sylvia, a ballad opera. The London Merchant puts its spectators in their  place  in  relation  to  the  viewing  public  and  diminishes  the  importance  of particular  subjectivity  in  favor  of  the whole.  Lillo’s  play  encourages  spectators  to imagine  themselves  as  spectacles,  which  creates  an  estrangement  of  subjective experience  from  its  source  leading  to  the  kind  of  anxiety  over  the  loss  of  self‐determination that will later be expressed in William Hazlitt’s criticism of Burkean sympathy.   George Lillo’s play, The London Merchant was first performed June 21, 1731 at  Drury  Lane  and was  staged  ninety‐six  times  from  1731  to  1741.  Although  not performed as  frequently  as  the most  successful play of  the period,  John Gay’s The 
Beggar’s  Opera,  The  London  Merchant  was  extremely  popular  with  English theatergoers  of  the  time.  However,  prior  to  being  staged  the  play  had  been considered something of a risk for its unconventional subject matter. Its story was adapted  from  the  ballad,  George  Barnwell,  about  an  apprentice  led  astray  by  a woman, but  the plot had been modified  to  strengthen  its  connection  to  the urban middle  classes.  Lillo’s  choice  of  characters  from  the  middle  classes,  while  not unprecedented,  broke  with  the  prominent  dramaturgical  dictum  of  its  day  that demanded  that  serious  drama  should  feature  characters  from  the  upper  ranks  of society.72 While  theaters  commonly  held  pantomimes  produced  especially  for  the apprentice  audience  on  selected  days  throughout  the  year,  the  extension  of  this practice  into  proper  drama  was  a  different  matter.  Even  the  attendance  of                                                         72 See McBurney’s introduction to The London Merchant, 1965. Also, the popularity of The Beggar’s Opera must have made this move a bit less bold. 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pantomimes was fraught. The fact that apprentices were encouraged to attend these plays  was  frowned  upon  by  larger  society  as  they  felt  that  apprentices  would abandon their businesses in pursuit of entertainment and would learn unacceptable behavior  from  the  characters  in  the  plays  (O'Brien  2004).  These  pantomimes generally contained an apprentice character that represented the audience and was conceived  as  someone with whom  they  could  identify.73  In The  London Merchant there are two such characters, George Barnwell and Trueman, who might be read in line with  the pantomime  traditions as  representing a dichotomy of  the apprentice class.  Trueman  is  a  model  apprentice,  as  evidenced  by  his  name,  and  George Barnwell,  the apprentice  led astray by the wiles of women, serves as a warning to apprentices everywhere that even a small act of disobedience, breaking the master’s curfew,  could  lead  to  disaster.  It  is  generally  agreed  that  The  London  Merchant aimed to offer its audience instruction in virtue, and it has even been suggested that the play’s popularity due less to its satisfaction of the public’s taste than to its being perceived as useful  instruction  for  the youth.74 But  the London Merchant does not perform a regulatory function in the manner of a pantomime. Instead it reflects on parallels between dramaturgy and economic exchange and offers a critique of self‐interest that applies to both arenas.    In  its  focus  on  Barnwell,  a  poor  apprentice,  and  Millwood,  a  woman  who must market her body in order to have agency, the play makes clear the black side of                                                         73  See  John  O’Brien’s  chapter,  “’Infamous  Harlequin  Mimicry’:  Apprentices, Entertainment,  and  the  Mass  Audience,”  in  Harlequin  Britain:  Pantomime  and 
Entertainment, 1690­1760, 2004, pp.138‐180. 74  See  William  H.  McBurney’s  introduction  to  The  London  Merchant,  Regents Restoration Drama Series, 1965. 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a system that not only exploits, but which excludes some of its members. The play’s critique  of  the  social  implications  of  capitalism  can  best  be  understood  in  the context of two writers whose works fall on both sides of Lillo’s play, chronologically and  ideologically:  Bernard Mandeville,  and  Adam  Smith.  In The  London Merchant Lillo  advocates  a  socio‐economic  system  based  on  sympathetic  interconnection, wherein individual subjectivity is always situated, one that anticipates Smith’s in the 
Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments.  Sympathy  works  as  a  model  of  socio‐economic interrelation  within  the  play  as  well  as  being  its  dramaturgic  principal  of engagement.  So  the  play  simultaneously  situates  its  spectators  as members  of  an ideal  socio‐economy  and  as members  of  an  audience.  In  its  two main  characters, Barnwell and Millwood, the play demonstrates two kinds of sympathy and looks to teach its audience the right sort of sympathy to allow.   There  has  been  little  question  throughout  the  history  of  the  play’s  critical reception  that George Lillo aimed  to offer his audience  instruction  in virtue,  there has been some disagreement regarding the efficacy of the play’s capacity for moral correction.  Some  have  seen  the  play  as  a  sort  of  moral  medicine  that  might  be topically applied to cure social ills. In 1763 George Alexander Stevens suggests uses the efficacy of The London Merchant as the standard by which to compare his mock proposal  for  setting  right  defaulters  in  the  exchange.  This  turns  out  to  amount  to comparing  Lillo’s  play  to  physical  abuse,  putting  the  status  of  this  comparison  in question,  but  establishing  at  the  least  that  the  play  was  viewed  clearly  as  a corrective. In The Beauties of all Magazines Selected for the Year 1763; Including the 
Several Original Comic Pieces, Volume II, Stevens writes: 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 …suppose every Lame Duck was to be foot‐ball’d up and down the      walks of the Change, three or four times on each walk, then kick’d      over the area for about ten minutes, between the hours of one and      two, in the middle of any day in the week, Sunday excepted; it would      not only be very beneficial exercise, for the health of the gentlemen      upon Change; but keep other people’s principles in good order, and      might have as fine effect upon the Change Alley dealers, as seeing the      play of George Barnwell has had upon several London prentices. But this pedantic strain rubbed some viewers the wrong way. Charles Lamb deemed it a “nauseous sermon” (On the Tragedies of Shakespeare, 1811). William Hazlitt took this negative reaction a step further, going so far as to say that the preaching quality of the play was as likely to inspire rebellion as correction. Hazlitt, in the essay, “On Actors and Acting” (1815), writes:     … we will hazard a conjecture that the acting of the Beggar's Opera a      certain number of nights every year since it was first brought out has      done more towards putting down the practice of highway robbery,      than all the gibbets that ever were erected. A person, after seeing this      piece, is too deeply imbued with a sense of humanity, is in too good      humour with himself and the rest of the world, to set about cutting      throats or rifling pockets. Whatever makes a jest of vice leaves it too      much a matter of indifference for any one in his senses to rush       desperately on his ruin for its sake. We suspect that just the contrary      effect must be produced by the representation of George Barnwell,  
    which is too much in the style of the Ordinary's sermon to meet with      any better success. The mind, in such cases, instead of being deterred      by the alarming consequences held out to it, revolts against the      denunciation of them as an insult offered to its free‐will, and, in a      spirit of defiance, returns a practical answer to them, by daring the      worst that can happen.   Hazlitt casts doubt on the efficacy of Lillo’s play for instruction because it tries too hard  to  instruct,  and  in  doing  so  the  play  threatens  the  agency  of  the  spectator. Rather  than  allow  the  viewer  to  make  his  own  determinations,  Lillo  would,  as Fielding  writes  in  “An  Essay  on  the  Knowledge  of  Characters  of  Men,”  (1743) “impose” his own judgment “on the rest of mankind.” 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 Lillo offers his dramaturgical program in the play’s dedication. Citing Dryden, he  postulates  that  if  the  aim  of  tragic  poetry  is  to  be  useful,  then  the  more extensively useful it is, the more excellent is the tragedy. Tragedy does its work by “exciting the passions in order to the correcting such of them as are criminal.” Lillo’s play  operates  on  the  principle  of  pathetic  concernment,  which  was  taken  from Aristotle’s Poetics and advocated by Rapin in France, and then by Dryden in Britain. The  principle  of  concernment  requires  that  spectators  invest  themselves passionately in the circumstances of a character on the stage. In accordance with the Aristotelian theory of dramaturgy,  the audience  is concerned in order to move the passions in order to educate them. Following Lillo’s logic, in order for his play to be excellent,  it  must  move  the  passions  of  the  bulk  of  his  audience.  But  a  changing public,  and  changing  tastes,  required  a  shift  in  subject  matter  to  accomplish  this task. A  review of The London Merchant  appearing  in The Gentlemen’s Magazine  in 1731  mentions  “an  observing  lady”  who  remarks  that  “the  distress  of  great personages has of  late,  fail’d  of  raising  those passions  that us’d  to  accompany  the representation  of  exalted  characters.”  This  gestures  toward  the  popularity  of The 
Beggar’s  Opera,  though  it  is  not  clear  whether  this  is  one  of  the  reasons  for  the success of Gay’s play or a condition that it helped to bring about. While there is no explanation  given  for  why  “exalted  characters”  no  longer  moved  audiences,  it  is important to note the position of this “observing lady” in relation to the passions on which she comments. She speaks not of her own passions or reactions to plays, but comments  from a distance on  the  general,  universal  passions of  the  theater‐going public.  This  implies  that  though  the  subjects  of  plays  were  no  longer  exalted,  a 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hierarchy still existed in order that a “lady” might comment dispassionately on the tastes  of  the  masses.  The  change  in  tastes  signals  a  change  in  notions  about  the social  function of drama  in  line with Richard Steele’s program  in The Spectator  of civilizing the public. The appeal of a play like The London Merchant extends beyond the  practical  moral  aim  of  instructing  apprentices  and  extends  to  instructing  the generality of the public.   A different sort of material is necessary to deal with domestic matters. Lillo chooses characters and concerns near to the situation and experience of the bulk of his audience and brings the drama closer to home.75 Lillo writes:     Plays founded on moral tales in private life may be of admirable use      by carrying conviction to the mind with such irresistible force as to      engage all the faculties and powers of the soul in the case of virtue by      stifling vice in its first principles.  Lillo offers Hamlet’s play within  the play as an example of  the affective efficacy of drama  carefully  aimed  at  its  audience.  Just  as  Hamlet  used  a  performance  that staged  the  transgressions of his Uncle and mother  in order  to  confront  them with their  guilt,  Lillo  aimed  to  put  his  spectators,  whose  sins  he  wised  to  correct,  or prevent,  on  the  stage before  them. At  least  one  reviewer  followed Lillo’s  lead and brought up the old story of a woman, who watching a production of Hamlet, was so moved by the proximity of the affairs depicted on the stage to her own experience  that she was overcome with guilt (so that the production of the play mirrors what                                                         75  As  David  Hume writes  in  his Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  1739‐40:  …we  find  in common life, that men are principally concern’d about those objects, which are not much remov’d either in space or time, enjoying the present, and leaving what is afar off,  to  the  care  of  chance  and  fortune.  …The  breaking  of  a  mirror  gives  us  more concern  when  at  home,  than  the  burning  of  a  house,  when  abroad,  and  some hundred leagues distant (II.III.vii). 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happens within  it)  in  order  to describe  a  similar  effect  brought  on by  the London 
Merchant.76 In a preface to Hamlet, published in 1784, bookseller and former actor, Thomas Davies recounts a modern equivalent to the old story of the woman whose guilt overcame her on watching Hamlet.     A more recent effect of stage‐representation, to rouse a sense of guilt      in the mind of a spectator, has been told me with such proofs of      authenticity that I cannot disbelieve it. Dr. Barrowby was, many years      since, sent for to attend a young lad who was an apprentice to a      tradesman in the city: he found him extremely indisposed and low‐     spirited. After some questions asked him by the doctor, the boy said,      his distemper was owing to his having lately seen the tragedy of      George Barnwell. His case, he said, resembled Barnwell’s, so far as the      robbing of his master; and this, he said, lay very heavy upon his mind.    Yet,  there  is  equal  evidence  that  the  play  affected  spectators  of  a  different  class, despite Lillo’s advertised program and the common opinion that the play worked as a sort of topical moral medicine. Despite the purported aim at the middle class and apprentices, there is some evidence that Lillo’s play appealed to an elite crowd with a taste for innovative drama. The GM reviewer “congratulates the taste of the few in 
town,  for  distinguishing  so  well.”  When  the  GM  reviewer,  after  mentioning  the “observing  lady” who  advocates  the  common  characters  of The  London Merchant, concludes by asserting “such is the artful contrivance of his play; so delicate  is the texture of  its composition,  that none, but a common prostitute,  can  find  fault with it,” he creates not only an opposition between the  two  female critics,  the  lady and the prostitute,  but he  creates  an  inversion of  class‐based  taste  and  subject matter 
                                                        76  Thomas  Davies  in  Dramatic  Miscellanies:  Consisting  of  Critical  Observations  on 
Several Plays, 1784. 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that  brings  into  question  whether  Lillo’s  play  was  doing  the  cultural  work  it advertised.   Lillo’s  play  is meant  to  be  enforcing  the  notion  that  character  is  related  to virtue,  that  one’s  fortunes  may  be  shaped  by  doing  good  acts.  In  its  program  it resembles Hogarth’s  twelve prints of  Industry and  Idleness  (1747). Hogarth  shows the progression in the lives of two apprentices, one of whom is dedicated and hard working, the other idle, which leads to crime and his execution. This shows the work ethic of Protestant England, where those who work hard get rewarded, such as the industrious  apprentice  who  becomes  Sheriff  (plate  8),  Alderman  (plate  10),  and finally the Lord Mayor of London in the last plate in the series. The idle apprentice begins  "at  play  in  the  church  yard"  (plate  3),  then  holes  up  "in  a  Garrett  with  a Common Prostitute" after turning highwayman (plate 7) and is finally "executed at Tyburn"  (plate 11).  To  cap  it  off,  the  idle  apprentice  is  sent  to  the  gallows by  the industrious apprentice himself. The idle apprentice strongly evokes both Macheath of Gay’s Beggar’s Opera,  and Swift’s author  in a garret. One might presume that of the  two, Hazlitt,  as  a  critic of Lillo’s heavy‐handed style, might  come down on  the side of  the  idle apprentice as an advocate of humanity over didacticism. But more importantly, over  the notion of  character as determinant of virtue  rather  than  the idea, as advocated in The Beggar’s Opera,  that virtue lies in the preservation of the power of subjective judgment in the face of imposing systems.   The  Gentlemen’s  Magazine  reviewer  makes  clear  that  character  is  not  the issue.  Rather,  the  play’s  success  in  raising  its  viewer’s  passions  is  due  to  the circumstances and situations in which the characters are placed: 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 The objection, that the characters are too low for the stage, the       Register answers—that ‘tis lowness of action, not of character that is      not allowed there. The circumstances here are of the utmost        importance, and rise as high in action as any to be met with in the      stories of mere pomp and ostentation.  Despite being the product of an attempt to create a distinctly domestic sort tragedy, these responses to its production reveal that the distinction is not so clear.   One of the more revealing parts of the dedication comes in the passage wherein Lillo grants that  the  traditional characters and subject matter of  tragedy deals effectively with problems of state.     I am far from denying that tragedies founded on any instructive and      extraordinary events in history, or a well‐invented fable where the      persons introduced are of the highest rank, are without their use, even     to the bulk of the audience. The strong contrast between a Tamerlane      and a Bajazet may have its weight with an unsteady people and      contribute to the fixing of them in the interest of a prince of the      character of the former, when, through their own levity or the arts of      designing men, they are rendered factious and uneasy, though they      have the highest reason to be satisfied.  The  reviewers  appear  to  see  Lillo’s  domestic  drama  performing  the  same  sort  of work in regards to class and taste that Lillo ascribes to traditional tragedy.   A  column  called  “The Apprentices  Looking‐Glass”  appearing  in The  London 
Magazine  in  1732  affirms  the  prominence  of  the  issues  of  class  and  taste,  while calling into doubt what has hitherto seemed the clear moral aim of the tragedy. The writer recounts     …a visit I lately made to a new theatre, erected for the entertainment      of certain wits, that inhabit the purlieus of Lombard‐Street and      Billingsgate, who were assign’d by their indulgent, but mistaken      parents, to shops and counting‐houses, when their genius’s led them      to the Muses and Parnassus: but at length one Mr. G___ arose, and      resolv’d to set at Liberty these choice spirits. 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 I was surpriz’d when I was told by one next me in the Pit, that The  
    Orphan, or The Unhappy Marriage, was to be acted; for I expected      something adapted to the place and audience, either the History of  
    Whittington and his Cat, The London Apprentice, or George Barnwell.  The  writer  goes  on  to  describe  the  dress  and  manner  of  the  audience.  Not surprisingly, the apprentices are all dressed like fops. It becomes clear that the real issue  here  for  the Grub  Street  reviewer  concerns  class  and putting  on  airs.  These apprentices think themselves part of an elite class of spectator, when they are they in fact “the public.” The “mirror” is held up as an impartial spectator of sorts, one in which  the  spectators may view  themselves  as  spectators  and mend  their ways by recognizing  themselves  as  part  of  public  with  a  specific  part  to  play,  and  not  as individual subjects free to move wherever their desires and capital might take them.   In a review of The Works of Mr. George Lillo; with some account of his  life,77 Davies recounts a story of the play’s first production:     Certain witty and facetious persons, who call themselves the town,      bought up large quantities of the ballad of George Barnwell, with an      intent to make a ludicrous comparison between the old song, and the      new tragedy; but so forcible and so pathetic were the scenes of the      London Merchant, that these merry gentlemen were quite        disappointed and ashamed; they were obliged to throw away their      ballads and take out their handkerchiefs.  Davies’ description of the theater‐goers’ shame echoes the guilt that figures in to the accounts above. Lillo’s play,  filtered  through  the contemporary writings around  it, works  to  encourage  a  sort  of  self‐monitoring  regulation  of  class  and  taste,  and  to plant an internal spectator, called “guilt”  in the passages above within the theater‐going public.                                                         77 “An Impartial Review of New Publications,” The London Magazine, or Gentleman’s 
Monthly Intelligencer. Vol 44, February, 1775. 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 In  the The London Merchant,  Lillo  addresses  the public’s  changing  taste  for different  sorts  of  characters  from  a  different  angle  than  Gay  did  in  The  Beggar’s 
Opera.  While  Gay’s  use  of  low  characters  furthered  his  satirical  critique  of  social structures. Gay’s low characters showed that there was really no difference between high and revealed the sham nature of ordering principles. Lillo used low characters in order to reinforce class structures. One can see this tendency in Lillo’s first play, a ballad  opera  titled  Silvia.  Silvia  was  staged  in  1730  and  was  a  failure.  Richard Noble’s suggestion that this failure was in large part due to Lillo’s lack for “lightness of touch and ironic theatricality” is informative considering the importance of irony to the function of The Beggar’s Opera.78 Gay’s irony and wit kept his pathos in check and kept his play engaging rather than formally imposing. Lillo’s ballad opera is the tale of a young woman, the titular figure, whose virtue remains intact when she, at the  instigation  of  her  mother  refuses  an  indecent  proposal  that  would  solve  her family’s financial problems but render her a fallen woman.    The  contrast between Lillo’s  and Gay’s ballad operas  is made  clear  in  their treatments of marriage. Marriage, a legitimated form of affective attachment, has, as I  have  argued  in  the  preceding  chapters  functioned  to  represent  generically prescribed sympathy in Banks’s Virtue Betray’d and in Gay’s The What d’ye Call  It? and The Beggar’s Opera. While marriage is depicted as something to be avoided at all costs by  the  characters  of Gay’s plays,  in  keeping with  their  aim of  protecting  the ownership  of  individual  affective  response  in  the  face  of  the  totalizing  systems  of                                                         78 See Noble’s introduction to Silvia in The Dramatic Works of George Lillo, edited by James L. Steffensen, 1993. 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generic hegemony, Lillo’s Silvia,  like The London Merchant advocates marriage as a virtuous  institution  and  equates  its  opposition with  prostitution  and  thievery.  As Silvia says, “the World owes its Order, Kingdoms their peaceful regular Succession, and private families their Domestick Happiness to Marriage” (I.iv.46‐47). While the author  of  the  illicit  proposal,  Sir  John,  argues  that  “love  can  subsist  without  the Marriage  Tye,”  advocating  a  position  that would  be  appreciated  by  Peachum  and Macheath  from  Gay’s  play,  in  the  end  Silvia’s  position  wins  out.  The  position  on marriage conveyed in Silvia should be read as aesthetic and ideological. Silvia sees marriage,  the  binding  of  affect,  as  the  source  of  civil  society,  and  Lillo  employs dramaturgical  sympathy  as  a means  of  controlling passion  and  reinscribing  social order.   Victoria  Kahn  has  demonstrated  convincingly  in  Wayward  Contracts  that there  is  a  connection  between  political  contract  and  genre.  Lillo,  as  has  been suggested  above, was  ultimately  concerned with  appealing  to  the  largest  possible audience. Appealing to a large audience is desirable for all playwrights of course, but for Lillo it was not merely a matter of financial success, but of the satisfaction of the moral aim of his dramaturgy as laid out in his dedication. In his effort to appeal to a large segment of  the population Lillo’s play  takes on  the generic  characteristics of melodrama.79    The  generic  classification  of  The  London  Merchant  as  melodrama rather  than  tragedy  makes  clear  its  concerns,  and  explains  some  of  its  apparent formal inconsistencies, as I will show below. In Tragedy and Melodrama: Versions of                                                         79  Frank  Rahill  points  out  that  “Melodrama  is  a  form  of  dramatic  composition intended for a popular audience,” The World of Melodrama, p xiv. 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Experience (1968), Robert Heilman asserts that divided consciousness is a quality of both  tragedy  and  melodrama,  but  that  “melodrama  is  the  realm  of  social  action, public action, action within the world; tragedy is the realm of private action, action within  the  soul”  (97).    This  insight  on  the  distinction  between  tragedy  and melodrama renders salient both the thematic concerns of The London Merchant as well as its use of character. Barnwell’s private dilemma is not explored by the play because it is not concerned with individual interiority, its subject is the situation of persons within social systems. The play’s characters must come to terms with their status,  and  pathos  is  used  to  reproduce  the  effects  within  the  play  between performance  and  spectator.  The  play  is  inherently  social  in  its  concern  so  that  it resists characterizations of  interiority  just as  it resists containment of  its action to the stage.   
The London Merchant and Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments   If the reception of The London Merchant, or at least accounts of the reception in the periodicals, works as a lesson in being a self‐aware part of a spectating public, then  it would  be  helpful  to  look  at The  London Merchant  alongside Adam  Smith’s 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, to which it appears to stand in proleptic relation.80 The 
London  Merchant  offers  two  potential  pathetic  figures,  Millwood  and  Barnwell.                                                         80  In  The  Figure  of  Theatre,  David  Marshall  discusses  the  centrality  of  theatrical relations  in  Smith’s  TMS.  I  return  to  his  work  later  in  this  chapter.  Marshall’s analysis  of  the  theatricality  of  Smith’s  theory  is  insightful  and  invites  an  inverse analysis:  if  thinking  about  theater  influenced  Smith,  as  Marshall  suggests,  then  it might be useful to look at contemporary drama through the lens of Smith’s theory, or  as  I  attempt  in  this  chapter,  to  look  at  earlier  drama  for  ideas  or  themes  that anticipate Smith’s TMS. 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Millwood  represents  self‐interest  and  a  false  form of  sympathy, while Barnwell  is tragic because he has succumbed to sympathizing with the first. This offers a lesson to  viewer.  The work  of  drama  depends  on  sympathy.  The  play  suggests,  through Barnwell’s example,  that  the viewer should be careful with whom he sympathizes, and sympathy should be based on approbation, not on a Mandevillian physiological response.    Smith’s  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments  responded  to  earlier  works  that attempted to explain  the  fabric of modern society. Notably, Smith sought  to refute Bernard  Mandeville’s  Fable  of  the  Bees.  While  Mandeville’s  Fable,  offered  a compelling account of society on an economic model,  it also troubled the notion of private  virtue.  The  difference  between  Mandeville’s  and  Smith’s  accounts  can  be clarified by considering the illustrative figures that each uses. Mandeville’s society is fundamentally economic, while Smith’s is theatrical.81 They are similar in that both figures  represent  the  relationship  of  individual  subjects  to  society  at  large,  both arguing in effect that the subject is inextricably a part of a system of exchanges. But the nature of the relationship between subject and society in the two schemes is as different  as  the  nature  of  the  exchanges  represented.    In  Mandeville’s  economic model, exchanges are superficial.    According to Mandeville, passions are never conquered; they only appear so at times. His cynical  fable depicts a society  in which the motives of  individuals are self‐serving, and though one can always anticipate them, they are hidden from sight.                                                         81  See David Marshall, The  Figure  of  Theater:  Shaftesbury,  Defoe,  Adam  Smith,  and 
George Eliot, 1986. 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Rather  than  being  controlled,  passions  are  translated  through  purchase  and  flow around as economic  forces. Pride  is  the  source of  all  apparent virtue according  to Mandeville.  It  is universal and sets up a need—a deficit—that must be satisfied by certain sentiments coming  in. Pride demands  the approbation of one’s community (275).  In  the  language  of  economic  virtue,  esteem  is  a  kind  of  credit.  Compassion then  is  a  counterfeit  charity;  it  is  a  way  of  buying  peace,  of  buying  off  a discomforting  passion.  In Mandeville’s  fable,  exchange  breaks  down when desires (passions) are removed. His world of private virtue is a kind of economic hell. But this seems to place the market in the place of prime importance from the get‐go (a sort of tautology? economy as his fiction of origin?)   Lillo’s play resonates at times with Mandeville’s model of society. Barnwell’s master explains the importance of business in forming the fabric of society:     THOROWGOOD. Methinks I would not have you only learn the method       of merchandise and practice it hereafter merely as a means of        getting wealth. ‘Twill be well worth your pains to study it as a        science, see how it is founded in reason and the nature of        things, how it has promoted humanity as it has opened and yet        keeps up an intercourse between nations far remote from one        another in situation, customs, and religion; promoting arts,        industry, peace, and plenty; by mutual benefits diffusing        mutual love from pole to pole.       (III.i.1‐9.)  Barnwell  describes  economy  as  a  science.  This  scientific  approach  suggests  that economics is natural, and that its laws and principles can be discovered through the application of method. Mandeville’s system appeals to nature too, but his is nature “red  in  tooth  and  claw”  and not  that  of  the natural  scientist, waiting  to be  tamed. This  economic  system  further  differs  from  Mandeville’s  in  that  the  passions  and appetites must be governed by reason. As Barnwell says, “The law of heaven will not 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be reversed, and that requires us to govern our passions”. Millwood responds, “To give  us  sense  of  beauty  and  desires,  and  yet  forbid  us  to  taste  and  be  happy,  is cruelty to nature. Have we passions only to torment us?” (I.viii.8‐12.)   Polly  Fields  argues  that  we  understand  Millwood  as  both  “capitalist practitioner  and  victim  of  capitalism”  in  part  of  Lillo’s  analysis  of  the  effects  of capitalism.82 The play focuses on the effects that capitalism has had on people who are  its  victims  through  no  fault  of  their  own,  but  through  accidents  of  birth  and gender.  Fields  argues  that Millwood  is  the  play’s  central  character,  a woman who uses  her  body  and her wits  to  convince George Barnwell  to  steal  and  even  kill  to supply her with money. Barnwell  is Millwood’s victim, but  in  the  larger picture of the  society  he  presents,  Lillo  shows  Millwood  to  be  the  victim  of  capitalism. Millwood  rebels  against  the  hierarchy  of  women  in  society  as  well  as  women  in business. Her rebellion continues to death, as the last scene in which she appears is a scathing criticism of the hierarchical dominance and hypocritical nature of men in the  economy.  In  the  gallows  scene  that  was  removed  for  most  productions,  a repentant George Barnwell urges Millwood to change her ways, to which she replies that  she  “was doomed before  the world began  to  endless pains  and  (Barnwell)  to joys  eternal”(Faller  2004).  In  Lillo’s  world  of  trade,  Millwood’s  commodity  is  her body;  however,  she  refuses  to  be  “victimized  as  a  woman  and  a  whore”  (Burke 1994).  Millwood  critiques  economic  hierarchies,  though  it  is  doubtful  that  Lillo intends his audience to be receptive to her critique.  
                                                        82 Polly Fields, “George Lillo and the Victims of Economic Theory,” 1999. 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 The play offers two pathetic figures, each possible subjects of an audience’s sympathy. Steffensen notes that the play is structured to some degree as a morality debate, like Dr. Faustus, with Millwood as the representative of vice set against the agents of good: Trueman, Marian, and Thorowgood.83 Yet there is a great degree of determinism in Lillo’s play. Once Barnwell gives into the temptation of passion, all of his other sins seem to follow almost automatically. After his sexual encounter, there is little conflict within Barnwell over whether to steal from his master, or to murder his uncle. The moral conflict resides in his acceptance of the determinism of a moral system that  is analogous  to  the workings of  the market. Millwood  is depicted as a villain, albeit one produced by the evils of society. Her villainy resides in her attitude toward the determinism of the market: she sees herself as a victim, her will at odds with  and  oppressed  by  the market, while  the  play  suggests  that  virtue  resides  in accepting  the  will  of  the  market,  and  accepting  one’s  role  as  a  cog  in  the  great machine. Millwood  says  that  she  herself  was  “doom’d  before  the World  began  to endless  Pains”  (V.xi.39).  Even  her  name  suggests  something,  an  object  without agency,  produced  as  the  result  of  a  process  of manufacturing  in  service  of  trade. Millwood’s  attitude  is  contrasted  with  the  virtuous  position  captured  in  Maria’s statement that “it is just and right that Innocence should suffer; for Heaven must be just in all ways” (IV.i.5‐6).84                                                         83 James L. Steffensen, Introduction to The London Merchant, in The Dramatic Works 
of George Lillo, 1993. 84 Robert Heilman, in a casual analysis of The London Merchant, argues that the lack of  anybody  to blame  is  further  reason  for  categorizing  the play as melodrama. He writes:  “  Lillo  aspires  to  tragedy,  but  is  led  astray  by  an  irresistible  impulse  to assume  the  shrill  tones  of  condemnation.  With  one  hand  Lillo  makes  Barnwell 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 Millwood expresses  the philosophy of passionate  self‐interest unabashedly, showing  that  rather  than having virtuously  accepted  the  justice of  the  system she has come to see it as inherently evil and justifies her own wrong doing as matching the nature of the market society:     MILLWOOD. … I have done nothing that I am sorry for. I followed my        inclinations, and that the best of you does every day. All actions       are alike natural and indifferent to man and beast who devour        or are devoured as they meet with others weaker or stronger        than themselves.         (IV.xviii.41‐45.)  Millwood  is  unapologetic  because,  as  far  as  she  is  concerned,  she  has  acted  in accordance not only with her own  inclinations but with  the natural order as well. Her  transgression  arises  from her  refusal  to mask  her  passions,  to  commit  to  the deception that, according to Mandeville,  is a part of civil society. But her refusal to deceive herself gives her a kind of knowledge and agency that is lacking in the other characters.    Mandeville’s system renders private virtue impossible so long as we consider subjects as individuals. Mandeville offers a kind of proto‐utilitarianism: the good of the many, ends over motives. But this scheme is peculiar because it starts from the presumption of the self‐interested subject and finds redemption for  interest  in the good of the whole. Smith wants to redeem the possibility of private good and does so by making  the  inherently  social nature of  the  subject his  starting point,  getting around the problem of  judging  individual virtue posed by Mandeville by making a                                                         tragically  responsible  for  his  own  downfall;  with  the  other  he  undermines  tragic effect by rhetorically blaming Barnwell’s downfall on  the prostitute Millwood, and Millwood’s, in turn, on society. Not only does this finger pointing muddle the focus, but it helps reduce Barnwell’s self‐accusation, already sentimental, to hysterical self‐abasement” (Tragedy and Melodrama, 145). 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claim about the nature of the individual subject, asserting that an individual is a kind of fiction. Smith cites Epictetus:         “In what sense,” says Epictetus, “are some things said to be according      to our  nature, and others contrary to it?—it is in that sense in which      we consider ourselves as separated and detached from all other      things. For thus it may be said to be according to the nature of the foot     to be always clean. But if you consider it as a foot, and not as        something detached from the rest of the body, it must behove it      sometimes to trample in the dirt, and sometimes to tread upon thorns,     and sometimes, too, to be cut off for the sake of the whole body;      and if it refuses this, it is no longer a foot. Thus, too, ought we to      conceive with regard to ourselves.”       (VII.II.405.)  This all hinges on  the alarming possibility of  the  foot’s  refusal  to  comply with  the exigent demands of an invisible agent with authority to decide what is best for the whole. While it  is  literally quite true that if a foot were to refuse anything,  it could not be a foot as we conceive feet, the real point is that in broaching the possibility of the rebellious foot,  the passage confronts us with a figure that has overstepped its bounds.  The  figure  of  the  rebelling  foot  represents  personification  that  is  out  of control, and to consider man as something separate from society, argues Smith via Epictetus, is to commit to a similar extravagance of personification. Self‐interest as a guiding principle is as much as to consider oneself as separated from the whole.   Barnwell’s master,  though  he  talks  of  pity,  reveals  that  his  view  of  human nature  relies  too much  on  reason  and method  though  a  kind  of  affect  is  what  is needed. Thorowgood advocates the mastery of the passions by reason, exactly that which Mandeville asserts is impossible.     THOROWGOOD. …When we consider the frail condition of humanity it       may raise our pity, not our wonder, that youth should go astray       when reason,  weak at the best when opposed to inclination,        scarce formed and wholly unassisted by experience, faintly        contends or willingly becomes slave of sense. (II.iv.17‐22.) 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Thorowgood’s  insistence  on  separating  reason  from  sense  is  a  sort  of  willful ignorance  in  the  face  of  the  need  for  sympathy.  Sympathy  for  Thorowgood  exists figuratively, or materially,  in  the motions of  the market. Trade  is  a  civilizing  force akin to Smith’s “social passion.” 
 Exchange and trade are  important  issues  to  the merchant, and are also key factors  in  the  text  itself  as  they  become  metaphors  throughout  the  play. Thorowgood  describes  the  expansion  of  global  commerce  as  a  circulation throughout the world (Hynes 683). For example, he tells Trueman in act three that he  should  study  trade  because  he  can  learn  “how  it  promotes  humanity  as  it  has opened  and  yet  keeps  up  an  intercourse  between  nations  far  remote  from  one another in situation, customs, and religion” (III.i.5‐9). Similarly, important aspects of the play, such as the bond between Barnwell and Trueman in act five, are put into the language of exchange. Barnwell describes their union as an “intercourse of woe” instructing Trueman  to  “pour  all  your  griefs  into my breast  and  in  exchange  take mine”  (V.ii.129‐130).  This  illustrates  a  reciprocal  trade  of  passion;  a  circular economy of sympathy which resonates with Thorowgood’s description of humanity promoting global trade. But the exchange of sympathy can be easily mismanaged. In addition  to  exchange,  excess  is  another  economic  element  that  functions  as  a metaphor  in  the  play.  Excess  is  most  strongly  exhibited  through  passion  (Hynes 685). While Barnwell begins by following calm commerce, a passionate lust replaces it with the theft from Thorowgood and murder of Barnwell’s uncle. Hynes describes that the most dangerous thing about passion is its insatiability, because “erotic love, unlike trade, includes no machinery of impulse and abatement, no way of rationally 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regulating  itself”  (Hynes  285).  While  trade  can  easily  sustain  itself,  passion  has nothing stopping it from going to the extreme. Millwood also embodies this excess, as  her  absolutism  political  ideology  is  incompatible  with  a  sustainable  system  of exchange  (Hynes 686).  She exploits  contracts,  simulating behavior of  exchange,  in order to defy the entire system.   Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments  is  founded on the principle of sympathy in order to get around the problem of self‐interest. This relation of sympathy to self‐interest is pertinent to understanding Thorowgood’s sympathetic market because it faces  the  same  challenge,  voiced  by Millwood,  of  denying  the  accusation  that  it  is founded on  self‐interest.  Smith  argues  that we  are by nature  interested  in  others, because we are by nature “feet,”  things whose  identity separate  from the whole  is rather nonsensical.  So Smith begins his Theory of Moral Sentiments with  the claim that      How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some      principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others,      and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives      nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. (I.1.3)  Self‐interest becomes a kind of  compassion derived  from man’s  social nature,  and this  in  the  strongest  sense:  the  self  is  by  nature  a  social  thing.  The  difference between one person and another becomes merely a question of situation.     As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can      form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by        conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. (I.1.3‐4) By way  of  imagination  an  observer  enters  a  fictional  situation  that  can  have  real, though weaker effects on his senses. He can in this way “become in some measure the  same  person”  suggesting  that  a  person  is  determined  to  some  degree  by 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sensations  (cf  Locke),  and  also  by  their  situations.  Smith  concludes:  “Sympathy, therefore does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as  from that of the situation  which  excites  it”  (I.1.7.)  Smith’s  point  about  the  situational  nature  of sympathy resonates with the point raised above by the reviewer for the Gentlemen’s 
Magazine who claimed that character matters less than situation.    Mandeville, Hume, and Smith, all make use of scenes of violence to illustrate the workings of sympathy. For Mandeville, the sight of an infant being devoured by a sow  elicits  and  undeniable  physical  reaction—perhaps  the  only  true  form  of compassion, or sympathy that is possible in a world that is categorically motivated by  self‐interest. Hume offers  a  scene,  not  nearly  so  graphic,  of  a man  about  to  be trampled by a horse, which stirs, he argues, an undeniable sympathy manifest in the desire of the subject to prevent the immanent suffering of the man. In fact, this scene is not only hypothetical, but incomplete; the violence only needs to be suggested to arouse  sympathy.  What  these  scenes  share  in  common  is  that  they  are  scenes.85 Hume’s example clearly intends to illustrate the essential role of the imagination in sympathy. And Mandeville’s, though it argues for physiological model of compassion wherein  there  is  an  immediate  connection  between  a  grisly  spectacle  and  the sensation of compassion, ends up relying on the imagination as well. It is working as                                                         85 David Marshall writes:    It is no coincidence that Smith illustrates a discussion of how we enter in to   the sentiments and actions of others with a description of reading; whether   we are confronted with a person or a  text, we must  face a  fiction. We must   imagine that we are persons who can be only representations to us; through   imagination we transport ourselves to a distant place, try to place ourselves   in  someone else’s  situation. We  take  their part by  trying  to play  their part.   (Figure of Theater, 171) 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an imagined scene in a text that arouses an uncomfortable sympathy in the reader. Smith makes the relationship of sympathy to imagination and scene clearer.   Millwood’s sympathetic appeal works  in a manner  like that of  the spectacle of the sow devouring the child; it is completely physiological. But it is sexual rather than violent. It is passion and self‐interest untempered by reflection. 
    MILLWOOD. Yet do not, do not leave me! I wish my sex’s pride would        meet your scorn, but when I look upon you, when I behold        those eyes—oh, spare my tongue, and let my blushes speak!        This flood of tears to that will force their way and declare what        woman’s modesty should hide.  She manipulates  this  sort of  sympathetic  response  in order  to  captivate Barnwell, swaying him from dutiful loyalty to his master.     BARNWELL. Oh, Heavens! She loves me, worthless as I am. Her looks,        her words, her flowing tears confess it. And can I leave her        then? Oh, never, never!—Madam, dry up those tears. You shall        command me  always. I will stay here forever, if you’d have me.                      (I.vi.74‐83.)  This  speech  illustrates  the  danger  of  sympathy  motivated  by  a  corporeal  figure, rather than by situation and imagination.   Smith  uses  the  familiar  scene  of  violence,  but  he  also  uses  the  tight‐rope walker,  books,  and  above  all,  drama  to  illustrate  sympathy.  Performance  is  an essential  element  in  Smith’s  theory  of  sympathy:  whenever  one  encounters  a sufferer, one encounters a performance. This is reinforced by musical figures Smith sometimes uses when he talks about sympathy: when we sympathize we “beat time to” the other, and we “lower our emotions to the right pitch.” The execution of the performance  determines  whether  the  spectator  will  sympathize.  Sympathy  is approbation, essentially the same as applauding a scene well acted. For Mandeville, 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social  performance  is  something  that  only  needs  to  done  by  those  in  the  upper classes.  According  to  Mandeville,  those  who  hold  most  power  to  exert  their influence on society do so by masking successfully what they do. The further down the  social  scale one goes  the more penetrable  the disguise until with  the working class none is needed at all. A deceptive prostitute or apprentice poses a threat to the stability of hierarchy and in order to remove the possibility of such deception, they must be taught to believe that they are always observed. 
  The  London  Merchant  occupies  a  position  in  which  Mandeville  and  Smith appear  to  overlap—just  as  the  figures  of  economy  and  theater  overlap  in  the accounts  of  the  play  in  the  periodicals  discussed  above.  Lillo’s  drama  resembles Mandeville’s Fable  in its allegiance of virtue with good economic practice, but only to a point. The play argues that economic virtue requires that self‐interest and the passions be kept  in check. So it turns to a kind of proto‐Smithian scheme in which public approbation goes beyond the surface. Moral judgment for Smith is a kind of spectation of performance. Approbation is granted if, when the spectator  imagines himself in the situation of the subject he sympathizes, or imagines that he would act in  a  like manner  in  those  same  circumstances.  A  sort  of moral  conscience  comes about as a result of the subject imagining a spectator.   In  The  London  Merchant,  moral  behavior  breaks  down  in  part  because spectation breaks down. When Barnwell’s friend Trueman, who seems to represent the impartial spectating public asks to be allowed to see what lies within Barnwell’s heart, Barnwell refuses him. While figures who should be Barnwell’s guides fail him in  that  they  refuse  to  put  themselves  into  his  situation  and  judge  him.  When 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Barnwell tries to confess to his master, Thorowgood responds by telling him: “I will not hear a syllable more upon  this subject.  It were not mercy, but cruelty,  to hear what  must  give  you  such  torment  to  reveal”  (II.vii.35‐7).  And,  like  Thorowgood, Barnwell’s uncle refuses to cast the eye of judgment even as Barnwell, after mortally assaulting him, asks to be judged.     BARNWELL. Expiring saint! Oh, murdered, martyred uncle! Lift up        your dying eyes and view your nephew in your murderer. Oh,        do not look so tenderly upon me. Let indignation lighten from        your eyes and blast me ere you die. By Heaven, he weeps in        pity of my woes. Tears, tears, for blood!     (III.vii.16‐20)  This  speech highlights  the difference between  two sorts of pathetic  response, pity and sympathy. Sympathy in Smith’s scheme involves two elements that are lacking in  pity:  situation  and  judgment.  Smith’s  sympathy  requires  that  the  spectator  put himself  into  the  situation  of  the  person,  into  the  person  of  the  other  person,  and imagines what he would do, or want to do, in that situation. If the observed person’s performance merits approbation,  then  the observer  sympathizes.  It becomes clear that this is not what is occurring with Barnwell’s uncle. By referring to his uncle as a “saint”  and  a  “martyr”  Barnwell  shows  that  there  is  a  distance  and  inequality  of moral status between the two, so that it would be difficult to imagine that his uncle’s tears  are  due  to  approbation.  The  final  line  of  Barnwell’s  speech  reinforces  this notion of inequality in the play’s terms of pathetic economies. Barnwell’s emphasis on “tears for blood” describes an unequal, unmerited exchange in which it is made clear that tears are more valuable commodities and should not be given away. The uncle’s  tears  are  like  coins  cast  to  a  beggar,  an  act  of  pathetic  exchange  that, according to the logic of the play, does more harm than good. 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 In English Dramatic Form, Laura Brown considers the intended effects of this scene  on  the  audience.  Brown  sees  Barnwell’s  behavior  as  a  calculated dramaturgical tactic meant to increase the spectators’ sympathy. She writes:     The predominant portion of this scene is occupied by the pathetic      consequences of this accident. Barnwell’s histrionic guilt and        vehement self‐accusation help to anticipate and thus dismiss much of      the horror and blame that inevitably accrue to his deed. The purpose      of the scene, then, is to represent Barnwell in the commission of a      heinous crime, but simultaneously to absolve him of blame so he can      remain, in one formally essential sense, a moral paragon, and so that      his fate, much like that of the self‐flagellating Jaffeir of Venice    
    Preserv’d, can be supremely pathetic.      (160‐1)  But  this  is a  reduction of what  is actually  taking place  in  the scene. The sympathy that the audience is meant to feel is not the sort, later elaborated by Burke86, where the spectator takes a sort of delight  in the suffering of another any more than it  is the unsatisfying pity bestowed on Barnwell by his uncle. This pivotal  scene  in  the play  is  one  that  shows  how  looking  at  the  function  of  sympathy  in  The  London 




been implanted within him and that he has come to see himself in this position as a neutral observer would see him.87      BARNWELL. Oh, hide me from myself, if it be possible! For, while I        bear my conscience in my bosom, though I were hid where        man’s eye never saw nor light e’er dawned, ‘twere all in vain.        For that inmate, that impartial judge, will try, convict, and        sentence me for murder, and execute me with never‐ending        torments. Behold these hands all crimsoned o’er with my        dear uncle’s blood! Here’s a sight to make a statue start with        horror, or turn a living man into a statue.     (IV.x.12‐19)  Barnwell’s suffering is a result of his being able to see himself from the perspective of an impartial spectator. His final lines play on the notion of cold impartiality. Even the most unfeeling of judges, represented by a statue would be turned against him, and  the  most  compassionate  would  turn  impartial  at  the  sight  of  Barnwell’s transgression.  Dramaturgically  speaking,  the  sort  of  sympathy  in  question  here requires an extra dimension of pathetic exchange occurring that Brown’s exposition does not account for. Barnwell and his uncle set up a situation that  is mirrored by the  audience  who  shed  the  same  pity  on  the  bloodstained  hero,  who  is  a  hero because he can see himself in the same light they do.   The clearest test of virtue in The London Merchant, as it is in Smith’s Theory 
of Moral Sentiments,  is  in  the subject’s performance  in  the  face of being  lopped off                                                         87 In The Figure of Theater, David Marshall describes the social function of sympathy in  a  way  that  is  pertinent  to  the  London  Merchant.  He  writes:  “it  forces  us  to moderate  our  passions  in  order  to  create  a  ‘harmony  and  concord  with  the emotions’  of  those  who  are  watching  us.  The  need  for  this  concord  more  than doubles the theatrical positions Smith sees enacted in sympathy by compelling us to become  spectators  to  our  spectators  and  thereby  spectators  to  ourselves.  In  this kaleidoscope  of  reflections  and  representations  in which  the  imaginary  change  of positions that takes place in the spectator’s mind is imagined, reflected and repeated in the mind of the sufferer, both of the characters in the scene of sympathy play the role of spectator and spectacle,” (173). 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like  a  bad  foot.  During  the  eighteenth  century  a  large  number  of  people,  many former  apprentices, were  executed  at  Tyburn  for  the  crime  of  theft.  This  practice was especially prevalent during the 1720’s. There were a number of scuffles during these executions between government representatives and the public as they tried to prevent both the hangings as well as the removal of the bodies (Burke 1994). The 
London Merchant originally closed with a gallows scene that Lillo was encouraged to cut from the production of the play. While it would have been a literal depiction of a violent  scene  that  many  in  the  audience  would  have  witnessed  firsthand,  John O’Brien  has  suggested  that  the  scene  would  have  been  too  “entertaining”  for  the message it meant to convey to come across properly (O'Brien 2004).    The  death  scene  should  not  be  seen  only  as  the  site  of  punishment—an expression of  the  inexorable  consequences of  transgression—but  rather  the death scene  is  the  true  trial  of  virtue.  In  a  context  where  virtue  resides  as  much  in  a person’s capacity to control the passions as in any right action, death offers a scene for  testing  the  mettle  of  a  more  humble  sort  of  character.  This  scene  meets  the particular  challenges  of  domestic  tragedy  with  its  more  humble  conflicts  and characters. The death scene acts as a sort of dramatic leveler; here the protagonist of domestic tragedy might prove himself heroic and noble. By the very nature of its more  pedestrian  concerns,  heroism  is  precluded  from  right  action;  virtue  in bourgeois society appears anything but. The death scene is the nexus of sympathetic identification.   The  two  competing  pathetic  characters  in The  London Merchant  are  set  in sharp  contrast  through  their  manner  of  approaching  execution.  Although  we  are 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denied the sight of Millwood going to her execution, perhaps to ensure that we do not sympathize, there is really no danger of that as we are told,  “She goes to death encompassed  in  horror,  loathing  life  and  yet  afraid  to  die.  No  tongue  can  tell  her anguish and despair” (V.xi.5‐7). Millwood’s comportment  in the scene of execution reinforces her status as representative of self‐interested subjectivity.    Meanwhile, Barnwell’s stoic performance guarantees approbation in the eyes of  the  impartial  spectator,  and  the  description  of  his  execution  centers  on  the sympathetic reaction of the observing crowd.     TRUEMAN. With bleeding hearts and weeping eyes we show          A human gen’rous sense of others’ woe,         Unless we mark what drew their ruin on,         And, by avoiding that, prevent our own.                    (V.xii.10‐13)  Trueman’s sympathy is a fitting performance. Here the economy of blood and tears is in balance, which it was not in the murder scene. Weeping is a show of generosity, and  in  the  end  it  is  self‐serving  because  through  it  he  prevents  his  own  ruin  and therefore an acceptable basis for a mercantile scheme of pathetic exchanges.   Barnwell’s performance in the situation of punishment is a point that marks a clear distinction between the programs of The London Merchant and The Beggar’s 
Opera. Where the hanging is canceled in order to please the public’s desire for poetic justice  in  the  latter,  the execution  is carried out  in  the  former making clear  that  it favors enforcement of  the systemic epistemic authority over the subjective agency of  the  individual.  And  Barnwell  performs  just  as  he  should:  there  is  no  distance between him as pathetic  figure and  the situation of execution. While he meets  the test of Smith’s stoic sympathy,  it  is  the play’s other pathetic  figure, Millwood, who 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advocates  the  agency  of  the  individual  spectator.  But  Lillo  seems  to  advocate Barnwell and has Millwood tell Trueman, who represents the spectating public, the danger of a kind of sympathetic engagement with a figure compared at once to the devil and to feminine sexuality.     TRUEMAN. To call thee woman were to wrong the sex, thou devil.      MILLWOOD. That imaginary being is an emblem of thy cursed sex        collected, a mirror wherein each particular man may see his        own likeness and that of all mankind! (IV.xviii.4‐7.)  In  this mirror  the  spectator  is  confronted with his  engagement  in  an unreflecting, superficial sort of spectatorship unlike the kind offered by Smith, or by Barnwell at the scene of his Uncle’s murder.    Given the socially oriented nature of this play, it is fitting that the true moral dilemma,  the  real  test of  virtue occurs not within  the divided consciousness of  its protagonist—he  seems utterly  incapable  of  such  complexity—it  occurs within  the breast of the viewer. The test lies in where the spectator attaches his sympathy, for as  the proper performance of  suffering warrants  approbation,  according  to Smith, the attachment of sympathy is a test of virtue and of being in accord with the values of society.  
Conclusion: situation of the public person    The play  offers  a  lesson  in  sympathetic  spectation  to  the  viewing public.  It seeks  to  wean  them  from  a  simple  kind  of  sympathy,  represented  by  Barnwell’s passionate  engagement  with  Millwood,  wherein  the  self  becomes  completely absorbed in another with no regard for circumstance. It seeks to promote the sort of imaginative  sympathy  triggered  by  Barnwell’s  guilt  after  murdering  his  uncle,  in 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which he sympathizes not only with his uncle, but imagines himself as a spectacle.88 This means  seeing  himself  in  his  situation,  and  imagining  how  a  spectator would imagine being in that situation. The analog with the theater‐goer would be that he imagines himself not  just  in the position of the imaginary persons on stage, but he imagines himself as a spectacle too. He imagines himself reflected in a mirror, and that mirror shows him that he  is not an  individual with unique tastes and desires, but  an  atom  in  the  body  of  the  public.  This  leads  to  a  problem  of  identity  for members of the viewing public as it threatens individual subjectivity and threatens equally to render the distinction between interiority and spectacle negligible.   While  the selection of characters  is  important  to  this  task,  the emphasis on characters being controlled by situation is equally so. Situation stresses the location of individuals within a system. The kind of pathetic concernment that developed in pathetic  drama  of  the  1680’s  and  which  reached  a  height  with  Nicholas  Rowe’s works  was  not  sufficient  to  achieve  the  goal  of  civilizing  the  public  at  large.  The sympathy of Lillo’s play teaches performativity rather than concernment. It does not teach  the  public  how  to  be  spectators  so  much  as  it  teaches  them  how  to  be performers. Casting characters from the lower classes  literally puts them on stage, and up  for  judgment. Spectators come to see  themselves as part of a performative society subject to approbation, thereby ensuring the stability of a circulatory system of pathetic exchange. Yet in this situation a distance from the self arises. Once more,                                                         88  Again, Marshall’s The  Figure  of  Theater  is  to  the  point.  Describing  the  distance inherent to Smith’s scheme, he writes: “Imagining ourselves as a spectacle, we look at  ourselves  in  exactly  the  same  way  that  we  look  at  others:  we  attempt  to sympathize with ourselves, to enter into our own feelings and persons,” (176). 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I will  return  to a passage  from David Marshall’s  commentary on Adam Smith  that serves as an apt reflection on the effect of Lillo’s dramaturgy:      Ironically, after founding his Theory of Moral Sentiments on a        supposedly universal principal of sympathy, and then structuring the      act of sympathy around the epistemological void that prevents people      from sharing each other’s feelings, Smith seems to separate the self      from the one self it could reasonably claim to know: itself.                   (Marshall, 176)  The  dramaturgical  strategy  of  Lillo’s  play,  to  affect  instruction  through  such proximity of subject matter that the spectator comes to think of himself as spectacle, leads  to  the  spectator’s  alienation  from  himself.  The  possible  implication  of  this situation is that he is no longer in control of his self; it has become public property. Anxiety  over  the  loss  of  self‐ownership  sets  the  stakes  for  the  manipulation  of reputation, which is the subject of the next chapter. 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CHAPTER V  X.Y.Z.’D: REPUTATION AND THE COMMODITIZATION OF CHARACTER        In  an  essay  called  “Project  for  a  New  Theory  of  Civil  and  Criminal Legislation,” written in 1828, William Hazlitt  takes Edmund Burke to task over his theory of sympathy, and raises a serious question about its implications. He writes:       I should like to know whether Mr. Burke, with his Sublime and    
    Beautiful fancies, would deny that each person has a particular body      and senses belonging to him, so that he feels a particular and natural      interest in whatever affects these more than another can, and whether     this peculiar and paramount interest does not give a direct and      natural right of maintaining this circle of individuality sacred.                                                               Why  should Hazlitt  come  out  against  sympathy  so  forcefully? Why  did  he  believe that  the aesthetic  theory at  the base of sensibility could pose such a dire  threat  to the  sanctity  of  individual  rights?  This  second  question  is  actually  posed  rather disingenuously,  because  the  point  is  that  for  Hazlitt,  Burke,  and  a  wide  range  of other writers in eighteenth‐century Britain, sympathy was not merely a principle of aesthetic  response  but was  offered up  as  a  candidate  for  the  passionate  glue  that held  together  modern  society.89  Sympathy  was,  both  for  Burke,  and  for  its  other major  proponent,  Adam  Smith,  at  once  a  social  principle  and  a  theatrical  one.   Hazlitt’s  criticism of  sympathy makes clear  the high stakes of arguments  in which arts and politics overlap. If a person might enter the place of another person, just as the viewer of a theatric spectacle enters  imaginatively  into the situation on                                                         89  See  Jonathan  Lamb, The  Evolution  of  Sympathy  in  the  Long  Eighteenth  Century, 2009. 
 126 
the stage, then the boundaries between “particular bodies and senses,” and thus of individual  rights, become discomfortingly violable. Burke’s definition of  sympathy, to  which  Hazlitt  takes  exception,  appears  in  his  A  Philosophical  Enquiry  into  the 
Origin of our  Ideas of  the Sublime and Beautiful  (1757). The  foundations of human activity, Burke thought, were the passions of curiosity, pleasure, and pain. Curiosity stimulated  the  activity  of  mind  on  all  matters.  Ideas  of  pain  and  of  pleasure corresponded respectively to self‐preservation and society, and society involved the passions of sympathy, imitation, and ambition. Sympathy established an interest in other people's welfare that extended to mental identification with them. The scope of sympathy could embrace anyone, unlike compassion, which applied only to those in a worse situation than oneself. Burke claims it is by sympathy that we     …enter into the concerns of others; that we are moved as they are      moved, and are never suffered to be indifferent spectators of any      thing which men can do or suffer. For sympathy must be considered      as a sort of substitution, by which we are put into the place of another      man, and affected, in many respects, as he is affected: so that this      passion may either partake of the nature of those which regard self‐     preservation,  and, turning upon pain, may be a source of the sublime;      or it may turn upon ideas of pleasure; and then, whatever has been      said of the social affections, whether they regard society in general,      or only some particular modes of it, may be applicable here.                         (56)  Such  width  of  concern  has  an  obvious  reference  to  the  social  order,  but  also expresses  also  Burke's  thinking  about  the  theatre,  seeming  to  equate  the  two. People  observe  one  another  as  spectators  and  sympathize  as  they  would  with characters  in  the  theater.  This  takes  the  common  eighteenth‐century  notion  of performative society to its furthest point. 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 In the debates surrounding the French Revolution, Burke argued against the need  for  abstract  definitions  of  individual  rights,  claiming  that  such  rights  are secured by tradition:     Our oldest reformation is that of Magna Charta. You will see that Sir      Edward Coke, that great oracle of our law, and indeed all the great      men who follow him, to Blackstone, are industrious to prove the      pedigree of our liberties. They endeavour to prove that the ancient      charter... were nothing more than a re‐affirmance of the still more      ancient standing law of the kingdom.... In the famous law... called the      Petition of Right, the parliament says to the king, “Your subjects have      inherited this freedom,” claiming their franchises not on abstract      principles “as the rights of men,” but as the rights of Englishmen, and      as a patrimony derived from their forefathers.           (Reflections on the Revolution in France , 151‐3)  Burke’s  definition  of  individual  rights  depends  on  the  individual’s  not  being  self‐contained but connected to the past. Individual rights are inherited and as such exist outside  of  the  individual,  property  to  be  passed  along  rather  than  something  that inheres in the individual subject.   The  development  of  the  dramaturgy  of  domestic  drama,  of  which  George Lillo’s The London Merchant  is  representative,  encouraged  a particularly  insidious form  of  sympathy  in  that  it  encouraged  spectators  to  see  themselves  as  pathetic spectacles,  creating  a  distance  between  the  objective  and  subjective  status  of individuals. This condition is developed in the Romantic period’s concern with the issue of fame, and reputation. In this chapter I will look at the way the plays of the popular  dramatist,  George  Colman  the  Younger,  alongside  Hazlitt’s  writings, examine the possibility of individuals losing their “particular and natural interest” in themselves to the public in the form of reputation. Virtue is no longer connected to agency,  there  is  no  ownership  of  judgment,  all  of  that  exists merely  in  the  public 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world  of  perceived  identity.  In  order  to  reclaim  ownership  of  ones  self  one must manipulate  public  image  through  language,  spoken,  but  mainly  printed.  The  self becomes  linguistic.  Indeed,  Hazlitt’s  demand  for  a  legal  recognition  of  the boundaries of the self  is a move to engage in the struggle on the linguistic  front of public  exchange.  Sympathy  becomes  associated  with  violation  of  the  self  and language that cannot be controlled.                  This  chapter  looks  at  two  of  George  Colman  the  Younger’s  plays  alongside William Hazlitt’s writings on fame. These texts on the edge of the nineteenth century are looking back at the mental/physical, subjective/objective split at the heart of the sentimental tradition.90 Expressing concern over the loss of subjective authority to the public, the characters in Colman’s plays desire to combine the subject and object in  character  through manipulations  of  reputation  and  fame.  Colman’s  plays  get  at the  implications  for  the  self.  Wanting  to  become  an  object  means  wanting  to preserve individuality by making sympathy impossible. They express the Romantic inheritance of the pathetic aesthetic while pointing to what has become paradox of wanting  to  be  an  object  and  a  subject  at  once  in  the  context  of  tightly  defined boundaries of the person at the end of the century.  
 
                                                        90  Thomas  Nagel  argued  that  the  mental/physical  distinction  is  really subjective/objective.  Objective  truth  can  be  understood  by  more  than  one,  while subjective can be understood by one point of view at most. “What is it Like to be a Bat?” 1974. 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Colman and reputation George  Colman  the  Younger  was  England’s  most  popular  dramatist  at  the turn of the Eighteenth century. Between 1787 and 1800, Colman’s fourth play, Inkle 
and  Yarrico, writes  Barry  Sutcliffe,  “was  acted  a  total  of  164  times  at  the  London Patent  theatres…  plac[ing]  it  second  in  the  league  table  of  the  most  frequently produced plays of the last quarter of the eighteenth century” (Sutcliffe 24). Despite his  success Colman  still  had  to  reckon with  the  critics of  the London newspapers, and  his  relationship  with  the  Grub  Street  writers  was  often  contentious.  In  an epilogue  to  Ways  and  Means,  produced  in  1788,  Colman  engaged  in  a  diatribe against the critics, describing them as nonchalantly “knocking down reputations by one inch of candle,” a tactic that, not surprisingly, resulted in the play receiving poor reviews. Interestingly, Colman’s attack on the critics preceded his ever having been the object of a bad review. Though he had not yet suffered the bitter fate of having a play  damned  by  the  critics,  Colman,  however  arrogant  he might  have  been, must have been aware of his vulnerable position. In his autobiography, Random Records, written  forty  years  later,  Colman  describes  the  anxiety  of  the  dramatist  who  is aware that reception, not effort, determines the success of his labor. When you are laboring for fame or profit, or for both, and think, all the while that you are at work, that  instead of obtaining either, you may be d‐d, ‐it is not a pleasant thought; ‐nor is it agreeable to reflect, that a handful of blockheads may, in half an hour, consign first to disgrace, and then to oblivion, your toil of half a year. (Random Records 62) 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A  dramatist’s  capacity  to  earn  capital  is  inextricably  linked  to  his  reputation,  a situation  which  reveals  the  degree  to  which  ones  own  character  is  out  of  ones control.    Events  surrounding  the  first  production of The  Iron Chest  at Drury Lane  in March of 1796 show the dramatist once again engaged in a contest with the critics over  reputation.    At  the  request  of  Richard  Sheridan,  Colman  had  taken  on  the challenging  task  of  adapting  for  the  stage  William  Godwin’s  three  volume  novel 
Things  As  They  Are:  Or,  The  Adventures  of  Caleb  Williams.  The  play’s  first performance  was  a  failure.  While  this  may  have  been  due  in  part  to  the ponderousness of Colman’s adaptation—it was  four hours  long, Colman was quick to blame the failure on acting‐manager and lead actor John Kemble, who despite his own illness had hurried the play to the stage and played his part while taking opium pills.91   The play was presented but  twice more  that  season. When The  Iron Chest was published, four months after its failed run, Colman attached a volatile preface, damning Kemble  for  his  part  in  the  play’s  failure.    Colman’s  preface  drew  a  great deal of ire and harmed public perception of the playwright. The press responded to Colman’s  attack  on  Kemble  in  kind:  “The  better  newspapers  were  gentle  but damning…  but  some  of  the  others  leaped  at  the  opportunity  to  flay  Colman.  The 
Oracle  printed  almost  daily…  jibes  at  Colman”  (Bagster‐Collins  91).  In  the  end Colman was vindicated. The play was produced the following season with a different 
                                                        91 See Jeremy Bagster‐Collins’ biography of George Colman for a fuller account of the details of this play’s interesting production history. 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actor in the lead role to great success.  The Iron Chest continued to be produced as a vehicle for star actors in the lead role of Sir Edward Mortimer as late as 1879.      Analysis of The Iron Chest invariably situates it in terms of Godwin and rarely in  terms  of  Colman.  By  reading  The  Iron  Chest  within  the  economic  paradigms suggested  by  one  of  Colman’s  later  play’s,  X.Y.Z.,  the  former’s  politics,  despite Colman’s claims to have excised Godwin’s, become clarified. And, in turn, the work of this popular playwright might be used to understand the issues of sympathy and character that were the issue of heated discussion between writers generally given more  attention.  This  chapter  will  look  at  Colman’s  treatment  of  reputation  as commoditized  identity  in  two  of  his  plays: The  Iron  Chest  and X.Y.Z.,  arguing  that shifts in setting, both temporal and spatial, allow Colman to examine subjectivity in the burgeoning market‐centered culture of turn of the century London, a setting in which newspapers were  the marketplace where characters were bought and sold. As  character  becomes  public,  public  opinion  takes  on  the  quality  of  determining force that subsumes  individual agency,  like the sort of violent sympathy described by  Hazlitt  in  the  passage  at  the  start  of  this  chapter.  The  plays  examined  in  this chapter show the struggle of individuals to claim control over their own characters by negotiating their position in relation to the force of public opinion.  
Pathetic violation in The Iron Chest 
The Iron Chest draws emphasis away from the issue of class tyranny, focusing instead on  the  subject,  embodied  in Sir Edward Mortimer,  of  the  conflict between conscience and reputation, public and private identity. Perhaps the most significant 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change made by the playwright is in shifting the setting from contemporary in Caleb 
Williams to medieval in The Iron Chest. Colman is said to have stated an intention to depoliticize  the  play—a  formidable  task  given  Godwin’s  reputation  as  a  radical thinker, and this shift in chronological setting has been seen as part of the attempt to dislocate the play from political context.92 But if we take Colman’s claim seriously, this  temporal  shift  turns  out  to  undercut  his  attempt  at  recasting  the  story  as apolitical. The  Iron  Chest’s medieval  setting  evokes Burke’s  conservative  nostalgia for  chivalry,  a  subject  treated  in  Godwin’s  novel.  This  shift  also  affects  the  play’s economic setting. Rather than being situated in the context of the market economy of the eighteenth century, The Iron Chest  takes place in a feudal environment. This economic  setting  infuses  the  internal  economy  of  the  play.  In  a  work  concerned thematically with the production of reputation and its relation to character, setting determines the ways in which reputation circulates if it circulates at all.93   At the top of the feudal structure of The Iron Chest is the central figure of the play, Sir Edward Mortimer. Mortimer has a reputation as a generous and benevolent lord  that  is  at  odds  with  a  secret  crime  he  keeps  hidden  away—Mortimer  is  a murderer. He  is plagued by anxiety  that his  crime might be  revealed and  ruin  the good name he has worked to produce. Mortimer’s secretary Wilford, along with the rest of his household are concerned by the gloomy cloud hanging over their master.       WILFORD.  Every new act of Sir Edward’s charity sets me a thinking;                                                          92 See Bagster‐Collins. 93 Andrea Henderson argues: “the growth of the perceived division between a ‘true inner  self’  and  a  ‘superficial  social  self’—the division  constitutive  of  the  canonical Romantic model  of  subjectivity  as well  as  its  obverse,  gothic  subjectivity—can  be intimately related to late eighteenth‐century economic developments” (38). 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and the more I think the more I am puzzled.  ‘Tis strange that a man should be so ill at ease, who is continually doing good.   (TIC 20) Wilford’s  surprise  is  at  Edward’s  exhibition  of  two  conflicting  forms  of  outward behavior.  Charitable acts and acting ill at ease are both performances of a sort, but Wilford  does  not  appear  to  subscribe  to  a model  of  identity  in which  there  is  an essential, inner self to stand in contrast to outward, performed behavior.  Mortimer accounts for his secretary’s puzzlement: MORTIMER.  That fame’s sole fountain!  That doth transmit a fair, and  spotless name when the vile trunk is rotten:‐‐give me that!                 (TIC 30) The “sole fountain” of which Mortimer speaks is by his account the mind, which he sets in opposition to the body. This familiar dichotomy of mind and body correlates with a binary of public and private self. Mortimer sets as his object a fame that will live after he has died, as if a good name in posterity will absolve him of his ill deed. But  this  speech  of  his  can,  and  should  be  read  less  figuratively.  That  “vile  trunk” puns on  the  iron chest of  the  title  in which evidence of Mortimer’s guilt  is  locked, and that chest is a thinly veiled metaphor for Mortimer’s heart.   In The Iron Chest, Colman distinguishes between an inner and an outer self.94 By changing the name of the play, Colman not only shifts the focus from the Caleb Williams/Wilford character to Mortimer, but draws attention to this split between 
                                                        94  In  “Of  National  Characters,”  David  Hume  argues  that  there  are  two  levels  of character, a personal character, “peculiar to each individual,” and shared character that  is  the  result of  “a  sympathy or  contagion of manners” Essays, Moral, Political, 
and Literary, 1741. 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essential  and  social  character  as  the  title  moves  from  proper  name  to  that metaphorical figure which houses the essential self. This distinction between public persona  and  actual  person underlies  some  comments made by William Hazlitt  on the issue of fame and reputation: The  good  or  the  bad  opinion  which  my  next  door  neighbour  may entertain of me is nothing more than his conviction that such and such a person having  certain good or bad qualities,  is possessed of  them; nor  is  the  figure, which a Lord Mayor elect, a prating demagogue, or popular  preacher,  makes  in  the  eyes  of  the  admiring  multitude‐‐‐
himself,  but  an  Image  of  him  reflected  in  the  minds  of  others,  in connection with certain feelings of respect and wonder.            “On Different Sorts of Fame,” 1816.  At  issue  in The  Iron  Chest  is  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  essential  and social  character.    The  passage  from  Hazlitt  supports  Mortimer’s  position  on  the subject, what  is  important  in regards to reputation  is not whether the two are the same but whether they are believed to be so. Colman draws a metaphoric diagram of  the  relationship of  essential  and  social  self  by  situating Mortimer’s  chest  in his library. The  chest, Mortimer’s  essential  self,  is  surrounded by words, words being that  of  which  a  person’s  public  self  is  made.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  chest contains words too. Mortimer: “You may have noticed, in my library, a chest… where I have  told you, brother,  the writings which concern our  family, with  jewels,  cash, and other articles, of no mean value were deposited”  (115). Penetrating the trunk is the  central  image.  Its  contents  are  a  lacuna—it  is  impenetrable—the  text  is  filled with another text. In Colman’s adaptation, the chest takes on a more central role—or,  it  emphasizes  the  centrality  already  there,  by  replacing  the  name  of  the protagonist with the impenetrable thing, the chest. While this complicates the claim that  the  role  of  language  is  in  the  creation  of  social  character,  it  strengthens  the 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argument that the chest stands for essential character that might be, at least in part hereditary.     The  significance  of  the  role  of  language  in  determining  reputation  is accentuated  in  Wilford’s  pivotal  role  in  the  matter.  Wilford’s  role  signals  the importance of language because he is Mortimer’s secretary; as Winterbottom says of him “he had the backs of all the books in our library by heart” (TIC 149‐150).  Notice the use of the phrase “by heart,” which fits in to the established binary of hearts and words, trunks and texts. Winterbottom’s line suggests that Wilford had at one point been convinced, concerning Mortimer, that the words and the man matched—to use Hazlitt’s  terms,  that  Mortimer  truly  possessed  the  good  qualities  he  was  said  to possess.     If  it  is what  is  said about a person  that shapes his character, at  least  in  the social sense, still it matters who is doing the talking. Characters at the bottom of the socio‐economic ladder face special difficulty in this regard. When Samson, the son of a poacher goes looking for more gainful and legitimate employment he is faced with the problem of how to establish a good name without anyone to speak for him. His father, Rawbold, cannot supply him with the good name he lacks himself.  HELEN.  If I should hire thee, who will give thee a character?     SAMSON.  My father, madam.   HELEN.  Why sirrah, he has none of his own.  (TIC 55) Here occurs a pun which Colman will return to in X.Y.Z. Having created a dichotomy between essential and social character and then throwing in the use of the word as a letter of  reference, character  is operating  in  three senses here,  leading  to comedic miscommunication, but also  telling  the audience something about  the relationship 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between the three. Samson’s essential character, his inner self is clearly not what is at issue here‐‐certainly his father is capable of supplying him with character of that sort, but as an outlaw and a man of  ill repute Rawbold cannot do the sort of work that Wilford has done for Mortimer and provide his son with a good name. It would not  be  at  all  surprising  to  learn  that Rawbold was  illiterate. As  Samson  says,  “the naked and hungry have seldom many friends to speak well of them” (TIC 55). What Samson’s family is incapable of doing Mortimer’s circle is able to far surpass. Having money, law, and social status on their side they are able to cover up a murder: MORTIMER.  We met:  and ‘twas resolved, to stifle rumour, to put me   on my trial.  No accuser, no evidence appeared, to urge it on.—  ‘Twas meant to clear my fame.‐‐‐How clear it then?  How cover   it?  Yousay.‐‐‐Why, by a Lie.        (TIC 67)  On the question of whether the inner and the outer self are distinct from each other, Colman’s answer is inconclusive. The model proposed by the main plotline suggests that the two cannot remain separate and that the essential character will find a way of leaking out into the public. Mortimer’s brother Fitzharding presents an image of the way this model works when he says that he “cannot hoop [his] heart with iron, like an old beer‐butt. I would have the vessel what some call weak:‐‐‐I’d have it ooze a  little”    (106).    Indeed the vessel does “ooze a  little”  in  the  final scene.   Mortimer accidentally  slips  irrefutable  evidence  of  his  own  guilt  into Wilford’s  chest  along with material that he had intended to incriminate the hapless secretary. Mortimer’s attempt  to  transfer  guilt  from  one  chest  to  another  is  foolishly  hopeful  given  the logic of the play, and it does not work. The inclusion, apparently uncontrollable, of evidence  of Mortimer’s  own  guilt  into Wilford’s  chest merely  shows  the material catching  up  with  the  internal.  What  Mortimer  has  accomplished  is  to  plant  the 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conviction in Wilford’s heart of the vileness of his character. Mortimer says “ I have labored for a name as white as mountain snow; dazzling, and speckles: Shame on’t! ‘tis blur’d with blots! Fate,  like a mildew,  ruins  the virtuous harvest  I would  reap, and all my  crop  is weeds”    (TIC  52‐53). The  incriminating evidence Mortimer  lets slip, a bloody dagger wrapped in a written plea for the redemption of “the wreck of [his]  lost honour,” presents  an  image  that  correlates with  the  chest nestled  in  the library—again,  the  essential,  material  evidence  of  the  deed,  is  covered  in  words which attempt to manipulate public interpretation of it. The question of  the proper relationship between the  inner and outer self  is taken up in the play’s subplot in which two members of a band of thieves debate the matter  explicitly.    Armstrong,  the  leader  of  the  thieves,  commands  his  men  to exercise compassion and most of his men comply, but Orson argues that one should be true to one’s assumed identity.     ARMSTRONG.  Humanity is scarcely counted fault:  if so, ‘tis a fault on  the right side.  ORSON.  Umph!  Perhaps not with us.  We are robbers! (TIC 38) Armstrong,  though  a  more  sympathetic  character  than  Orson,  subscribes  to  a position identical to Mortimer’s except that they inhabit social positions that lie on opposite sides of the law, as much to discount a reading of character in the play that is  based  on  legality.  In  an  even  clearer  formulation  of  his  position,  Orson  puts  it thus: “when a man takes to the trade of a wolf, he should not go like a  lamb to his business”  (TIC  41).  For Orson  there  is  no  distinction  at  all  between  essential  and social self, in fact he has no heart.     ARMSTRONG.  Thou art a mere machine.  Could I but give it motion, I  would  take an oak from the forest, here, clap a flint into it for 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heart, and make as bold a fellow as thou art.  (TIC 40) Far from matching up with a character like Fitzharding whose heart  leaks out into the  social  realm,  Armstrong  is  lacking  a  requisite  element  in  the  model  of  the relation between essential and social character. In the end Orson comes out ahead of the other thieves, he retaliates for his banishment by turning them over to the law. This would seem to suggest  that all  that  really matters  is  the surface and  that  the inner  self  is  a  negligible  element.  But  this  position  is  rendered  untenable  when Colman’s notorious preface to the play is brought into consideration. Colman’s bitter complaint  about Kemble who,  “dark as Erebus  cast  a gloom upon”  the  cast of The 
Iron  Chest  is  strange  in  light  of  the  fact  that  Kemble  was  playing  the  part  of Mortimer,  a  gloomy  character,  but  is  germane  as  it  suggests  that  performance  is preferred over authenticity and that they are distinguishable. The  notion  of  performance  characterizes  the  farcical  elements  that  invade 
The Iron Chest and undermine what has been taken to be its position on the relation of  inner and outer self up  to  this point. Samson assumes a new identity simply by putting on the livery of his new occupation, a change so effective that his own sister does not recognize him. He explains to her, “my old character is laid aside with my old  jerkin.  I  am  now  exalted”  (90).  Such  exaltation  comes  cheaply.  The  case  of Samson  casts  the  issue of  character  in  a  cynical  light  since  character  and  clothing have become interchangeable. It is one thing to say that there is a particular sort of character: that which I have been calling social, that is shaped by words. That sort of character has been up until this point something not to be treated lightly, but in the case of Samson it has become casual, even laughable, making Mortimer a ridiculous 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rather  than  a  tragic  character.    Samson  expresses  the  phenomenon  of  changing character with clothing again, this time in language of reptilian metaphor: I’m your fellow‐servant:‐‐‐the new comer. The last footman cast his skin this morning, and I have  crept  into  it  (TIC  59‐60).  Samson’s  metaphor  of  the  snake  casting  its  skin brings  to  his  act  of  character  changing  the  associations  of  serpentine  qualities  of cunning.  The  shrewd  poacher’s  son  is  the  only  character  in  the  play  consciously aware of the way social character is working.    
Subject and object in X.Y.Z   By  the  time  that X.Y.Z. was written  and produced  in1810, George Colman’s position as a dramatist was firmly established. In fact X.Y.Z. marks a significant point in Colman’s career, as it was the first time he had been asked in advance to write a play. Despite the different tonality of the treatment, several figures carry over into 
X.Y.Z. Chests and trunks figure in and characters in X.Y.Z. are parodic reproductions of  characters  from  The  Iron  Chest.  Hempseed  and  Galliard  reproduce  the relationship of Wilford and Mortimer. Hempseed,  like Wilford,  is a scribe occupied in  the  production  of  words  but  he  is  significantly  less  qualified  for  the  job.  The relationships correlate as well in that both of them have been the sites of a transfer of  chests  though  the  transfer  between  Galliard  and  Hempseed  is  far  less melodramatic.  While  The  Iron  Chest  is  an  expression  of  the  anxiety  of  a  young dramatist to create and circulate a good reputation for himself, X.Y.Z. is the product of a writer whose character is established. 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 The issue of character remains a central concern of Colman’s, and despite the play’s farcical tone, the issue is treated as seriously in X.Y.Z. as it is in The Iron Chest. Through  its  insistence  of  miscommunications,  X.Y.Z.  can  play  on  its  seemingly inconsequential surface the logic that drives The Iron Chest. The efficacy of farce to engage  in  serious  criticism  was  often  underestimated.  A  letter  addressed  to  the editor  of The Examiner,  printed  in  1808,  responds  to  criticism  leveled  against  the writers of farce. The letter’s author writes:       Sir, you write very clever criticism and we write very bad plays yet      you have not quite effected our derision; now, if you will only consent      to turn poet, and let us turn critics, you shall find that our bad        criticism shall damn your good plays in half the time.  (178)  The writer of the letter to The Examiner concedes that the critics are cleverer, but in the  end  cleverness  fails  because  it  is  not  what  the  public  wants.  The  writer’s argument suggests that the writers of farce knowingly choose to engage in a lower form of humor because it will find an audience. The sort of criticism in which X.Y.Z. is  engaged  is  particularly  suited  to  a  genre  that  is  consciously  attentive  to  the pressure of  pleasing  an  audience  since  it  is  looking  at  the  commoditization of  the subject in the context of consumer culture.95 Set in contemporary London, the plot revolves around Neddy Bray, a shy but well  to do country squire who decides  to advertise  for a wife  in  the Morning Post,                                                         95 The eighteenth century has been characterized has long been characterized as a performative  period.  Judith  Pascoe  argues  that  the  Romantic  period  was  a performative  one  as  well,  due  in  part  to  the  significant  influence  of  the  theater.  Cultural  figures  such  as  Mary  Robinson  were  adapt  at  using  publicity  to  fashion images  of  themselves  and  create  audiences.    Pascoe  suggests  that  Wordsworth himself was posing and advocates “a more detailed attention to and respect for the artificiality of authenticity.” 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while  Roscius  Alldross,  a  theatrical  manager,  takes  out  an  advertisement  for  an actress  in  the Morning  Herald.  Both  sign  their  advertisements  “X.Y.Z.”  and  direct letters to Old Slaughter’s Coffeehouse, resulting in confusion. Bray’s act of taking out an ad  for a wife  in the Morning Post and signing  it  “X.Y.Z.” sets  the play  in motion. This  is  an  act  simultaneously  anonymous  and  self‐exposing.  Aldross’  ad  for  an actress  in  the  Morning  Herald  creates  the  opportunity  for  tension  and  draws  a parallel  between  the  would‐be  husband  and  the  theater  director,  as  well  as  the actress and the wife. Much of the play’s action is moved along through the agency of letters.    Mrs.  Mouse  is  eager  to  receive  a  letter  from  the  lawyer,  and  her  co‐conspirator,  Grubbleton—a  letter  that  contains  a  copy  of  another  letter, which he has written in response to Bray’s ad.  Indeed, the title of the play itself resembles the plot  in  that  it  is  a  sequence  of  letters,  but  drama  arises  as  a  result  of  the  letters functioning as signature.   An eye toward the function of language in X.Y.Z. should alert the audience to potential significance behind the curious diction of Hempseed, a bumpkin employed as a clerk who writes in “a tightish copying hand” (12). His speech is, like his writing, characterized by impenetrability. Because Hempseed never uses the objective form of  the  first  person  singular  pronoun,  his  words  have  the  effect  of  deflecting  any transitive verb.   For  instance,  in telling Mrs. Mouser how he ended up working for Grubbleton,  Hempseed  says:  “I wanted  somebody  to  take  I  in”  (12).    The  strange phrasing makes Hempseed the agent in the act of “taking in.” Surely this is done in part for comic effect, but Hempseed is not a clever character so it should not be seen as a sort of knowing wink. Rather, Hempseed’s diction is an impediment of speech—
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indeed,  it  is  revealed  that  he  is  a  stutterer,  which  is  the  effect  of  his  social disadvantage. Hempseed is poorly suited to a setting where character is portrayed as a social performance strongly connected to  language. Hempseed is, or claims to be,  an  orphan  and  this  social  disconnectedness  is  the  cause  of  his  perpetual subjecthood. The character Daggerwood, in one of Colman’s earlier plays, New Hay 
at  the  Old  Market  (1795),  says  of  his  wife:  “  Mrs.  Daggerwood  a  fine  figure,  but unfortunately stutters; so, of no use in the theatrical line,” which offers a strong clue to the model of character that Hempseed is meant to illustrate.   Hempseed’s  pattern  of  speech  is  broken  when  he  speaks  of  himself  in connection with Maria, “Noa; we be too pratty for he to trust us alone” (16). Though he is able to use the objective pronoun in the plural, Hempseed’s speech here is still wrong, but  it  is wrong with a purpose. Here he alters the form of the third person pronoun,  but  this  is  to  draw  attention  to  the  verb  phrase  of which  “us”  is  a  part. Indeed the point is to highlight that “us” is a necessary condition of being an object. Hempseed’s diction offers a way of getting at the underlying philosophy of the play.   An object is what one wants to be in the scheme of X.Y.Z., this illustrates the absence of, or the negligible importance of the inner self in this play compared with 
The Iron Chest. In X.Y.Z. chests have been emptied of their value—literally in the case of Hempseed’s  theft  of Galliard’s  trunk. The  chest, which  functions  as  a  symbol of interiority  and  private,  as  opposed  to  social,  space  is  no  longer  either  since  the landlady has the keys. Trunks and chests appear in the play but they have become burdensome—Hempseed warns Maria “if you ha’  trunk to carry, Miss,  I can tell ye you’ll find it a bit heavy” (34). This means that in the setting of X.Y.Z. the inner self 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that  has been  symbolized by  chests  and  trunks  is  no  longer  relevant. An object  is necessarily  something  observable  and  public,  in  the  rather more  cynical world  of 
X.Y.Z. it is to have achieved the status of being of a recognizable character, to have a definite value. The preeminence of objecthood comes through in Alldross’ reaction when reading the letter which he believes to be in response to his advertisement for an  actress.  After  reading  a  line  in  which  the  writer  says  that  the  young  lady  he writes of “is really an object,” Alldross exclaims: “An object!  Then this is above your Lady Graveairs, Tragedy Queens and Mother Bundles” (21).    
Genre and the contents of the chest The different treatment of chests in X.Y.Z. relative to The Iron Chest has to do with generic difference. Billed in its time as “comic opera,” The Iron Chest’s blend of song and sentimentality qualify  it  for the more familiar designation of melodrama. The melodramatic dramaturgy of The Iron Chest uses exaggerated displays of pathos in  order  to  engage  its  audience.  But  The  Iron  Chest  is  more  precisely  a  gothic melodrama, it uses devices and techniques typical of the genre and its feudal setting gives  strength  to  this  classification.  In  general,  the  gothic  shows  a  preoccupation with the link between internal and external dimensions of things, and the distance between  these  two  dimensions.  Disguises  are  key  to  the  gothic,  undercutting  the credence  given  by  proponents  of  sensibility  of  the  legibility  of  inner  self,  or  the passionate  self,  through  the  practice  of  observing  physiognomy.  This  trope  of disguises  suggests  a  preoccupation  with  the  difficulty  of  accurately  judging character  in a world of performative selves who mask dangerous passions. So,  the 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link between passion and outward signs of it is suspect. But in regards to inanimate objects—tears, statues, as in The Castle of Otranto (1764), the link is real. Objects are often crystallizations, and transmitters of emotion: sympathetic connections to the past. There is a curious double bind in the gothic that gets at the violent possibilities of sympathy. For example,  in The Castle of Otranto  the reader  is asked to trust the author’s literary devices (i.e. correspondence of statues, etc) even as the story warns against  trusting  rhetoric  and  appearances.  Communicability  of  passions  is  only reliable  in  one  direction,  that  is,  characters  can  be  influenced  by  concrete manifestations of emotion, but we cannot be sure that those concrete manifestations correspond  to  what  produced  them.  On  the  other  hand,  in  James  Hogg’s  Private 
Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824) as in Godwin’s Caleb Williams it is  presented  as  a  dangerous  possibility  that  one  might  enter  into  the  subjective states of others by means of  language rendered material: by bodily mimicry, or by penetration  of  a  sympathetic  object,  i.e.  the  chest,  and  accessing  a  hidden  past, hidden character in the form of letters. So,  The  Iron  Chest  explores  a  thematic  double  bind  that  is  typical  of  the gothic: the near impossibility of penetrating to the heart of illegible surfaces, and the horrible  outcome  that  follows  when  interiors  are  actually  accessed.  In  Godwin’s 
Caleb Williams, Caleb, after accessing Falkland’s interior, is pursued and eventually transformed  into  an  object,  a  stone.  Like  Caleb  Williams,  The  Iron  Chest simultaneously  depicts  the  undesirability  of  encountering  other  persons  as  mere objects, and  the danger of accessing  their hidden  inner,  subjective states, which  is 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depicted ultimately as a sort of  tyranny,  in keeping with Hazlitt’s view of Burkean sympathy.  As farce, X.Y.Z. plays upon surfaces. While the chest remains a central figure, the  etymology  of  “farce”  is  at  play  in  the  treatment  of  its  hidden  space.    Farcire means “to stuff,” and is connected to food, as in to fill a pie.  This elicits the way that farce  is  functioning  in X.Y.Z.,  filling  the  interior  space  of The  Iron  Chest  through  a metaphor linked to consumption. The inaccessible quality of interiority ceases to be a  problem  as  interiority  becomes  undesirable.  Characters  in  the  farce  answer  the threat of sympathetic violation by striving to become objects, and like the pathetic objects  of  gothic  novels  they  want  to  influence  without  being  influenced,  to  be spectacles  without  being  spectators.  Exteriority  has  come  to  refer  to  interiority. These plays want to fill the interiority, do away with the difference and through the manipulation  of  reputation,  do  away  with  reference—the  thing  is  the  thing.  This amounts  to  playing  on  “figure”  just  as  the  plays  play  on  “character.”  Figure  as  a figure of speech that moves, and figure as a material thing with shape. In wanting to become and “object,” a material thing that matters, the characters want actually to be  a  figure  in  both  senses—able  to  move  without  being  penetrable.  Reputation, though vexed, offers a way of knowing characters and making ones own character known  that  is  an  alternative  to  violent,  Burkean  sympathy,  and  a  way  of manipulating  the  market  of  identity  by  becoming  objects  of  consumption  rather than consumers. Hazlitt  describes  the  desire  for  character  to  become  entirely  social,  to become  a  name  even  to  those whom  one  knows  personally,  effectively  removing 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ones person, which I take to mean inner self, from the equation entirely. He writes that “the desire to be known by name as an author chiefly has a reference to those to whom we are known personally,  and  is  strongest with  regard  to  those who know most of our persons and least of our capacities” (“On Different Sorts of Fame, 1816). This point of view is replayed in X.Y.Z. during the interview between Grubbleton and Alldross.    Grubbleton, mistakenly  believing  that  Alldross  is  trying  to  get  a  higher dowry  tells  him:  “As  your  object  goes  to  her  personal  accomplishments  only,  I should hope that would content you;” showing that personal accomplishments are of a lower order than a recognizable name (39). To become an object requires entering into a set of social relations.  Marriage is an act by which one is legally joined to another. Bray’s desire for marriage is both a  literal  and  symbolic  of  a  yearning  for  a  fixed  and  recognizable  identity  that  can only come about through entrance into the public, social sphere.  Bray expresses his desire, or at  least his recognition of  the need to emerge  from his private state, his bachelorhood in an exchange with Mrs. Mouser.    MRS. M.  Well, Squire, success to X. Y. Z. BRAY.  “I’m tired of being I by itself, I do assure you” (9). This pun on  “I”  should bring  to mind Hempseed,  and  it  is  apparent  that  “X.Y.Z.”  a cluster  of  letters,  stands  here  for  the  marriage  enterprise  while  “I  by  itself”  is bachelorhood. Just as the move from singular to plural creates a shift from subject to object in Hempseed’s strange grammar, the entrance into social relations is a move that will give Bray the identity he wants.   The  term  “character”  functions  in  the  same  way  that  “object”  does  above. While  objecthood  can  be  argued  for  abstractly,  character  is  something  that  has 
 147 
apparent  value  in  itself—which  is  what  I  have  claimed  it  is  to  be  an  object.  But character  too  depends  on  social  relations.  The  following  exchange  between  Mrs. Mouser and Betty can be read straight and make perfect sense.   MRS. M.  Don’t be impertinent‐‐‐how do you expect I can give you a  character?     BETTY.  I’m to be married on Monday, and then I can live without one. Mrs.  Mouser  is  of  course  talking  about  a  letter  of  reference  when  she  says “character.”96 This makes clear that what one is doing when one writes such a letter is  in  fact  giving  character,  once  again  reinforcing  the  theme  that  character  is something  dependent  on  social  relations.  Betty  does  not  need  to  worry  about getting her character from Mrs. Mouser because she is to be married. Her statement is working ambiguously:  she does not need a letter of reference because she will not be looking for another job; and she does not need Mrs. Mouser to give her character because she  is entering  into a new social  relationship which will provide her with one, i.e. the commercial role of female character is to enter into marriage.     The  exchange  between Mrs.  Mouser  and  Betty works  on  yet  another  level that reinforces the importance of written language in both plays. “Character,” in Mrs. Mouser’s line is meant to stand for a letter of character, but of course a character is a letter. This punning equation of  character and  letter  is  significant and points once again  to  the  fact  that what Colman has  in mind when he writes about character  is reputation, or name. This  is something  that  is  formed  in  the public eye and which can be manipulated by those who are shrewd enough to see how it is accomplished.                                                         96 In The Economy of Character, Deidre Lynch looks at the significance of this play on character in her analysis of the trope of character as a thing that circulates. 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Alldross  describes  some  people  of  this  sort:  “I  live  at  the  Garrick’s  Head,  in Bowstreet,  with  a  parcel  of  fallen  Stage  Heroes,  who  still  struggle  for  fame,  by paragraphs of praise occasionally popt by  themselves  into  the prints, and get new engagements”  (20).    There  is  more  to  this  utterance  of  Alldross’  however.    The Garrick’s Head  is  a  coffeehouse,  the  second of which  to appear  in  the play  though this  one  indirectly.    The  popping  of  “paragraphs  of  praise…  into  the  prints,”  is  a recurrence  of  the  same  phrase  used  by  Bray  to  describe  the  marriage  proposal, evidence that these two acts are meant to be seen as analogous. Ostensibly,  Bray’s  object  is  marriage  and  he  has  come  to  taking  out  an advertisement  for a wife  in  the paper because he  is  too  “timbersome”  to  “pop  the question”  in  person.    But Bray’s  shyness  has more  to  do with  a  fear  of  the public than of women.       MRS. M.  We must cure you, Squire, of this shyness; London is a rare       Place for assurance, company, public places, and‐‐‐     BRAY.  Public places!  Lord love you, that will never do! But  a  newspaper  is  very  public  thing,  as  is  a  coffee  house.    Bray  need  not  have submitted  his  advertisement  in  person,  nor  gone  to  the  coffee  house  to  pick  up correspondence; a man of two thousand a year could very well have sent a servant.  It might be argued that this was another precaution taken to protect his anonymity, but then, why tell Mrs. Mouser everything?  What strike me as most contradictory in George  Colman’s  XYZ  are  the  apparently  contradictory  desires  of  the  character Neddy  Bray  to  be  simultaneously  anonymous  and  identifiable.      Either  of  these desires would be unremarkable on its own but paired create a tension that demands unraveling.   I mean to argue that the contradiction here is only a seeming one.   By 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signing his ad “X.Y.Z.”, Bray is withholding that which he desires; he wants a name and sets about achieving it by entering into the public eye, by way of the newspaper and the coffee‐house.   Whereas  in The Iron Chest  language  is a way of deliberately shaping ones public persona and potentially covering up a less than desirable inner self, in X.Y.Z. the inner self is out of the equation, there is only social character so to enter into print is to define oneself entirely.   The  coffee  house  is  the  most  public  of  places  as  it  is  the  place  where periodicals are circulated and  letters are received.   Bray’s entrance  into  the coffee house for the first time is part of his scheme to obtain a marriage, but symbolically the two acts are the same.  Consider that the coffee house is called “Slaughter’s” and that  Betty  is  marrying  the  butcher.    By  entering  into  the  public  realm,  Bray  is becoming a character, an object.     Bray  describes  the  elaborate  lengths  he  went  to  when  he  submitted  his advertisement for a wife to the Morning Post: “I took it to the office, with the money, myself.    I  went  in  a  Brutus  wig,  and  a  barouche  great  coat;  so  I  defy  ‘em  to  tell whether  I  was  a  fine  gentleman,  or  a  hackney  coachman”  (7).    Bray  appears determined  to mask  his  personal  identity  and  his  social  standing.    He  enters  the coffee house dressed in a strange combination of upper, and lower class apparel as if by  failing  to  fall  neatly  into  a  category  he  might  frustrate  identification,  or  even make  it  impossible  as he  suggests.    Identity by  clothing  is  the  theme  that  Samson embraced  in  The  Iron  Chest.    Clothing  becomes  costume  and  person  becomes performer.    The  mix‐up  of  Bray’s  and  Alldross’  letters  serves  to  draw  a  parallel between  the  husband  and  the  theater  director,  the  wife  and  the  actress.    The 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correlation between society and the theater serves to make the case that character is really the same thing as a role in a play.    It makes sense in this instance that he would make an effort to disguise his social  status  since  it might  allow  an  observer  to  identify  him  as  the writer  of  an advertisement that is quite explicit in expressing the financial standing of its author.  In the ad, Bray is careful not to name the county in which his properties lie for fear that  he might  be  identified.    This  desire  for  anonymity  seems  to  disappear when Bray visits Slaughter’s Coffee House—instead, he is upset by it.  “I declare, somehow, coming into a coffee‐room, for the first time in one’s life, and where nobody knows one has two thousand a year, landed estate, quite dashes a body” (23, 24). This is all too evocative of what Hazlitt has  to say about  the unique character of  the London coffee‐house:  London  is  the  only  place  in  which  each  individual  in  company  is treated according to his value in company, and to that only.  In every other  part  of  the  kingdom  he  carries  another  character  about  with him, which  supersedes  the  intellectual  or  social  one.    It  is  known  in Manchester or Liverpool what every man in the room is worth in land or money; what  are  his  connections  and  prospects  in  life—and  this gives  a  character  of  servility  or  arrogance,  of  mercenaries  or impertinence to the whole of provincial intercourse.  You laugh not in proportion  to  a man’s wit,  but  his wealth;  you  have  to  consider  not what, but whom you contradict.              “On Coffee‐House Politicians,” 1822.  Bray  does  not  truly  desire  anonymity;  he wants  to  be  known  as  he would  be  on Hazlitt’s  account,  in  the  country.    Still,  it  is  not  his  inner  self  that  he wants  to  be known by, but by a different model of social character.   In reading the switched responses to their advertisements Bray and Alldross each  interprets  according  to  his  own  set  of  values,  which  correlate  with  the 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respective scheme of character held by each.  Bray reads geography into each line of the  letter  he believes  to  be  from his  future wife while Alldross  reads  theater  into what he takes to be a letter from a potential member of his acting troupe.     ALLD.  May I take the liberty of asking your name?     BRAY.  I don’t see why I should tell him (aside) I am X.Y.Z. at        Slaughter’s Coffee‐House.     GRUB.  Are you?  If that’s the case, then, pray, sir, who the devil are        you all this while?  (To Alldross.)     ALLD.  X.Y.Z. at Slaughter’s Coffee‐House‐‐‐that’s an imposter.     GRUB.  Two X.Y.Z.’ds! X.Y.Z. has become a verb at this point in the play, and a transitive one, showing that both Bray and Alldross have  indeed become objects.   But neither has attained  the sort  of  character  that  he was  seeking.    Both have been  reduced  to  an  anonymous sequence of letters, totally lacking any meaningful character.  To be X.Y.Z.’d is to be commoditized by the newspapers.97 In Slaughter’s, Bray moves through a rapid sequence of identities determined this time, not by clothing but by location, in keeping with the overall tendency of the play to locate identity in the external, and for Bray to assign identity to geography.  Identity  becomes  not  only  external  and  geographic,  but  tied  to  consumption  and economics.    Customers  in  being  identified  by  their  orders  have  lost  not  only interiority, but name  too.   This  resembles  the association of  identity with clothing observed above but it goes a step further in the externalization of character.  It does so by way of comsumption, by the internalization of the social identity.  Bray enters the capillaire box, drinks the capillaire, and that identity has invaded his body.  But                                                         97 In describing the way that poems became commodities in the newspapers, Judith Pascoe adds “the newspaper poet could also become transformed into a product for sale, a ‘personality’ with additive celebrity status” (171). 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this  identity  assumption  is  not  lasting.    Bray  gets  up  and moves  to  the  next  table where  he  assumes  another  identity  and  the  process  is  repeated.    The  dynamic  of identity of  location  that  takes place  in  the  coffee‐house  is different  from  the  tying together of character and clothing is different because the distinction between inner and outer becomes permeable, making it unlikely that performativity could be said to play a part in the same way that it has above.    The  London  coffeehouses  were  notably  democratic  spaces;  people  of  all classes might sit next to one another and engage in conversation.  By the time of the production of X.Y.Z. the popularity of the coffeehouse was already in decline, much of the clientele being lost to the increasing popularity of the social club.   Markman Ellis  gives  an  account  of  Leigh Hunt’s  reaction  to  the waning  of  the  coffee‐house: “‘society’  now  congregates  in  the  pew  at  church  and  the  box  in  the  theatre,  both places in which Hunt finds only a kind of confinement.  He regretted the passing of the  old  coffee‐house, where  ‘there was  a more  humane  openness  of  intercourse’” (Ellis 208).   Bray  says,  “if  I  had  courage  to  swim round  the  room  like  that  chap,  I could get a wife without advertising!” (23).  Colman punningly draws a comparison between  the  coffee  house  and  the  theater  by  using  the  language  of  the  latter  to describe  the  former.    An  unhappy  customer  complains,  “there’s  the  worst attendance in this house” (23).  There is something that keeps Bray from being able to enjoy the “openness” of the coffeehouse, an impediment like Hempseed’s stutter.  It  is  his  lack  of  an  essential  self.    Harkening  back  to  Hazlitt’s  description  of  the London coffeehouses,  it  is clear  that Bray  is exactly  the type of person who would not fit in there.   
 153 
 
Conclusion Colman’s  plays  illuminate  the  influence  of  economics  upon  contemporary models of  subjectivity.   Private spaces are not honored  in X.Y.Z., Mrs. Mouser uses her extra keys to rifle through the rooms and desks of her lodgers, showing that all that  is  left  is public.   This points  to a shared anxiety over  the potential  threat of a burgeoning new culture to stable notions of  identity.    In the commercial economic setting of X.Y.Z. character becomes a commodity and essential character disappears.  Colman  clearly  intends  X.Y.Z.  as  a  critique  of  the  conditions  of  contemporary economics, which might not render such loss of inner self  inevitably, but set up an environment in which the peril of such an occurrence is immanent.   At the same time, Colman satirizes the atavistic longing for days past.  Philip Connell  has  described  Romanticism  as  “an  alternative  strain  of  social  criticism, which aligned  itself  in opposition  to  the new sciences of  society”  (Connell 5).   But this  claim  is  suspect  given  that  the  chief  purveyor  in  the  present mix  is  Edmund Burke, a figure to whom Godwin, Hazlitt, and Colman react negatively. Neddy Bray stands  for  this  atavistic  position  that  refuses  to  let  go  of  a  feudal  model  of subjectivity.  Through Bray, Colman shows that the essential self of the feudal model is  not  the  self‐authenticating  thing  it  purports  to  be  but  derives  authority  from connection  to  objects  such  as  land,  or  lord.  In  this way  the models  of  subjectivity presented in The Iron Chest and X.Y.Z. are not as dissimilar as they first appear to be.  In both systems authentic identity depends on connection to a sort of object; in one 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system  that  object  is  material  property,  and  in  the  other,  it  is  an  image  created through the circulation of print.    Colman’s  adaptation of Godwin’s novel  turns out not  to be  apolitical,  as  he had  claimed,  rather  it  joins  in  Godwin’s  attack  on Malthus  based  on  the  issue  of individual  rights. Malthus  claims  that  the  poor  have  no  "right"  to  complain  about their  situation  or  to  receive  government  support  because  “the  inevitable  laws  of nature” determine their situation. Much of Malthus'  first edition of  the Principle of 
Population  was  meant  as  a  refutation  of  Godwin's  theory  of  the  perfectibility  of society.98 Malthus claimed that Godwin's perfect society would,      …from the inevitable laws of nature, and not from any original        depravity of man, in a very short period degenerate into a society      constructed upon a plan not essentially different from that which      prevails in every known State at present; I mean, a society divided      into a class of proprietors, and a class of labourers.                 (Essay on Population, 1798)   Basically the idea is that without checks on population growth in the form of misery, starvation,  and  vice,  society  would  realign  itself  on  the  basis  of  class  even  if  it reached Godwin's perfect society for a moment. Godwin responds by taking Malthus to task for denying the individual rights of the poor based on his "inevitable laws of nature." He writes: "it is not the Law of Nature. It is the Law of very artificial life. It is                                                         98 In Enquiry concerning Political Justice (1793), Godwin argues for the perfectibility of the humanity on the grounds that there are no innate principles, and therefore no original propensity to evil. Godwin writes: "our virtues and our vices may be traced to the incidents which make the history of our lives, and if these incidents could be divested of every improper tendency, vice would be extirpated from the world." All control of man by man was more or less intolerable, and the day would come when each man, doing what seems right  in his own eyes, would also be doing what  is  in fact best for the community, because all will be guided by principles of pure reason. 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the Law which ‘heaps upon some few with vast excess’ the means of every wanton expence  and  every  luxury,  while  others,  some  of  them  not  less  worthy,  are condemned to pine in want” (Essay on Population 1820).   Hazlitt attacks Malthus in a way that resonates with the themes of Colman’s plays:  it  connects  literally  to  consumption,  since  it  has  to  do with  food,  and with Malthus's  assumptions  about  class  organization  that  inform  his  beliefs  about  the economics of food consumption, i.e. Hazlitt argues that Malthus puts forward what he  purports  are  "natural"  laws  about  population  that  are  actually  reifications  of existing categories of class (“Malthus and the Liberties of the Poor” 1819). In effect, Hazlitt  claims  that Malthus's world  of  scarcity would not  be  a  problem  if  the  rich would simply consume less. Hazlitt also seems to rely on sympathy      For my part, I place my heart in the centre of my moral system. I do      not look on the poor man as an animal, or a mere machine for        philosophical or political or economic experiments. I know that the      measure of his suffering is not to be taken with a pair of compasses or      a slip of parchment.  In  response  to Burke’s  tyrannical  sympathy, which effectively equates  concern  for others with self‐interest, and to Malthus’s complete lack of it, Hazlitt asserts a kind of  sympathy  that  maintains  particularity.  But  in  order  to  do  so,  he  must acknowledge that we are disinterested, and somewhat estranged from ourselves. In his Essay on the Principles of Human Action (1805), Hazlitt argues that self‐interest depends on the imagination, as we have no more present access to our own future states than we do to the subjective experience of others. Therefore when we do act in the interest of our future selves, or in the interest of others, it is with disinterest, as it can bring us no present pleasure. This move establishes the possibility of a kind 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 In  order  to  review  the  central  issues  addressed  in  this  dissertation  more clearly I turn now to the essayist and critic, Charles Lamb. In his writings under the pseudonym  Elia  for  The  London  Magazine  he  constructs  an  imaginary  figure  to engender sympathy in the estranged situation of the periodical market. Though this situation  is  in  many  ways  the  opposite  of  the  theater,  the  aim  of  pathetic involvement is the same. But where the pathetic figure in Otway’s and Bank’s plays might  be  called  the  embodiment  of  rhetorical,  the  figure  in  Lamb’s world  of  print attempts to simulate the experience of embodied presence.  Lamb shows a concern in  the  relation  between  theater  and  print  that  suggests  the  two  share  common interests,  and his preference  seems  to  vacillate.  In his  essay,  “On  the Tragedies of Shakespeare,”  (1811) Lamb argues  that  the best  qualities  of  Shakespeare's  drama can  be  fully  appreciated  only  through  reading:  according  to  Lamb,  stage performances often diminish the plays’ meanings, and  individual performers often misinterpret Shakespeare's  intended characterizations, which makes clear  that  for Lamb the authority of judging should be kept seated in the individual. The material differences  between  theater  and  print  are  most  marked  in  the  situation  of  the periodical.  But  the  conditions  of  the  latter  amplify many  of  the  difficulties  of  the former.  The  challenges  faced  by  the  dramaturgist  to  engage  his  crowd  through pathos are made clear by the situation of the periodical writer. In the guise of Elia—
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a persona adopted  for his writing  in  the London Magazine, Charles Lamb recounts his “First Play.” What is on the surface a nostalgic account of youthful experience is actually  a  sophisticated  analysis  of  the workings  of  sympathetic  engagement.  The essay  opens with  a  description  of  the  place where  the  author witnessed  his  first play, a place that has since changed.    At the north end of Cross Court there yet stands a portal, of some      architectural pretensions, though reduced to humble use, serving at      present for an entrance to a printing‐office. This old door‐way, if you      are young, reader, you may not know was the identical pit entrance to      old Drury, ‐‐Garrick’s Drury, ‐‐all of it that is left.  The doorway’s decline goes beyond the reduction from theater to printing‐office. It is  a  slide  from  the  particular  association  with  Garrick,  to  the  anonymity  of mechanism and business. At the same time it is a step down from the associations of the  pit,  with  the  class‐based  organization  of  theater  audience  to  the  invisible readership of printed text. And when,  later  in the essay, Elia tells his reader of the change that occurred between his first visit to the theater as a child, and his next as an  adult,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  decline  of  the  doorway  stands  a  figure  for  a decline in his capacity to enter into the drama: “I had left the temple a devotee, and was  returned  a  rationalist.”  Lamb  looks  at  the  theater  in  order  to  reflect  on  the conditions  of  sympathy  in  periodicals.  Now  I  will  look  at  his  examination  of  the limits  of  sympathy  in  the  periodical  market  in  order  to  reflect  on  pathos  and situation in the theater. Charles  Lamb’s  essay,  “Imperfect  Sympathies,”  makes  a  point  about  the status  of  sympathy  in  the  context  of  periodical  culture  through  its  expression  of outright  prejudice—sympathy  becomes  problematic  as  the  reader  becomes 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consumer  and  judge.  Read  in  the  context  of  the  August  1821  issue  of  the  London 
Magazine  Lamb’s  essay  functions  as  a  satire  of  notions  of  sympathy  that  run throughout  many  of  the  magazine’s  other  pieces.  Frequently  evoking  and undermining  articles  that  precede  it  by  no  more  than  a  few  pages,  “Imperfect Sympathies” argues indirectly that sympathy must inevitably be attended by apathy and  antipathy  and  that  the  unspoken  truth  about  sympathy  is  that  its  function depends  on  exclusion,  and  in  doing  so  “Imperfect  Sympathies”  systematically reduces  to  absurdities  the  foundational  ideological  principles  of  the  London 
Magazine.99  “Imperfect  Sympathies”  begins  with  a  passage  from  Sir  Thomas  Browne’s 




beast at all.100 In stark contrast to Browne’s position is Elia’s confession in which he equates sympathies with taste: …I  do  feel  the  differences  of  mankind,  national  or  individual,  to  an unhealthy  excess.  I  can  look with  no  indifferent  eye  upon  things  or persons. Whatever  is,  is  to me a matter of  taste or distaste; or when once it becomes   indifferent,  it  begins  to  be  disrelishing.  I  am,  in plainer  words,  a  bundle  of  prejudices—made  up  of  likings  and dislikings—the veriest thrall to sympathies, apathies, antipathies.                 (Lamb 67)  Elia’s  “imperfect  sympathy”  might  be  seen  as  an  exaggerated  response  to  the passage from Browne; indeed, his particularities seem to grow more idiosyncratic as his  meditation  progresses.  Elia’s  reduction  of  sympathy  to  entirely  a  matter  of aesthetic preference is strongly driven home when he justifies his antipathy for “the Negro,”  explaining  that  it  is  “—because  they  are  black”  (Lamb  72).  But  this superficial  basis  for  sympathy  is  not  so  far  removed  from Browne’s  position  as  it seems  to  be.  In  fact,  the  author  of  the  passage  from  Religio  Medici  describes  his freedom from national prejudices as a lack of the feeling of “repugnance.” This might then  be  construed  as  evidence  that  the  author  has  no  taste  and  that what  at  first appeared a claim to virtue  is a confession that he  is  lacking that which is required for him to enter into the elect community of The London Magazine. The import here is that while The London Magazine might purport to be a cultivator of sympathy in the “perfect” sense, what it actually accomplishes is a sympathy of exclusivity. That is  to say that the only real sympathy it generates  is between imagined figures:  the 
                                                        100 The elect reader, perhaps Coleridge and a few other of the author’s intimates, would have known of Lamb’s great fondness for Browne and thus have recognized the ironic tone of the piece immediately. 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reader and the author, and between the reader and other imagined members of the community of London Magazine readers.   In  a  footnote  Elia  tells  the  reader  that  “[he  has]  met  with  [his]  moral antipodes, and can believe  the story of  two persons meeting (who had never seen one another before in their lives) and instantly fighting” (Lamb 67). Thus, he briskly and  offhandedly  lampoons  the  romantic  conceit  of  the  second  article  in  the magazine, “Zariadres and Odatis; a Grecian Story,” a tale of two lovers who dream of one another and each fall in love with the other’s vision, “as if by divine sympathy,” before they ever meet in person. Here again the impact of the satire is not merely to make  its  object  appear  ridiculous,  but  to  reveal  its  darker  side  as  well.  If  it  is possible  to  fall  in  love  and  wed  without  knowing  anything  of  the  other,  then  its opposite is equally possible, and equally foolish. Since the relationship between the periodical  author  and  his  audience  cannot  be  other  than  that  of  Zariadres  and Odatis,  Lamb calls  into question  the project of  the London Magazine  to  cultivate a sympathetic relation with its audience. Or, is this a trick? “Imperfect Sympathies” is filled with pessimism about the possibility of creating an affective union between an anonymous public and a writer, but this might be seen as something other than a complete dismissal of a project in which  Lamb was  earnestly  engaged.  Likely  Elia’s  confession would mark  the  first point in the piece, if not the magazine, at which a large portion of the audience truly sympathizes  with  the  sentiments  of  the  author.  Elia’s  confession,  clearly  absurd, marks the piece as satire and allows the reader to understand how he is to proceed. The reader can see that Lamb is engaged in a self‐reflexive criticism of the periodical 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in  which  his  work  appears  and  because  he  recognizes  the  satire  as  such,  feels included.  In  his  influential  work,  Jon  Klancher  describes  a  transformation  in  the English  reading  public  that  took  place  in  the  late  eighteenth‐century  from  one  in which  readers  and  writers  might  imagine  changing  places,  to  one  in  which  the distinction between the two roles becomes quite clear even as the identities of the players  cease  to  be.  Citing  Arnold  Hauser,  who  describes  a  state  in  which  books begin to be published for consumption by a “general public completely unknown to the  author”  and  presents  this  relationship  as  one  that  “correspond[s]  to  the structure  of  middle  class  society  based  on  the  anonymous  circulation  of  goods” (Klancher  19).  The  periodical  sought  to  establish  a  more  reciprocal  relationship with its public than books could provide as the former allowed for exchanges in the form  of  letters  and  contributions  from  its  readers.  The  authenticity  of  these contribution  is  often  dubious,  which  is  a  key  point  about  periodicals  such  as  the 
London Magazine,  they  operate  in  a  realm  of  the  dubious,  acting  as  imitations  of themselves, creating imaginary situations.   Klancher explains that part of the work of the periodical was to construct an audience. Reflecting on the determining effect of audience on letter writing, Manning writes in a letter to Charles Lamb: “I can no more write  the  same  thing  to  two people,  than  talk  the  same  things  to  ‘em…  I  am now writing satire, you see—presently  ‘twill be morality,  for my  friends,  to wit, & then Nonsense,  for  the choise  few!!!”  (109‐110). The London Magazine demands of Lamb that he establish the illusion of a sympathetic relationship with his audience 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that is at least superficially the same as that which he shares with a choice group of friends. Jonathan Swift gives a similar account of sympathy in A Tale of a Tub (1704) where  he  describes  it  as  a  resonance  that  unites  a  privileged  group.  We  must imagine  that  he  is  describing  the  bond  between members  of  the  Scriblerian  Club when he writes of “a peculiar string in the harmony of human understanding which, in  several  individuals,  is of  exactly  the  same  tuning”  (Swift 81). This  is  the  sort of community that the periodical is attempting to establish, but Swift goes on to argue in a shot that seems aimed straight at the heart of the audience‐forming project of the periodical, that it  is madness for one “to conceive it  in his power to reduce the notions  of  all mankind  exactly  to  the  same  length,  and  breadth,  and  height  of  his own” (Swift 80). The  author  of  an  “Epistle  to  Elia,”  which  also  appears  in  the  August  1821 issue of The London Magazine describes a longing to commune with Elia. The author describes his desire to sit with Elia in a club‐like atmosphere in terms that illustrate the mirroring function of the act: “I would, that eye to eye it were my lot/ To sit with thee,  the  chafing world  forgot”(LM  1821).  A  sort  of  narcissism  is  revealed  in  this concretized depiction of  the act of  sympathy. And  the author  reveals  the way  that this act functions even later when       …the sun finds us mix’d with common men.       But this brief night remains; a thing to tell       And re‐enjoy; a mirth‐provoking spell       To call up sympathies in other hours.  Surely  this  sort  of  sympathy  cannot  function  if  ones  constitution  makes  no distinction between men,  let  alone  things as  it makes no  sense without  setting up 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the distinction between the exclusive community and “common men.” But of course this is exactly the sort of letter that Lamb would have sent to his friend and frequent correspondent,  Thomas  Manning.  In  fact,  the  appeal  of  calling  “up  sympathies  in other hours” recalls Lamb’s  first  letter  to Manning.101 There  is something  ironic  in the  author’s  desire  to  sit  eye  to  eye  with  a  fictional  character,  that  is,  until  one realizes that in this has been achieved through the letter’s insertion into the pages of the London.  Charles  Lamb  was  at  once  acutely  aware  of  and  largely  resistant  to  this changing literary market. His relation to writing runs the gamut from one extreme to  another.  Jane  Aaron  describes  the  intensely  intimate  literary  relationship between Charles and Mary Lamb:  “they  lived  together, wrote  together,  ‘writing on one  table’”  (Aaron 2). This on  the one hand  represents  the  ideal  scene of writing: responses are immediate, without delay or distance. Here the writer and the reader are immediately interchangeable. Somewhere slightly outside of the Edenic scene of textual sympathy yet still far removed from the wilderness of an anonymous public audience  lies  the exchange of  letters between Lamb and his close circle of  friends: Coleridge, Manning, and Wordsworth.  A  theme  that  runs  through  many  of  Charles  Lamb’s  Elia  essays  is  the dependence  of  a  coherent  idea  of  the  self  on  a  process  of  reflective  interchange between  the writer  and  an  audience.  In  “Distant  Correspondents”  Charles  Lamb’s literary  alter  ego,  Elia,  bemoans  the  temporal  gap  in  communication  that  comes                                                         101 Lamb writes: “Will it be agreeable to you, if I occasionally recruit your memory of me, which must else soon fade, if you consider the brief intercourse we have had?” (I.119) 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when  letters  have  to  travel  further.  Elia’s  impatience  at  delays  in  “Distant Correspondents” might be seen as an instance of autobiography as it has a corollary in real life. After waiting two weeks for a response from his friend Thomas Manning, with none forthcoming, Lamb impatiently sent another letter, this time in triplicate, demanding to know why his  friend had not yet answered. This gives some  idea of the importance of these letters to Lamb—but the question is why? The significance of textual exchange might be understood in terms of the  idea of sympathy. Lamb’s reflections  on  writing  presume  the  notion  put  forth  by  a  line  of  English  social philosophers  from  Shaftesbury  through  Burke  that  the  self  is  essentially  social. Hume tells us “man is altogether insufficient to support himself,” and that we cannot even  experience  joy  unless  we  share  it  with  another,  and  as  Burke  puts  it  in somewhat more bitter terms, society is what gives us relief from “the positive pain of  solitude”  (Burke  67).  In  all  cases  sympathy  is  the  invisible  force  that  creates community and thereby makes the self in some sense complete. For Lamb sympathy becomes  a  matter  of  language.  The  exchange  of  written  texts:  letters,  books, magazine  articles,  serves  as  the means of producing  sympathy. Writer  and  reader depend on the mediating text to engender a sympathetic relation with the imagined other in order create a sense of community and of completeness.  This point  is made clearer when Lamb begins  the essay,  “My Relations,” by ruminating  on  the  inevitability  of  oblivion.  Lamb  emphasizes  that  oblivion  comes not with the death of the body, but when one has faded from the memory of one’s friends. Once again there is a corollary in Lamb’s private writing. In his first letter to Manning,  Lamb  asks  “will  it  be  agreeable  to  you,  if  I  occasionally  recruit  your 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memory of me, which must else soon fade (I, 164). This view makes clear that the self to some degree exists in the minds, or in the selves, of others. The self then, in the  Elia  essays  is  something  largely  constructed  through  exchanges  between  an author and his audience. However, delayed exchange is an inevitable characteristic of  the  printed  text  and  it  is  dubious  indeed  whether  the  sort  of  sympathetic exchange  through  writing  which  has  been  outlined  above  can  exist  once  writing enters the market. The  delay  in  the  exchange  of  letters  interrupts  the  reflective  process  of sympathetic  communion  between  friends,  and  prevents  their  work  of  self‐completion.  A pun  is  reflected  from a  friend’s  face as  from a mirror. Who would consult his sweet visnomy,  if  the polished surface were two or three minutes (not to speak of twelve‐months, my dear F.) in giving back its copy?               (Lamb 122)  Sympathy suggests interchangeability—Burke describes it as “a sort of substitution, by which we are put into the place of another man” (Burke 70). In the exchange of letters roles switch back and forth, hence Lamb’s mirror metaphor. The pun, being what  is  reflected,  itself  suggests  a  double  nature;  a  word  that  plays  on interchangeable meanings.  The pun  stands metonymically  for  the  interchangeable relationship  between  writer/readers,  and  the  point  that  the  currency  of  textual exchange  as  Lamb  moves  from  epistolary  to  journalistic  writing  ceases  to  be sympathy and becomes money instead.   Texts serve as tokens of exchange in what moves from a community to a market of affective identification.  Lamb’s  public  deployments  of  affective  exchange  in  the  setting  of  the magazine incorporate his private correspondences. Lamb follows up a letter written 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to  Manning,  who  was  then  in  China,  in  which  he  had  exaggerated  the  sorts  of changes his friend could expect to find when he returned home, including the deaths of many of  their acquaintances, with  the explanation  that  “A correspondence with the  uttermost  parts  of  the world  necessarily  involves  in  it  some heat  of  fancy”  (I. 358).  If  Lamb might  forge  the deaths of  friends  and  acquaintances,  then Elia  very well might  imagine  the  death  of  the  underlying  principles  of  the London.  And  the motivation might be seen as the same—delayed response. In this case, there can be no  response  and  in  a  hopelessly  non‐reciprocal  relationship,  Lamb  resorts  to pretending  to  tear  down  and  distance  himself  from  the  project  to  which  he  is attached. It is the fancy that is most important—in order to make sympathy work he must construct a fiction, Elia. Lamb points  to  a  contradiction  in  the way  that  sympathy  can work  in  this context of the market oriented periodical. While the ostensible aim of the periodical is  to  create a  sense of  the  sort of natural  sympathy espoused by Swift,  it  can only really  produce  the  illusion  of  such,  one  that  is  achieved  through  “some  heat  of fancy”.  Here  we  should  consider  the  creation  of  the  figure  Elia,  not  only  as  a rhetorical strategy for the promulgation of sympathy among a faceless public, but as a means for the author to achieve the effects of sympathy as well. In the Elia essays, Lamb  simultaneously writes  to multiple  audiences:  distant  and  near,  strange  and intimate.  In  “Distant Correspondents” Elia  tells his  reader  that what  is  true  in one situation  does  not  necessarily  hold  in  another.  Something  of  Lamb’s  layered rhetorical strategy can be seen  in his  letter  to Manning:  “I mean to confess myself nearer  to  truth  as  you  come  nearer  to  home.” Most  readers will  pick  up  some  of 
 168 
Lamb’s hints and see that Elia is not always telling the truth. The nearer the reader is to Lamb, the better equipped he is to read through the fictions, and to see that the lies are really puns.   Just as Lamb’s letters depend on his readers picking up on the play of puns, allusions, and irony, the Elia essays connect with readers through to the extent that they get the jokes. If Lamb might be imagined to have a perfect sympathy with any “distant correspondent” it is with Browne.102 And an elect reader would know that the  claim  for  universal  sympathy  in  Religio  Medici  is  troubled  quite  a  bit  by Browne’s  following  the  passage  given  to  us  by  Elia with  a  statement  of  complete self‐sufficiency, which serves to render sympathy dubious. Browne writes: “I am no plant  that will  not  prosper  out  of  a  garden. All  places,  all  airs, make unto me one country;  I  am  in  England  everywhere,  and  under  any  meridian.”  Browne’s  self‐sufficiency could not be  further  removed  from what  the  reader can see of Charles Lamb, or I should say, of Elia, who explains:  There  is  an  order  of  imperfect  intellects  under which mine must  be content to rank… The owners of the sort of faculties I allude to, have minds rather suggestive than comprehensive... They are content with fragments and scattered pieces of truth.                       (Lamb 68)  Elia confesses to his incompleteness, but his incompleteness is meant to fit like the piece  of  a  jigsaw  puzzle  into  the  sympathetic  needs  of  both  Lamb  and  his audience.103  Charles  Lamb  solves  the  problem  of  sympathetic  completion  in  the                                                         102 In fact, a Harvard honors thesis about Lamb’s relation to Browne entitled A 
Perfect Sympathy was published in 1937.  103 In his volume of Lamb’s letters, Alfred Ainger includes a “Sonnet to Elia” written by John Hunter of Craigcrook which had appeared in Friendship’s Offering, 1832. 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periodical  market  through  a  pun  and  a  lie,  or  a  pun  on  a  lie.  The  creation  of  a fictional  figure,  standing  as  an  affective mediator  present  in  the  text,  allows  both author  and  audience  to  identify  with  the  same  figure  thereby  a  sympathetic community is born. De Quincy asserted that Lamb had “the dramatic intellect and taste, perhaps in  perfection,”  (“Charles  Lamb,”  1848).  This  brief  chapter  suggests  the appropriateness of De Quincey’s observation on Lamb’s intellect. Lamb was keenly attuned to key issues of theatricality and how they extended to issues of print. His productions  in  The  London  Magazine  create  the  effect  of  a  “dramatic  intellect.” Lamb’s writing explores the importance of situation and immediacy in the exchange of sympathy with the conditions of the literary periodical amplifying the challenges of the dramatist to engage a crowd sympathetically. Lamb’s strategy of constructing a persona in order to achieve sympathy sheds  light on the function of the pathetic figures  used  by  Otway,  Banks,  Gay,  and  Lillo.  These  figures  create  a  nexus  of affective  exchange.  Character,  in  the works  of  these  dramatists  functions within  a                                                           Thou Gentle Spirit, sweet and pure and kind,   Though strangely witted—“high fantastical”—   Who clothest thy deep feelings in a pall   Of motley hues, that twinkle to the mind,   Half hiding, and yet heightening, what’s enshrined   Within; ‐‐who by a power unknown to all   Save thee alone, canst bring up at a call   A thousand seeming opposites, entwined   In wondrous brotherhood—fancy, wild wit,   Quips, cranks, and wanton wiles, with deep sweet thought,   And stinging jests, with honey for the wound;   All blent in intermixture full and fit, ‐‐   A banquet for the choicest souls : ‐‐can aught  Repay the solace which from thee I’ve found? 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situation  of  pathetic  exchange.  Like  Charles  Lamb’s,  Elia—punning  on  “a  lie,”  the pathetic  figure  was  not  meant  to  be  a  realistic  character  so  much  as  a  fictional construct to facilitate the circulation of sympathy. 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